Page 2 of 2 China seeks an Afghan stepping-stone
By Tariq Mahmud Ashraf
well as a rail link, a fiber optic communications link and energy pipelines. He
also suggested the possibility of extending the proposed Iran-Pakistan-India
(IPI) gas pipeline to China.
Interestingly, on the same date that Musharraf made this speech, the Indian
government announced the visit of its petroleum minister to Islamabad to
negotiate the possible extension of the proposed
Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan (TAP) gas pipeline to India and renaming it
as the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline.
Although senior Pakistani leaders have repeatedly alluded to the
proposal for the construction of an oil and gas pipeline connecting Pakistan
and China, there has been no official response or statement yet on this
suggestion from the Chinese leadership. Despite the evident potential of the
TEC that Pakistan has to offer to China, the latter has, at the declaratory
level, shown only marginal interest in the idea till very recently when China
has started evincing a strong interest.
Notwithstanding China's reticent and non-committal position on this specific
proposal, it is continuing support and participation in the major
infrastructure projects in Pakistan that could be construed to be components of
the TEC. China's commitment to the construction of Phase II of Gwadar port, the
new international airport at Gwadar, the upgrading of the KKH and interest in
investing in an oil refinery and storage facilities are examples that
substantiate the Chinese interest [12].
This involvement of China in major infrastructure development in Pakistan leads
to the assumption that while there is no categorical commitment on the TEC by
China, it can be said with some confidence that it will support Pakistan's
initiative, while maintaining a low profile, because of political and strategic
considerations. For ease of analysis, the proposed TEC could be split into two
distinct sectors for development: a Trade Corridor and an Energy Corridor.
The Trade Corridor's starting point is the existing Karakoram Highway. A
decision to upgrade the 335 kilometer KKH was taken during Musharraf's visit to
China in February 2006. The envisaged upgrade would widen the KKH from 10 to 30
meters, make it suitable for long vehicles and allow it to remain functional
the entire year. In parallel with the KKH upgrade, China is also involved in
the construction of a new rail line linking Gwadar to the main Iran-Pakistan
rail line and is working with Pakistan to expedite customs over the
Sino-Pakistani highway with a view to creating a stronger regional trade
system.
On the Chinese side, a new extension of the Xinjiang railway up to Kashgar
(about 500 kilometers via the KKH from the Sino-Pakistani border) has been
completed while Pakistan has reciprocated by building a dry port at Sust on the
KKH, which was inaugurated by Musharraf on July 4, 2006 [13]. In another
related development, Iran has offered Pakistan land access through its
territory to Central Asia and Afghanistan for trade in return for similar
access to China through the KKH [14].
A railway line along the KKH is also being considered as an integral part of
the TEC project. This would be used not only for trade purposes but also to
transport energy, in case a pipeline is not a viable option. This rail track
will be linked to Gwadar, where oil-refining and storage facilities are planned
to be constructed by the Chinese. Pakistan has shortlisted a Chinese and a
European firm to conduct the feasibility study for this 1,000 kilometer
rail-track.
In Pakistan, the 750 kilometer track starts from Havelian and passes through
the Karakoram mountains up to the Pak-China border at Khunjerab with the second
part, consisting of a 250 kilometer track being constructed inside the Chinese
province of Xinjiang. Experts estimate that this project could take 10 years to
complete and cost around $5 billion [15].
While the envisaged Trade Corridor comprising of road and rail links could also
be utilized for the transportation of oil and gas, a more efficient means of
transporting these commodities would be through pipelines. These would make up
the Energy Corridor component of the TEC. In an address in Islamabad on May 23,
2006, former Pakistani Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz said, "Pakistan and China
are considering a feasibility study for an oil pipeline from Gwadar port to
western China to transport China's oil imports from the Gulf. An oil pipeline
from Gwadar to western China would greatly reduce the time and distance for oil
transport from the Gulf to China. A major oil refinery at Gwadar would further
facilitate China's oil imports."
The Pakistani government presented a blueprint of the 3,300 kilometer Karakoram
oil pipeline during the first meeting of the Sino-Pak Energy Forum held at
Islamabad from April 25-27, 2006. This proposal entails the construction of a
30-inch diameter pipeline from Gwadar till the Khunjerab Pass capable of
handling 12 million tons of oil per year with an estimated construction cost of
between $4.5 and 5 billion [16].
China has also recently shown interest in reviving the dormant UNOCAL pipeline
project to pump natural gas from Turkmenistan to India through Afghanistan and
Pakistan. This could also then be extended to China just like the
Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) gas pipeline. Additionally, China's Exim Bank is
financing an oil pipeline from Port Qasim in Pakistan's south to the country's
north. This pipeline would cater for 75% of Pakistan's future oil needs and it
has been under construction by China's Petroleum Engineering and Construction
Company since June 2006 [17].
Conclusion
China's strategic interests in Afghanistan are multi-dimensional, but in its
view any substantial advancement in Sino-Afghan ties is contingent on stability
returning to this war-ravaged country and foreign forces withdrawing from its
soil.
Energy-hungry China is also keen on capitalizing on the convenience that
Afghanistan and Pakistan offer for the exploitation of energy resources of
Central Asia and the Middle East, and is working in this direction. As regards
the utilization of Pakistan as a TEC, it appears that while the Trade Corridor
could be expected to be established in the near future, the activation of an
Energy Corridor would take an appreciable amount of time and could only be
considered a long-term possibility because of the enormous costs involved.
For China, therefore, the stability of Afghanistan emerges as a priority while
the prospects of Pakistan becoming a trade corridor are more promising than it
becoming an energy corridor in the short and medium terms. Since the chances of
China using Pakistan as an energy corridor are remote in the short term, it can
be concluded that Pakistan should place equal if not greater importance on
providing TEC facilities to its South Asian, Central Asian and West Asian
neighbors, who are eager to tap Pakistan's TEC potential.
Notes
1. Tarique Niazi, "The Ecology of Strategic Interests: China's Quest for Energy
Security from the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea to the Caspian Sea
Basin," China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Volume 4, No 4 (2006) p 97-116.
2. John W Garver, "China's South Asian Interests and Policies," Sam Nunn School
of International Affairs, Georgia Institute of Technology, prepared for panel
on "China's Approaches to South Asia and the Former Soviet States". US-China
Economic and Security Review Commission, 22 July 2005.
3. Srikanth Kondapalli, "The Chinese Military Eyes South Asia," chapter in
Andrew Scobell and Larry M Wortzel, Eds Shaping China's security environment:
The role of the People's Liberation Army, US Army Strategic Studies
Institute, October 2006. The author has cited this information from the
editorial titled "India Participates in Central Asia" which appeared in Bingqi
Zhishi, Issue 197, No 3, 2004, p 6.
4. See the US Energy Information Administration
5. "America's War on Terrorism and Chinese Strategy," published in China Brief,
Volume 2, Issue 5, February 28, 2002 by the Jamestown Foundation.
6. Sujit Dutta, "China's Emerging Power and Military Role: Implications for
South Asia," Chapter in In China's Shadow: Regional Perspectives on Chinese
Foreign Policy and Military Development, Edited by Jonathan D Pollack
and Richard H Yang.
7. John W Garver, op cit.
8. Asma Shakir Khawaja, "Pakistan and the 'New Great Game'," Islamabad Policy
Research Institute Paper No 5, Published by Asia Printers, Islamabad, April
2003.
9. Significant Potential for Undiscovered Resources in Afghanistan. United
States Geological Survey Report.
10. Tarique Niazi, op cit.
11. Fazal-ur-Rahman, "Prospects of Pakistan becoming a Trade and Energy
corridor for China."
12. John W Garver, op cit.
13. Fazal-ur-Rehman, op cit.
14. Naqi Akbar, "Railways shortlist two companies for China rail link study,"
The Nation, November 16, 2006.
15. Fazal-ur-Rehman, op cit.
16. Ibid.
17. Stephen Blank, "China's recent energy gains in Central Asia: What do they
portend?" CACI Analyst, October 31, 2007.
Tariq Mahmud Ashraf is a retired air commodore from the Pakistan Air
Force. A freelance analyst on South Asian defense and nuclearization issues, he
has authored one book and published over 70 papers and articles in journals of
repute.
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