Page 1 of 2 China wary of a 'normal' Japan
By Hiro Katsumata and Mingjiang Li
Since the early 1990s, a number of Japanese policymakers and opinion leaders
have called for the "normalization" of their country. The notion of a so-called
"normal Japan" has been central to the debate over the country's security
policy. The Japanese normalization discourse and its active international
security policy have put China on the alert. Beijing is watching closely and is
to some extent uneasy about what Japan intends to do under the rubric of
normalization.
But what exactly does a "normal Japan" mean? When the Japanese call for the
normalization of their country, what kind of Japan do they have in mind? The
definition of Japan's normalization can be ambiguous to outside observers. This
partly contributes to the concerns of the Chinese over Tokyo's intention. In
the skeptics' interpretation, normalization is synonymous with
militarization or military buildup. Japan's normalization may involve various
elements, such as the of its Self-Defense Force (SDF) and the revision of its
pacifist constitution. Yet, for skeptics, all these elements of normalization
are associated with military buildup.
However, an accurate interpretation of the Japanese discourse on normalization
should free the Chinese from their anxiety. For the Japanese, the normalization
of their country is by no means synonymous with its militarization. For them, a
normal Japan means a nation that actively participates in international
peacekeeping activities, mainly under the auspices of the United Nations (UN).
Chinese views on a normal Japan
The domestic discourse in China is highly skeptical over Tokyo's security
posture. In the past decade, a number of Chinese academics and opinion leaders
have observed and commented on Japan's aspiration to become a normal nation.
While some Chinese scholars and opinion leaders are able to understand Japan's
normalization aspiration in the proper context, many others have simply been
carried away by their emotions. In much of the Chinese analysis of Japan's
normalization, there is a wide-spread and profound sense of unease and anxiety
that this normalization drive could be part of Tokyo's attempt to aggrandize
its military capabilities and to enhance its security influence in East Asia.
According to the most radical Chinese interpretation, normalization is closely
associated with the re-emergence of extreme militarism and jingoistic
patriotism, both of which were prevalent in Japan during the war era [1].
A slightly more moderate interpretation links normalization with the rise of
assertive Japanese nationalism. Such nationalism, according to this
interpretation, enables the Japanese to whitewash their war-time history. In
other words, against the background of the emergence of this assertive
nationalism, a normal Japan distorts the history of World War II in its own
favor [2].
In addition, for some Chinese authors, the overseas deployment of the SDF is
also an element of normalization. What should be noted here is that, in their
view, the purpose of the overseas deployment is egoistic, aimed at containing
China and expanding Tokyo's sphere of influence in military terms [3].
Furthermore, some Chinese observers regard constitutional amendment as an
element of normalization. For them, again, Tokyo's intention is egoistic, aimed
at utilizing its military forces as a means to maximize its geopolitical
interests.
In any case, all of these views share one focal point: the military dimension
of Japan's normalization. All the elements of normalization identified by the
Chinese - extreme militarism, jingoistic patriotism and assertive nationalism,
the overseas deployment of the SDF and constitutional change - are associated
with militarization. The Chinese believe that even constitutional change will
create background conditions for military buildup and the overseas deployment
of the SDF will only stimulate such buildup further. However, these
interpretations do not necessarily reflect the discourse on the part of the
Japanese.
Ozawa's normalization thesis
What does a normal Japan mean for the Japanese? Ichiro Ozawa, the current
leader of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), first introduced this concept in
the early 1990s. For him, a normal Japan is a nation that can participate in
international peacekeeping activities, mainly under the auspices of the UN. In
his 1993 book, Ozawa raised the following issue: "How can Japan, which so
depends on world peace and stability, seek to exclude a security role from its
international contributions?" [4]
In the book Ozawa also touched upon the issue of the constitution. One of his
proposals was to add to the existing constitution a clause concerning Japan's
contribution to the UN's peacekeeping activities, given that the existing
constitution is ambiguous about this matter.
After publishing his book, Ozawa became the leading proponent of constitutional
change. He has constantly called for constitutional revision, the main purpose
of which, for him, is to enable Japan to take part in international
peacekeeping activities.
The discourse of Japan as a normal state developed on the basis of Ozawa's
thesis. In other words, the key point at issue in the normalization debate
since the early 1990s has been international peacekeeping activities and
constitutional change: whether and to what extent should Japan participate in
such activities, through the overseas deployment of its SDF and the changing of
its constitution?
This becomes apparent in the editorials in major newspapers. From 1993 to 2006,
the top three papers in terms of subscription - ie, The Yomiuri Shimbun, The
Asahi Shimbun and The Mainichi Shimbun - published a total of 39 editorials
which address the issue of a normal Japan. Out of these 39 editorials, 30
explicitly mention Ozawa's name, and treat the normalization thesis as Ozawa's
argument, and six discuss the notion of normalization or a normal nation in the
context of Ozawa's argument. That is to say, they implicitly define the word
normalization in terms of international peacekeeping activities and
constitutional change.
The remaining three, however, use this notion in different contexts. In these
editorials, normalization is associated with the strengthening of anti-terror
cooperation with the United States or the development of the emergency laws,
which stipulate measures to be taken should the country come under military
attack. After all, even in Japan, there is no common definition of a normal
Japan. It is for this reason that the implications of Japanese security policy
should be considered carefully. Is normalization a means for Japan to build up
its military power? Importantly, overseas operations and constitutional
revision might become a means for Tokyo to militarize itself.
Implications of normalization
For the Japanese, normalization and militarization are by no means synonymous.
The results of public opinion surveys show that a majority supports the
country's normalization, but not its militarization.
To begin with, an increasing number of people support Japan's military
contributions overseas. In 1991, the Cabinet Office of Japan surveyed public
opinion on the country's participation in the UN's peace-keeping operations. At
the time, 46% was supportive of it, 38% disagreed with it, and the rest
remained neutral. In contrast, in 2003, when the Cabinet Office conducted a
survey on the same issue, the percentage of those who were supportive increased
to 76%, while the percentage which disagreed decreased to 13% [5].
In addition, the Japanese have supported their country's international
contributions outside the framework of the UN. According to a survey in 2005
conducted by The Yomiuri Shimbun, 58% of the population viewed positively the
participation of the SDF to the international reconstruction effort in Iraq
[6].
Furthermore, a growing number of people are considering constitutional
revision. In 1993, the year in which Ozawa put forward his normalization
thesis, The Yomiuri Shimbun found that 50% of the respondents supported the
idea of constitutional change. In 2005, the percentage rose to 61% [7].
Yet the support for normalization exhibited in these survey results
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