Iran claim clouds Turkey's energy goals By Robert M Cutler
MONTREAL - An Iranian official's declaration that his country has entered into
negotiations with European firms about the supply of natural gas into the
Nabucco pipeline intended to supply Europe via Turkey was rejected this week by
one of the firms concerned.
Reuters quoted the managing director of the state National Iranian Gas Export
Company as echoing last month's statement by former German chancellor Gerhard
Schroeder (president of the North Stream project that seeks to take Russian gas
under the Baltic Sea to Germany for distribution to the rest of the European
Union) that the Nabucco project could not succeed without Iranian gas.
However, a spokesman for German energy company RWE reiterated in reply that
"Iranian gas is not necessary" to the pipeline, adding that "Iran is not [even]
a potential member of the
consortium" and that political conditions remain "unfavorable" for cooperation
with the country.
This most recent skirmish in the war of press releases came after Turkey signed
an agreement to invest US$3.5 billion in the Iranian energy industry, including
production of gas from Iran's South Pars field. The agreement would in
principle allow the Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO) to capture some of the
gas produced for export to Europe.
Yet it is far from clear where the capital for investment will come from during
the current worldwide economic crisis, which affects Turkey as well. Even
governments in Europe are encountering difficulties in finding financial
resources for their energy projects, and Ankara's own investment projects in
southeastern Anatolia lack funding.
Meanwhile, a separate statement from the Turkish side mentioned that progress
had been made in negotiations with Azerbaijan for the supply of gas from
Azerbaijan to Turkey. Although this appears to refer to the ongoing dispute
over price over the current contract (see
Azerbaijan and Turkey clash over energy, Asia Times Online, October 23,
2009), such progress, if it is real, holds implications for future
Turkey-Azerbaijan cooperation over Nabucco.
As Baku is delicately playing Ankara off against Moscow as a potential
large-volume consumer, so Ankara has responded by seeking to play Tehran off
against Baku. Thus Turkey threatens to use Iran rather than Azerbaijan as the
preferred transit country for gas from Turkmenistan for its own domestic
consumption and/or onward re-export to Europe through Nabucco.
Indeed, it has come to light in the press that, in view of the on-again
off-again understandings with the EU over commercial and legal questions (see
Nabucco is still alive, Asia Times Online, July 3, 2009), Turkey wishes
to purchase gas at its own northeastern border, then sell it on its western
border. This creates potential difficulties insofar as Turkey, being owner of
the gas, could then choose to withhold it for domestic consumption or simply to
hold it in the Lake Tuz storage facilities that Gazprom three months ago agreed
to build for Turkey.
Another agreement concluded during a visit by Turkish Prime Minister Recep
Tayyip Erdogan to Tehran calls for a $2 billion investment to construct a crude
oil refinery in northern Iran, likewise with an eye towards exports to Europe.
In the 1990s, some Kazakhstani oil was exported to Neka, in northern Iran on
the Caspian Sea. However, these were "swaps" in return for which Tehran
exported equivalent amounts of its own production from its own ports on the
Gulf in the south.
Moreover, the Kazakhstani volumes were never very great, partly due to the high
sulfur content of the Tengiz crude (a problem eventually overcome in
principle), but also due to Astana's accumulated dissatisfaction with the
Tehran bureaucracy's failure to execute in a timely and businesslike fashion.
Some production of oil in Turkmenistan's offshore sectors today goes to
northern Iran, but it is very low-volume. As a result of these and other
issues, it is therefore difficult to adjudge this project for a crude oil
refinery exporting to Europe as realistic.
There is a distinction between Turkey's seeking economic cooperation and
advantage from Iran and its seeking to be a tribune for Iran's interests. Yet
this distinction is not implemented in practice by Turkish diplomacy: thus, for
example, Erdogan castigates permanent members of the UN Security Council who
advocate implementing sanctions on Tehran for its non-fulfillment of previous
resolutions in the sphere of nuclear activities.
Such declarations, together with other recent developments beyond the energy
sphere, create more than the impression that Ankara sees a strong and defiant
Iran as being in Turkey's own national interest.
Many international observers have noted, for example, that Turkey invited Syria
to participate in joint bilateral military exercises the day after it
disinvited Israel from a joint North Atlantic Treaty Organization exercise in
which it had long participated in the past. It is difficult to reconcile such
moves with Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu's insistence that Europe remains a
main axis of Turkey's foreign-policy doctrine and international orientation.
Dr Robert M Cutler (http://www.robertcutler.org), educated at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology and The University of Michigan, has
researched and taught at universities in the United States, Canada, France,
Switzerland, and Russia. Now senior research fellow in the Institute of
European, Russian and Eurasian Studies, Carleton University, Canada, he also
consults privately in a variety of fields.
(Copyright 2009 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please
contact us about
sales, syndication and
republishing.)
Head
Office: Unit B, 16/F, Li Dong Building, No. 9 Li Yuen Street East,
Central, Hong Kong Thailand Bureau:
11/13 Petchkasem Road, Hua Hin, Prachuab Kirikhan, Thailand 77110
