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Domestic needs shape China's foreign policy
By Tim Summers
HONG KONG - In the run-up to the 60th anniversary of the establishment of the
People's Republic of China (PRC) on Thursday, Chinese President Hu Jintao has
hit the international headlines with some regularity.
His diplomacy has taken him to New York where he delivered the first speech at
the United Nations General Assembly by a Chinese head of state, and took on a
possible global leadership role ahead of international negotiations on climate
change in Copenhagen in December. It then saw him visit Pittsburgh for a key
role in the Group of 20 deliberations on the world economy and in enhancing the
say of emerging economies in global economic management.
This comes after a year when politicians and commentators in
developed economies have sought help from China - whose economy is close to
surpassing Japan's as the world's second-largest - to pull them out of economic
recession. A couple of years ago, many did not expect the PRC's economic clout
to give a greater say in world affairs quite so quickly.
Such talk is in many ways music to Beijing's ears. But this does not
necessarily mean the PRC is where it wants to be internationally, 60 years
after its founding in 1949.
To start with, the current global set up is still seen by many in China as the
result of a prolonged period of US and European hegemony. This is reflected in
the rules which govern the global economy, or international financial
institutions, or the dominance of democracy and human rights in international
discussions around value systems.
From a military perspective the world is still unipolar, and the United States
remains more generally dominant, even if it has lost some of the battle for
global hearts and minds. Beijing's sense that the US was not (yet) prepared to
share the top table with China on an equal basis is partly behind its rejection
of the idea of a US-China "Group of 2" to manage key global issues.
Instead, Beijing talks about multipolarity - a world where there are a number
of centers of power, not one dominant one. This, China's diplomats claim, is
the current trend in global affairs. But Beijing also acknowledges that
multipolarity is still only a goal, not a reality. Moving further in that
direction is therefore an important objective.
Behind China's foreign policy lie major domestic challenges. Overall economic
growth has been rapid, but uneven. Problems of corruption, environmental
degradation and social unrest are well documented. When he addresses senior
meetings of the ruling Chinese Communist Party, Hu Jintao often talks about
uncertainty and instability in world affairs. The desire for a more peaceful
and stable international environment is partly aimed at facilitating the
party's efforts at national development and strengthening, and hence its own
hold on power.
Looking forward, therefore, how will Beijing seek to address the gap between
the status quo and an international environment which better suits the PRC?
First comes active promotion of good bilateral relations across the globe, an
important part of the Hu foreign policy approach. This starts with the current
top dog, the US. Beijing appears generally pleased with relations since Barack
Obama became president. But the recent spat over Chinese tire exports to the
US, and Obama's plans to meet the Tibetan spiritual leader in exile, the Dalai
Lama, later this year, show the underlying tensions.
In contrast, the European Union offers China fewer challenges, but remains
important particularly in economic terms. Japan is also a vital economic
partner. The political relationship between Tokyo and Beijing remains testy,
though the early indications are that the new Japanese government may herald a
phase of improved relations.
Over time, Beijing and Washington have worked closer together over North
Korea's nuclear program. But the deepening of relations with the US also
complicates Beijing's diplomacy with countries like Iran, Myanmar and Sudan,
which are important for Chinese economic interests, but still pariahs in
Washington.
In these areas Russia remains an important geopolitical partner for China,
though there are tensions in this relationship as well - for example, over
growing Chinese economic influence in Russia's Far East - and Beijing still
relies on Russia more than it would like for military technology. What China
will also continue to do, as Hu made clear in New York, is to deepen and
broaden its interactions with developing countries, both for reasons of access
to resource and markets, and as a reflection of its growing global status.
A second strategy is engaging through multilateral institutions. This has
characterized Beijing's approach to many of China's neighbors, with an active
role in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization strengthening its links with
Central Asia, and the use of multilateral economic and security fora fulfilling
a similar function with respect to Southeast Asia. Here, however, neighbors are
nervous about Chinese intentions, and bilateral tensions remain over territory
and resources in what the Chinese call the South China Sea. More generally,
China's resource demands risk creating new stresses, whether in Asia, Africa or
South America.
In other multilateral contexts, China has quietly but clearly pushed for
reform, for example to the International Monetary Fund, to give emerging
economies more clout and reduce the historically dominant role of the developed
world. At the same time, Beijing is keen not to rock the boat, and - as recent
cases in the World Trade Organization show - happy to demonstrate that it takes
a responsible approach to international affairs by working within systems as
they stand. Indeed, its embrace of a capitalist-led globalization lies behind
much of its own economic growth since reforms began in 1978.
This also underlines the fact that China's international freedom to maneuver is
constrained by current economic forces, and Beijing needs to deal with both
existing tensions and new threats (such as the reported al-Qaeda threats to
Chinese interests in Algeria). The Taiwan problem remains unresolved, even
though the atmosphere has improved markedly over recent years. We should not
forget domestic politics either. Nationalist sentiment in China is strong, and
there are voices - occasionally public - calling for a harder line over issues
such as territorial disputes with Vietnam, India or Japan.
The current tensions between China and India - though on the whole the
relationship has improved substantially over the last decade - also remind us
that other emerging economies will compete with China for international space
and influence, at the same time as working with the PRC to further developing
country interests on issues such as climate change.
As the PRC celebrates its 60th birthday on Thursday, China's leaders can
rightly be pleased with where their country stands internationally: a
recognized and serious world power with global interests and relationships. But
they will also be conscious that there is plenty still to do to cement that
position, and to realize a world system which better suits China's interests.
Expect a gradually more proactive foreign policy to be part of this.
Tim Summers, a former British diplomat in China, is now a PhD candidate
researching Chinese political economy at the Chinese University of Hong Kong.
(Copyright 2009 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please
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