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2 Buffer benefits in Spratly
initiative By Cheng-yi Lin
Taiwan's President Chen Shui-bian
re-ignited passions over the South China Sea's
Spratly Islands with his visit to disputed area
earlier this month. Both Taiwan (ROC) and China
(PRC) legally claim sovereign rights over the
Spratly archipelago, composed of islets and reefs
in the form of a U-shaped line based, on the same
assertion that they are historically Chinese
waters.
Yet his visit was accompanied by
proposals for future joint research and other work
by the islands' claimants, which, though difficult
to implement for diplomatic reasons, underscore an
important benefit of Taipei's involvement in the
area - it effectively maintains a Taiwan presence
between its Southeast Asian maritime neighbors and
mainland China.
Neighboring countries,
including Vietnam, Taiwan and the PRC
have
competing claims over the Xisha (Paracel) Islands
in the north of the South China Sea; Vietnam,
Taiwan, Brunei, the Philippines, Malaysia and the
PRC have competing claims over the Nansha (Spratly)
Islands to the south. Taiping
(Itu Aba) Island - the largest of the Spratlys
(0.18 sq miles) and about 1,000 miles southwest of
Taiwan - together with the Tungsha (Pratas)
Islands - about 260 miles southwest of Taiwan -
have been under the control of Taiwan since 1956
with its military presence, facilities and
administrative measures to safeguard its
territorial claims.
On February 2,
President Chen boarded an Air Force C-130
transport plane and - for the first time by a
Taiwanese president - landed on Taiping Island,
which was followed by a trip to Tungsha Island on
February 10, Chen's third such visit since
assuming office in 2000. The other claimants to
the Spratlys have expressed their concerns over
the Taiwanese initiative of building an airstrip
with a 3,800-foot-long, 100-foot-wide cement path
on Taiping Island, which began in 2005.
Taipei claims that the airstrip could
supplement coastguard facilities on the island for
emergency and humanitarian relief operations.
Ecologists and some Kuomintang (KMT) lawmakers in
the opposition party were critical of the
government's plan to construct the airstrip on the
Taiping Island, while proponents of the airstrip
argue that it will reinforce Taiwan’s
long-standing assertion of sovereignty over the
disputed waters and legal claim to maritime
rights.
An airstrip or President
Chen? Taiwan was the first of the claimant
countries to establish a military presence and
exercise effective jurisdiction over the Spratly
Islands after World War II. The PRC, the latecomer
in this island-grabbing race, started its first
occupation of Yongshu Jiao (Fiery Cross) in 1988.
For several decades, PRC scholars and
experts expressed in private their appreciation
toward Taiwan for safeguarding the Taiping Island
by maintaining a constant patrol of the South
China Sea before Beijing first set its foot on the
Spratlys. Taiwan's management of its policy toward
the South China Sea, however, is far from
impressive.
Taiwan's policy toward the
South China Sea from the 1970s to the 1990s was
one that could be characterized as self-restrained
and moderate. When islands claimed by the
Taiwanese government were occupied by other
claimants, Taiwan did not take concrete military
actions but simply issued diplomatic notes to
protest the encroachment on its territory.
In comparison with the airstrip built by
Vietnam on Nanwei Dao (Spratly Island, 2,000
feet), Malaysia on Danwan Jiao (Swallow Reef,
5,000 feet), and the Philippines on Chungye Dao
(Pagasa Island, 4,000 feet), Taiwan and China are
the only two claimants that did not maintain an
airstrip on the Spratlys until this year. Neither
did Taipei strengthen its military projection
capability in the Taiping Island as China and
Vietnam have done since 1988, the year when the
PRC entered the Spratlys and ignited a naval
standoff with Vietnam.
In 1999-2000,
Taipei surprised many countries when it announced
that it was downgrading its military presence on
Taiping and Pratas Islands [1]. At its peak, the
number of stationed troops reached 500. In
February 2000, the jurisdiction of these islands
shifted from the Ministry of National Defense to
the Coast Guard Administration. Subsequently,
Taiwan also reduced the number of marines
stationed on these islands, but added some coast
guard personnel to deal with fishery disputes on
the adjacent waters and security safeguard
measures.
Taiwan still maintains and
operates its air defense and heavy machine guns on
these islands, though there are only 10 stationed
military troops on its occupied island - in
addition to 190 coast guard personnel - compared
with 90 for Malaysia, 100 for the Philippines, 600
for the PRC and 2,000 for Vietnam [2]. Taipei's
move to reduce the number of troops on the islands
was not reciprocated by the other claimants, who
did not indicate any willingness to take similar
steps in seeking a peaceful resolution for the
region with Taiwan.
Contrary to the false
notion held by Beijing that Taipei was trying to
forfeit its claim of these two islands to the PRC
or to Association of Southeast Asian Nations (of
which Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam and
Brunei are members) in order to claim the
statehood of Taiwan, Taipei's tactical moves were
mainly due to the absence of a clear grand
strategy toward the South China Sea and a
streamlined defense structure. Security analysts
of all stripes were critical of the government's
decision and seriously urged the Taiwanese
government to re-examine its apparently misguided
policy.
Construction of an airstrip to
bolster Taiwan's claim and efficient occupation of
Taiping Island had long been a pet project of
security analysts in Taiwan. President Chen first
raised the idea of branding Taiwan as a maritime
nation in 2000, although his major focus was not
on the South China Sea but on cross-Strait
relations with the PRC.
Only after Chen’s
re-election in 2004 and the release of the
National Security Report in 2006 did the ruling
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government
start to emphasize the importance of maritime
interests, which is regarded as one of the major
security concerns facing the country.
The
report urges the government to elevate the status
of maritime affairs' decision-making and to
"utilize oceanic resources for sustainable
development, interact with other democratic
maritime countries, and together respond to
threats from the sea" [3]. Subsequently, the
decision-making body on the South China Sea also
shifted from the Ministry of Interior to the
National Security Council in 2006.
In
addition to building communications infrastructure
and harbor facilities on these two islands, the
DPP government opened up Tungsha Island to charter
tourism and made the island the sixth national
park of Taiwan in 2007. President Chen visited
Tungsha on three occasions, first in December 2000
then in July 2005 and lastly this February. The
readjustment of control from the Ministry of
National Defense to the Coast Guard Administration
might help smooth further infrastructure
development of the Pratas and Taiping islands
since 2000.
Reactions from other
claimants Chinese Foreign Ministry
Spokesman Liu Jianchao avoided direct comments on
President Chen's historic trip to Taiping Island,
and only stated that "China has indisputable
sovereignty over the Nansha Islands and adjacent
waters. Taiwan is an inseparable part of Chinese
territory. China is willing to solve the South
China Sea disputes through friendly consultation
with relevant countries and work with them to
safeguard peace and stability there."
China took an uncharacteristically
low-profile position on its usual interpretation
that any airstrips or facilities in the South
China Sea that were built by Taiwan also belong to
the PRC. Beijing's calculus is that the airstrip
could indirectly bolster the Chinese presence in
the region vis-a-vis other ASEAN claimants.
Beijing designated the National Institute
for South China Sea Studies in the Chinese island
province of Hainan as the focal point for any
contacts - and as counterparts to discuss the
South China Sea issue - with the Institute of
International Relations at National Chengchi
University in Taiwan. Delegates from the National
Institute visited Taipei in November 2007 and in
discussions indicated no major concern over the
construction of the airstrip on Taiping Island.
They also avoided revealing any undergoing
development between China and ASEAN for the
finalization of a Code of Conduct in the South
China Sea, although it was expressed that if the
other
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the Nansha (Spratly)
Islands to the south.
