Omaha greets an 'unusual visitor' from China
By Peter J Brown
Last summer, the Washington Times reported that "an unusual visitor not seen at
any formal nuclear forces facility since allegations of Chinese nuclear-weapons
espionage surfaced in the late 1990s" had attended the US Strategic Command's
(US STRATCOM) first-ever conference on strategic deterrence which was held in
Omaha, Nebraska in late July.
US STRATCOM which is headquartered at Offutt Air Force Base near Omaha oversees
all aspects of US nuclear warfighting.
Senior Colonel Yao Yunzhu of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) was the
"unusual visitor" in this instance. Yao is currently a senior researcher at
Department of World Military Studies at the Academy of Military Science (AMS).
She joined the PLA in 1970. She holds a master's degree of arts from the
PLA's Foreign Languages Institute, and a PhD in military science from the AMS -
the first woman in China to earn a doctorate in this field of study.
All attempts to contact Yao via China's Ministry of Defense after the
conference were unsuccessful. However, a brief yet cordial reply from Yao
finally came from the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard
University where she is currently a fellow - she previously spent a year at the
School of Oriental and African Studies at the University of London. Yao's
e-mail included a reminder that any contact she might have with the media
required prior authorization from Beijing.
In early October, Asia Times Online was among the first news organizations to
obtain a copy of the official transcript of Yao's remarks in Omaha, and this
writer immediately detected errors in this document. US STRATCOM was informed
of these errors, and yet after a review of the audiotape one more time, the
transcript was deemed accurate. Two days later, however, after viewing the
videotape of her presentation which had better sound quality, US STRATCOM
admitted that the recommended changes to the transcript were necessary.
This revised transcript is mentioned because Yao's remarks have generated lots
of media attention in the past. For example, during a dinner held in early 2007
at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, she became the first Chinese
military officer to comment publicly about the controversial 2007 Chinese
anti-satellite (ASAT) test. Previously, only the Chinese Foreign Ministry had
issued brief statements about the ASAT test.
The Associated Press reported that she said, "My wish is we really want to keep
space as a peaceful place for human beings." She went on to add that China
would like all countries to come to a consensus that space should be used only
for peaceful purposes - "But personally, I'm pessimistic about it," said Yao.
"My prediction: Outer space is going to be weaponized in our lifetime."
Now, given what happened in Omaha, there is some validity to the idea that in
Davos, what she really meant to say was that weapons in space were inevitable
unless the international community made a very serious effort to do something
about the situation. China's efforts - along with Russia - to promote a United
Nations convention banning weapons in space are very consistent and visible.
The US has blocked this effort. It is highly unlikely that Yao and her views on
weapons in space would somehow fail to accurately reflect this stance which the
Chinese government advocates.
Richard Fisher, senior fellow at the International Assessment and Strategy
Center in Washington DC, met Yao in China several years ago. He stressed that
the January 2007 ASAT test followed two or three previous Chinese ASAT tests.
Therefore, what Yao may or may not have said in Davos about space weapons does
not really matter.
"This amounts to the use of 'moral equivalence' to justify what is likely a
long-standing PLA decision to develop active outer space military capabilities.
On this subject and on other aspects of China's intentions with respect to
strategic weapons, it is my sense that Yao knows far more than she is permitted
to reveal," said Fisher.
So why was Yao in Omaha? US Air Force General Kevin Chilton, commander of US
STRATCOM, simply wanted a PLA representative to participate in this symposium,
and she was selected by her PLA superiors to attend.
Chinese military officers cannot visit "sensitive US facilities, including
facilities involved in nuclear-weapon and power-projection capabilities",
according to the Washington Times. However, Yao's trip took her to the Quest
Center which is in downtown Omaha, so she never actually visited US STRATCOM
headquarters. In fact, no PLA officer has ever been to US STRATCOM
headquarters, according to a US STRATCOM spokesman. General Jing Zhiyuan,
commander of China's nuclear forces, has been invited to visit there, but he
has not accepted so far.
"General Chilton is a strong proponent of military-to-military engagement and
dialogue and as such, has invited Chinese military representatives to engage in
several symposia, notably the recent Deterrence Symposium," said this
spokesman. "We anticipate additional engagements and dialogue in the future."
Dr Gregory Kulacki, senior analyst and China project manager for the
Massachusetts-based Union of Concerned Scientist's Global Security Program, is
quite familiar with Yao's work, and he is not surprised that she was designated
to attend this conference in Omaha. She is frequently invited to international
conferences because her overall command of the English language is unusual for
a senior Chinese military officer.
"She is a prolific author, who can write in English, and who submits her work
for publication in English-language journals," said Kulacki. "And, most
importantly, she is a very well-read scholar, diligent in her research and
insightful in her analysis."
Yao quickly registered on the US diplomatic radar screen years ago after a
conversation with former US secretary of state Henry Kissinger which was widely
reported in the press.
"Kissinger is a highly respected figure in China. His praise for her response
to his question elevated her profile," said Kulacki.
Yao attracted considerable attention again months after her ASAT remarks in
Davos when she openly questioned US Defense Secretary Robert Gates at a
regional defense forum in Singapore in mid-2007. This was Gates' first trip to
Asia and the unusual assertiveness of the entire PLA delegation created quite a
buzz at this forum. The delegation was headed by Lieutenant-General Zhang
Qinsheng, deputy chief of the PLA General Staff.
Yao asked Gates, "Do you think there are still any Cold War approaches that are
valid or relevant in coping with US concerns about China in general and about
the Chinese military in particular? Also, do you think there are other
approaches, post-Cold War approaches, that the United States should adopt in
dealing with multilateral relations between China and the United States?"
"The years-long negotiations [with the USSR] played an extraordinarily valuable
role in creating better understanding on both the Soviet and American sides
about what the strategic intentions of each side were; what the strategic
thinking was; what their motives were; where they were headed ... That kind of
dialogue, whether or not it involves specific proposals for arms control or
anything else, is immensely valuable. It is one of the great assets of the
developing military-to-military dialogue between the United States and the
People's Republic [of China]," Gates said.
The US Armed Forces and China's PLA have fundamentally different military
command structures which impacts these engagements and exchanges, according to
Kulacki. The US military has a single commander-in-chief, while the PLA is
governed by China's Central Military Commission, and the US president has
greater latitude in directing these exchanges than the general secretary of the
Chinese Communist Party, who chairs the Central Military Commission.
This difference shapes the perceived prerequisites and expectations of both
sides "in ways that are inhibiting progress", according to Kulacki. United
States military officials who conduct the exchanges have greater
decision-making latitude than their Chinese counterparts. China and the US have
different objectives, too.
"China wants the exchanges to contribute to an improved political climate that
benefits the broader US-China relationship. They are part of a larger,
political strategy directed by the Party leadership. The US wants the exchanges
to produce working relationships on crisis management, and to facilitate
communication at lower levels of the command structure," said Kulacki.
According to Fisher, China's objective here is to make sure that all military
engagement remains in China's favor.
"Think-tanks and academies [which are part] of the PLA, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and Ministry of State Security often deploy 'academics' to US and other
foreign universities. I know of no rigorous assessment of this practice, but I
would be willing to bet their understanding of us has benefited far more than
our understanding of them," said Fisher
In Omaha, Yao sat on a panel with the Russian ambassador to the US as well as
senior active duty and retired military officers from Pakistan, India and
France.
In her concluding remarks, Yao stated that "there are still some factors which
complicate China's nuclear calculations".
She pointed out that China has three new nuclear neighbors, and that tension
across the Taiwan Strait might draw the China and the US into a nuclear
confrontation. As for the development and deployment of US ballistic missile
defense (BMD) systems, she was quite clear.
"[This] threatens the credibility of China's deterrence based on a very small
arsenal and threatens the strategic stability between the United States and
China," she said. Later on, she added that the US BMD system, "may result in a
re-assessment of force components and force size but not in the abandonment of
a policy which has served China's national interests for nearly half a
century".
Yao's comments on the development and deployment of a US BMD system is what
perplexed this writer, and triggered the above-mentioned corrections to the
transcript. According to Kulacki, after the dust settled, Yao did not say
anything new.
"China's strategy presumes nuclear weapons cannot actually be used. They are
psychological weapons, used to coerce and influence behavior, not to fight and
win wars," said Kulacki.
"In this case, what China needs is a force just large enough to give anyone
thinking of using nuclear weapons to attack China an assurance that they can
and will retaliate. Missile defenses are a threat to a small force like China,
because they can be used to mop up whatever might be left after a first strike.
China is modernizing and slightly increasing numbers [maybe] in order to leave
that doubt about invulnerability in the minds of adversaries."
For this and other reasons, it certainly seems as if these exchanges are a very
sound idea.
"Barring another round of arms sale or a decision to go ahead with the October
2008 sale [to Taiwan] by the [Barack] Obama administration, I think these
exchanges will proceed, albeit at a very slow pace," said Dr Jing-dong Yuan,
director of the East Asia Non-proliferation Program at the James Martin Center
for Non-proliferation Studies, and associate professor of International Policy
Studies at the California-based Monterey Institute of International Studies.
"This relationship is most fragile, but at the same time also most important to
nurture and promote given the stakes."
Yao has an important role to play here as one of China's most eloquent
participants in what will certainly be a very difficult and delicate series of
discussions.
"I have met her once. She seems to be one of the people that the PLA has
developed to interact with Westerners on these issues. She accurately reflects
a point of view within the Chinese military," said Dr Jeffrey Lewis, director
of the Nuclear Strategy and Non-proliferation Initiative at the New America
Foundation in Washington DC, is the author of Minimum Means of Reprisal: China's
Search for Security in the Nuclear Age, who added that these "exchanges
have developed slowly, but that is to be expected. This is a very difficult
process."
Yuan cautions that things will not get any easier over the coming months.
"The [US Nuclear Posture Review] later this year or early next and the Pentagon
report on the Chinese military [due out] next spring will pretty define how the
US views China in military terms; this will also incur Chinese reactions,
depending upon the contents of these reports," said Yuan.
Chances are that Yao may be asked to explain those reactions.
Peter J Brown is a freelance writer from the US state of Maine.
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