Asia impacted by US missile shift
By Peter J Brown
United States President Barack Obama and members of his administration are
going to great lengths to explain the reasons why the US abruptly changed
course with respect to its anti-missile strategy for Europe. In the process,
little or nothing has been said about the impact of this new plan on Asia.
Silence or not, both China and Japan must assess the consequences of this
activity because what the US is now proposing for Europe in terms of missile
defense is right in line with what has been unfolding all along in East Asia,
where the US Navy forms the front line for the US missile shield, backed by
land-based interceptors in increasing numbers and a powerful radar network both
on land and at sea.
Last Thursday, Obama announced he was halting plans to deploy
10 missile interceptors in Poland and a related radar in the Czech Republic,a
shield that had been proposed under the George W Bush administration. Instead,
a different missile-defense plan will rely on a network of sensors and
interceptor missiles based at sea, on land and in the air to meet what Obama
called "the most pressing threat from Iran to US troops and allies in Europe" -
potential attacks by short- and medium-range missiles.
United Secretary Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, writing on the op-ed page
of the New York Times at the weekend, made no mention of Asia, for example.
The
new approach to European missile defense actually provides us with greater
flexibility to adapt as new threats develop and old ones recede. For example,
the new proposal provides some anti-missile capacity very soon - a hedge
against Iran's managing to field missiles much earlier than had been previously
predicted. The old plan offered nothing for almost a decade.
Those who say we are scrapping missile defense in Europe are either misinformed
or misrepresenting what we are doing. This shift has even been distorted as
some sort of concession to Russia, which has fiercely opposed the old plan.
Russia's attitude and possible reaction played no part in my recommendation to
the president on this issue.
The US announcement in this
instance appears premature. Why Obama was not advised to hold off on this
decision at least until after his trip to Asia in November is a mystery.
Obama's visit will include an Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in
Singapore, along with calls on China, and probably Japan and South Korea as
well.
When it comes to US economic and national security concerns, China - not Russia
- is Obama's top priority. And North Korea's actions, not Iran's present
posturing, is what has preoccupied US ballistic missile defense (BMD) planners
so intensely over the past five years.
The US decision does not put Asia at risk, but it does not fit well with
current US efforts to improve ties with China at a time when North Korea is
happy to cast itself as the largest dormant volcano in Northeast Asia. Obama is
displaying a lack of predictability, and this weighs on US-China relations.
Making China uncomfortable at this point is not a good idea because Beijing
equates a failure to appreciate the need for predictability with instability,
and perhaps even distrust.
Although China no doubt welcomes the fact that no meeting with the Dalai Lama -
the exiled Tibetan spiritual leader - will take place until after Obama returns
from Asia, China is anxious about the expanding and rapidly shifting US missile
defense network in East Asia.
China's anxiety, especially when the US is doing something which in turn
mirrors the strategic mindset of the US Navy in the Asia-Pacific region in
particular, is not to be taken lightly because too much electricity is already
in the air whenever the two sides sit down to exchange viewpoints.
The extent of the polarization was demonstrated last month when Guan Youfei,
deputy director for China's Defense Ministry's Foreign Affairs Office, and
Randolph Alles, director of the Strategy and Policy Bureau of the US Pacific
Command, along with their respective delegations, met in Beijing to discuss
what has been happening lately in the South China Sea and the Yellow Sea.
"China believes the constant US military air and sea surveillance and survey
operations in China's exclusive economic zone had led to military
confrontations between the two sides," China's Defense Ministry said. "The way
to resolve China-US maritime incidents is for the US to change its surveillance
and survey operations policies against China, decrease and eventually stop such
operations."
Nothing ambiguous there, in stark contrast to the very ambiguous nature of the
latest US announcement. Take a good look at this statement a second time.
"The new approach to European missile defense actually provides us with greater
flexibility to adapt as new threats develop and old ones recede," Gates wrote.
China cannot ignore the fact that by implication, this US emphasis on "greater
flexibility" is not limited to threats in Europe. Furthermore, by making such
an abrupt change of direction in Europe, China must be wondering if the US
might engage in the same behavior right on its doorstep.
Ever since the resumption of the Defense Policy Coordination Talks in Beijing
in February, China has been quite consistent in the messages that it has been
sending to the US regarding renewed military ties, which suffered a serious
setback following the US decision to sell Patriot missiles and other military
equipment to Taiwan.
"China-US military relations remain difficult. We expect the United States to
take concrete measures for the resumption and development of our military
ties," said Qian Lihua, director of the Foreign Affairs Office of China's
Defense Ministry in February.
In early September, Admiral Robert F Willard, Commander US Pacific Fleet,
posted this on his personal blog site: "Our Relationship With China's PLA
Navy". In it, he recognizes the challenges that confront the US as it attempts
to improve relations. [1]
The United States Navy has many partners in
this region of the world, many allies and close navies. There are some that
we're seeking to improve our relations with. One of those is China. There has
been great interest as China has emerged over the past decades in seeking ways
and means to engage with China at all levels of government, to include the
military. This has sometimes been difficult for us. On occasion our
military-to-military engagement has been suspended as a result of political
issues that have arisen between the US and China, and at times our encounters
with Chinese military forces have been less than constructive in nature.
That said, it is incumbent on us and on our counterparts in the PLA Navy, to
seek to leverage areas of common interest and we have many ... We also have to
seek to find the forums to engage and discuss our differences. There are a
number of those. We meet in forums throughout the Asian region including the
Western Pacific Naval Symposium, and others, where we have opportunities to
engage with our Chinese counterparts. And, in those I think it's important that
some of these areas of difference, or differences in interpretation in
international law, come out and be discussed openly.
While
Willard's tone and choice of words are positive and reveal that he supports
what is underway, it is unclear how China gauges the impact of the US decision
in Europe on China's attempts to convince the US Pacific Fleet to be less
intrusive.
Given that the core of the new US anti-missile defense strategy in Europe
involves a layered approach starting with the careful placement of US Navy
BMD-capable, Aegis-equipped warships, and augmented quickly if circumstances
warrant by a surge of additional ships, it looks like China faces an uphill
battle.
At the time of the recent North Korean satellite launch - keep in mind that
many experts have challenged North Korea's depiction of the launch as a
satellite launch as opposed to a long-range missile test - only two US Navy
BMD-capable, Aegis-equipped destroyers out of a total of 15 of this type were
assigned somewhere other than the Pacific. In addition, there were three US
Navy BMD-capable, Aegis-equipped cruisers assigned to the Pacific Fleet, bring
the total to 18 ships in the Pacific.
While plans had been approved previously by the US Department of Defense to
upgrade several more existing warships in this manner, experts are now debating
exactly how many US BMD-capable, Aegis-equipped warships will have to be
reassigned to help defend Europe.
This naval force restructuring triggered by the Obama administration's decision
coupled with the fact that a surge mechanism is built into the overall formula
means that the US Navy's capabilities in this regard will undergo a significant
expansion - sooner rather than later. New ships may have to be built to
accomplish this objective.
Besides possibly expanding the US Navy - navy shipbuilding is a controversial
topic in itself these days - if the Obama administration with its enthusiasm
for sudden moves is so inclined, what is to prevent it from broadening the new
space-related, high-technology transfer agreements signed by India and the US
this summer?
In addition, there is a wild card here in the form of the joint activities
involving India and Israel. While their joint space activities in particular
have been quite limited in scope to date, the US is not doing anything to
restrain India from pursuing this relationship in parallel with other projects
involving the US.
At the same time, the recent announcement that South Korea will soon be
deploying Israel's "Green Pine" anti-missile radar technology - for protection
from short-range missile barrages - only reinforces this notion that all the
pieces are falling into place quickly on China's doorstep, and that the US is
quite active behind the scenes to make sure these things happen.
The anti-missile interceptors sitting in their silos in Alaska make it clear
that Asia is where the US sees the greatest threat to its security, while
critics contend these are little more than a grand and very expensive exercise
in self-deception.
At the same time, China realizes that unforeseen events might drive the US to
pursue other options at very short notice. When it comes to Iran, this means
that the US and its allies need to be quite agile.
"The technology they have at hand is sufficient to embark on an IRBM
[intermediate range ballistic missile] program at any minute if they decide,
but it is still not sufficient to embark on a 10,000 kilometer missile which
would be both capable of delivering a meaningful payload, and small enough and
light enough to be based in silo or upon a mobile launcher," said Uzi Rubin, an
Israeli missile defense expert. "I agree that this is the situation at this
moment. However, this does not preclude the possibility that they are pursuing
further refinement of their technologies such that it will enable them to
develop survivable ICBMs. But all this is speculation."
"There is no evidence that the Iranians are proceeding on an ICBM program,
neither slow nor fast - but then there is no evidence that they are not. [There
are only projections and speculation.] Former president George W Bush chose to
pick the more pessimistic projection because it served his political agenda,
and President Obama chose to pick the more optimistic one because it served his
political agenda," Rubin added.
As for Japan, where a new government is forming, Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama
has been given little time to prepare for this stunning announcement as he
heads to the US this week. He has gone to great lengths this month to assure
the US that despite the need for a few adjustments, Japan values its strategic
relationship with the US. However, now Hatoyama is no doubt hearing a strong
message from members of his own party as well as others in his coalition
government who might find the US sudden change in direction in Europe to be
disconcerting for Japan as well.
Hatoyama is already being pressured by several of his fellow Democratic Party
of Japan (DPJ) members who remind him that he cannot adhere to his campaign
pledge to be an agent for true change in Japan if he does not cut defense
spending, and as long as he continues to uphold the status quo in terms of the
US-Japanese alliance. DPJ member Tsuyochi Yamaguchi, for example, might view
this US decision as another opportunity to remind Hatoyama that the current US
anti-missile umbrella is simply not going to be able to defend Japan in the way
everyone might expect.
On the other hand, Hatoyama might not be open to any attempts to convince him
to question the reliability and performance capabilities of US anti-missile
technology because Japan is fully engaged with the US in the ongoing
development of new ground-based interceptors, among other things. However, the
fact that Poland was abandoned so abruptly, and that a decision was made by the
US to not simply layer all the elements of the new anti-missile system atop the
one already planned is something that is going to be very hard for him to
ignore.
So, as Asian leaders old and new arrive in the US this week for the United
Nations General Assembly meeting, you can bet that they have their own
less-publicized concerns about Obama's decision.
Head
Office: Unit B, 16/F, Li Dong Building, No. 9 Li Yuen Street East,
Central, Hong Kong Thailand Bureau:
11/13 Petchkasem Road, Hua Hin, Prachuab Kirikhan, Thailand 77110
