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US-CHINA: QUEST FOR
PEACE
Part 9: Potential tragedy of
miscalculation
Opinion by Henry C K
Liu
Part 1: Two nations, worlds apart
Part 2: Cold War links Korea, Taiwan
Part 3: Korea: Wrong war, wrong place, wrong
enemy
Part 4: 38th Parallel leads straight to
Taiwan
Part 5: History of the Taiwan time bomb
Part 6: Forget reunification - nothing to
reunite
Part 7: The referendum question
Part 8: Avoiding another no-win war
US calculations on military intervention over
Taiwan rest on strategic considerations. The MacArthur
doctrine of the military importance of Taiwan to US
interests in Asia had been framed in a Cold War
geopolitical context of a hostile China - that was a
given. In the new post-Cold War geopolitical context,
the US military advantage from hanging on to Taiwan is
more than neutralized by the creation of a resultant
hostile China out of a friendly one, foreclosing the
prospect of a strategic partnership for a stable Asia.
Cordial US-China relations would spell more security to
the United States than US control of Taiwan could ever
offer.
Thus the United States has no intrinsic
strategic interest in Taiwan, except diplomatic
credibility that may affect US strategic defense
commitments to Japan and South Korea. US policy on
Taiwan, disguised as defense for democracy and
capitalism, is really held hostage to the traditional
Japanese view of the importance of Taiwan for Japanese
security. Taiwan is the only pro-Japanese territory in
Asia. and it will be its first objective in future
expansion into Southeast Asia. US policy planners argue
that if the United States should define Taiwan in terms
of Japanese security interests, as theater missile
defense (TMD) implies, and subsequently fail to defend
that very strategic interest, Japanese rearmament may
well result. Yet Japanese interest in Taiwan is framed
in threats from non-Asian sources, not from China, whose
proximity to Japan is further north.
De facto US
occupation of Taiwan does not serve Japanese long-range
national interest. Japan is much more interested in
resolving the North Korea nuclear issue with the
cooperation of China and would not complicate the
problem with Japanese opposition to Chinese control of
Taiwan.
On the other hand, if Taiwan moves
toward independence, even if without Japanese support,
it will spark Japanese ambitions toward it over time,
not to mention immediate Chinese action. Thus the
optimum solution for the United States may well be an
early accommodation with China, before the growing
divergence of US-Japan interests escalates, so that the
return of Taiwan to China may be viewed by Japan as a
neutral development in terms of Japanese security and
national interests.
US intervention in any armed
conflict over Taiwan will involve US bases in Japan.
That will force Japan to choose between a hostile
relationship with China and the existing US-Japan
alliance and its strategic interests in Taiwan. How
Japan will choose is by no means clear or predictable,
and the US might be taken aback, just as Washington was
shocked by Ankara's refusal to allow the United States
use of its bases in Turkey in support of the Iraq war.
Japan has been trying to shift gradually from its now
unhappy economic dependence on the US, with which
contentious trade disputes have been intensifying and
satisfactory resolutions appearing more remote over
time, by developing alternative markets and economic
relations in Asia, particularly China, and in Europe.
Japan would be drawn into Taiwan
conflict
Japan cannot escape concluding that the
Asian financial crises of 1997 were caused - if not
engineered - by US-led finance globalization and dollar
hegemony and that Japan has been a collateral victim
while the US has been a happy beneficiary.
The
immediate threat to Japan during the Cold War was the
Soviet Union, the dissolution of which changed the basis
of the US-Japan defense alliance. Japanese security
issues with North Korea and China may in fact be simpler
with a reduced US presence, by deflecting anti-US
sentiment from Japan. Both the left and the right in
Japanese politics oppose the US-Japan defense alliance.
The left does not wish to see Japan dragged into a war
in Asia merely to defend US interests, while the right
opposes the defense treaty as an insulting obstacle to
Japan's sovereign right to rearm. Japan is now using US
pressure to send Japanese troops to Iraq as an opening
for Japanese military independence. Just as the nature
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has
changed after the Cold War, the US-Japan defense
alliance faces a very uncertain future.
Taiwan
may well be the focus for Japan to address its future
security options. Thus it is natural for China to
consider it imperative to reach an understanding with
Japan independent of US positions over Taiwan, as China
has begun to do with Europe.
The United States,
Japan and China have a common interest to manage the
Taiwan issue and the North Korea nuclear issue to
prevent a destructive unraveling of the Asian-Pacific
strategic balance, resulting in an unending
confrontation between the US and China, similar to the
situation with Cuba, Iran, Iraq or worse, and/or a
breakdown in the US-Japan alliance, and/or a
re-emergence of hostile regional rivalry between Japan
and China. The US is facing enormously difficult
problems in the Middle East, in the Persian Gulf, and
increasingly with a problematic Russia, a challenging
European community and a populist Latin America. With
such a global range of pressing problems, with the
support of traditional allies such as France, Germany
and Japan becoming more conditional on the US curbing
its unilateralism, and an open-ended global "war of
terrorism", the US does not need China as an added
enemy.
The US insistence on molding China in its
own image as a condition for a constructive relationship
is foolhardy. Yet US leadership has been timid in
shepherding public opinion away from demonizing China.
Deep-rooted US antagonism toward China has forced all US
administrations since 1949 to bypass normal diplomatic
and institutional channels in their dealings with China,
at times with an energetic White House that even cut out
the State and Defense departments, let alone Congress
and the press.
This style of foreign policy
unfortunately leaves US policy on China devoid of
broad-based support or even understanding. Thus
Washington's China policy has been allowed to fall
victim to the peculiar dynamics of domestic politics and
the whims of energetic policy wonks, the latest being
the neo-conservatives. Many US analysts rightly
criticize China for being inept in its handling of the
US Congress, popular opinion, and US religious groups.
Yet the responsibility for nurturing this faulty Chinese
perspective traces back in no small way to an arrogant
White House that saw foreign policy as its imperial
prerogative. China has become a political football in US
presidential elections every four years, with the
sitting administration, Republican or Democrat, targeted
by the opposition for being soft on China diplomatically
and economically.
Promoting China's
dismemberment weakens the region
US attempts to
defuse rising Chinese national capabilities through its
clandestine support for separatist forces will not
succeed, because China will resist such development at
all costs. A policy of fragmentation or dismemberment of
China, by encouraging its breakup into independent
regions and provinces, is a contradiction in logic. A
weak China that can be dismembered is a threat to
everyone, so a policy of fragmentation to reduce a
so-called China threat is not only unnecessary, it will
in fact bring about chaos that will threaten regional or
even global stability. In fact, a US policy to fragment
China would be a guarantee to ignite precisely the kind
of Chinese super-nationalism that its enemies are
interested in avoiding. The "Open Door" policy of US
secretary of state John Hay worked out that logic a
century ago.
New China's national purpose is one
of redressing a century of national victimization under
Western imperialism and its residual reincarnation in
neo-liberal globalization. Until the current order of
residual imperialist exploitation is redressed, no
Chinese government can accept the status quo and expect
to stay in power for long. China's national interests
lie in a rightful fulfillment of Chinese "manifest
destiny" to balance its rich traditional culture with
modern scientific technology. It involves a renaissance
of Chinese culture and societal values in the socialist
vision of Da Tong (great commonality). It involves the
justifiable recovery of territories lost under the age
of Western imperialism.
China, by political
logic and by virtue of its size and long history, is
entitled to major-power status and deserves the
acknowledgment of that status by all. It seeks to expand
its rightful influence in international institutions and
forums that make decisions economically and
strategically for the region and the world. China's
destiny is being fueled by a revival of popular
nationalism and renewed confidence in its cultural
heritage. Any government that does not respond to these
national aims cannot govern China for long. Any foreign
government that does not acknowledge this Chinese
destiny cannot hope for good relations with China.
A new US policy of containment of China will be
counterproductive and futile. Such a policy will
unnecessarily create a hostile China and force it again
into the role of a garrison state. Asian governments
would no longer support such a US policy in the
post-Cold War world. Yet former US president Bill
Clinton's policy of "constructive engagement" was based
on a dubious objective: changing China through "peaceful
evolution". That policy required the militarization of
the peace, by using trade as an ideological weapon of
moral imperialism. It purports to change China in
America's image by engaging it with trade. In the end,
neither trade nor peace was served by this policy.
President George W Bush has retreated from his
strategic-competitor posture on China since the US
launched the "war on terrorism".
Now the
Democrats are demonizing Chinese monetary and economic
policy as the cause of joblessness in the United States,
rather than structural defects in US-engineered
globalization. Just as US domestic politics caused the
blunders of the Korean War and the hostile containment
of China for half a century afterward, US domestic
politics will set the course of US-China relations for
the coming century - and the fate of Asia and the world.
Recovering Taiwan the centerpiece of China's
security
Security threats faced by China in a
multipolar world have not diminished. The main threat
has shifted now to the form of ethnic separatism, mainly
orchestrated by US interests in the name of freedom,
human rights and democracy, at least up to the launching
of the current "war on terrorism". This is why the
recovery of Taiwan is a sine qua non of Chinese
national security. Increasingly, China recognizes
economic development as a key tool in combating ethnic
separatism, not political suppression. Historically, a
prosperous China attracted fringe ethnic groups seeking
to join the center for obvious benefits, and a poor
center feeds centrifugal forces toward separatism. Much
of Chinese history had been devoted to efforts to keep
out envious neighboring ethnic groups.
Current
policies in both Washington and Beijing are locked on a
collision track. An excessively hostile and belligerent
approach to China in general and the Taiwan issue in
particular will reinforce the prospect of China
concluding that war with the United States is
unavoidable. Recent official government and military
contacts between the US and Taiwan are viewed by China
as direct violations of the three communiques. Bush's
reference to Taiwan as the Republic of China in a
televised press conference soon after his inauguration
was undeniably provocative. On the other hand, excessive
appeasement on the part of the current Chinese
leadership toward US belligerence will only reinforce
former US secretary of state George Shultz's notion of a
helpless China without options, causing the US to push
its anti-China policies even harder. The danger of
miscalculation in both capitals is very real. No Chinese
government can survive the independence of Taiwan, nor
can peace in Asia or even the world.
Just as
Washington ignored repeated messages from China about
its intention to enter the Korean War in 1950 to the
detriment of all, the Taiwan issue is shaping up to be a
potential tragedy of miscalculation. The ideal solution
is a peaceful solution. But there is no doubt that if
military conflict is necessary, China will use it,
regardless of cost. Recent US policy on Taiwan appears
to be based on a momentous miscalculation of this fact.
It is a miscalculation that would lead to a military
conflict with no winners. China can learn lessons from
the way president John F Kennedy handled the Cuban
missile crisis in order to preempt a nuclear
confrontation with the Soviet Union.
The way to
prevent US miscalculation over Taiwan is through
credible Chinese brinkmanship. The new Chinese
diplomatic offensive against US hegemony by
strengthening bilateral ties with the European Union,
Japan, Egypt, Libya, Iran, Venezuela, India and African
nations should be a warning to US policymakers on the
geopolitical irony of their anti-China policies.
Allowing the historical conditions of Taiwan to
hamper a constructive relationship between China and the
United States is to lose the future in pursuit of the
past. For China to pursue a course of domestic economic
development and adopt a policy of promoting peace and
stability, the Taiwan issue has to be settled first.
Further delay will only raise the final cost and make
peaceful resolution more difficult.
The Taiwan
and the Korea situations are two dangerous military
flashpoints in the complex and challenging foreign and
defense policy issues facing the United States in the
Asia-Pacific region. The North Korea nuclear issue
cannot be solved without Chinese cooperation. While it
is obvious that the denuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula is in the interest of all, the Taiwan problem
had its origin in US intervention in the Korean civil
war and the Korean nuclear issue, and like that other
conflict, the Taiwan issue is a product of the
unfinished Korean civil war.
US-Taiwan
defense ties undermine China ties
There is no
more sensitive issue in US-China relations than the
Taiwan issue. Moreover, the US-Taiwan defense
relationship is the most controversial aspect of that
relationship. The Bush administration's policy toward
Taiwan, at least in the first term, is markedly
different from the Clinton administration's position, at
least in its second term. On defense issues, President
Bush's policy has clearly moved from one of "strategic
ambiguity" to one of greater "strategic clarity".
Even before the last US presidential election,
the Republican Party platform, which was ratified by the
GOP (Grand Old Party) in Philadelphia in August 2000,
stated: "Our policy is based on the principle that there
must be no use of force by China against Taiwan. We deny
the right of Beijing to impose its rule on the free
Taiwanese people. All issues regarding Taiwan's future
must be resolved peacefully and must be agreeable to the
people of Taiwan. If China violates these principles and
attacks Taiwan, then the United States will respond
appropriately in accordance with the Taiwan Relations
Act. America will help Taiwan defend itself."
The platform added in a separate section of the
document: "Taiwan deserves America's strong support,
including the timely sale of defensive arms to enhance
Taiwan's security." Secretary of State Colin Powell, in
his confirmation testimony before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee in January 2001, affirmed: "The
United States will maintain the capacity to resist any
form of coercion that jeopardizes the security of the
social or economic system of the people of Taiwan."
Early in his tenure, President Bush clarified
the US commitment to defend Taiwan. On ABC's Good
Morning America television show on April 25, 2001,
the president stated that if the People's Republic of
China (PRC) attacked Taiwan, the US had an obligation to
defend the Taiwanese. He declared that the United States
would do "whatever it took to help Taiwan defend
itself". Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao told the Washington
Post in an interview last November 21, on the eve of his
first visit to the US: "The Chinese people will pay any
price to safeguard the unity of the motherland."
"Whatever it took" was matched by "pay any
price". In a February 2002 speech to a US-Taiwan
Business Council meeting in St Petersburg, Florida,
Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz noted, "As
President Bush and others have said, the United States
is committed to doing whatever it takes to help Taiwan
defend itself. Our position is clear. We don't support
Taiwan independence, but we oppose the use of force." At
the same conference, Wolfowitz and James Kelly,
assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific
Affairs. each met with Taiwanese Defense Minister Tang
Yao-ming.
This was the first visit of a
Taiwanese defense minister to the United States since
the breaking of official relations with Taiwan in 1979.
This meeting established a new precedence in the defense
relationship, and publicly demonstrated a strong US
interest in issues related to Taiwan's security. Other
high-level defense visits have also taken place since
that time. On Taiwan defense issues, the Bush
administration clearly showed much less equivocation in
policy than in the past.
Consistent with
long-standing US policy, while the Bush administration
supports a "one China" policy as stipulated in the three
Sino-US joint communiques and acknowledges that Beijing
views Taiwan as a part of China, it does not itself
accept that view. Thus officially, the "one China"
policy supported by the US is not identical to China's
"one China" policy. Adherence to the 1979 Taiwan
Relations Act (TRA, Public Law 96-8) is fundamental to
Bush administration policy. The TRA mandates arms sales
that allow Taiwan to "maintain a sufficient self-defense
capability".
More specifically, in terms of the
US-Taiwan defense relationship, the administration
believes this means maintaining a military balance
across the Taiwan Strait through the provision of arms,
military services and training to Taipei. The TRA also
states that any attempt by the PRC to settle the Taiwan
issue by military means, including by boycott or
embargo, would be considered a threat to the peace of
the region and a matter of grave concern to the United
States.
The biggest change from long-standing
policy is the administration's belief that fulfilling
former president Ronald Reagan's 1982 secret "Six
Assurances" to Taiwan is an important element of US
policy. The Six Assurances were conveyed to Taipei as a
result of the August 17, 1982, Sino-US joint communique,
in which the United States pledged that it "does not
seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to
Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed,
either in qualitative or quantitative terms, the level
of those supplied in recent years ... and that it
intends to reduce gradually its sales of arms to Taiwan,
leading over a period of time to final resolution". On
this basis, the PRC argues that the US should no longer
be selling arms to Taiwan at all.
Next: US heading down the wrong path?
Henry C K Liu is chairman of the New
York-based Liu Investment Group.
(Copyright
2004 Asia Times Online Co, Ltd. All rights reserved.
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