Nukes and missiles keep Kim going
By Kosuke Takahashi
TOKYO - North Korea's true intentions, it appears, are now laid bare: Pyongyang
won't and cannot abandon its nuclear and missile development, despite a series
of compromises by the George W Bush administration, which is eager for a rare
foreign-policy success in its final months in office. For Dear Leader Kim
Jong-il, nuclear-tipped missiles are still his strongest weapon and best
deterrent against regime collapse in the Hermit Kingdom. He will hang onto them
by all means.
North Korea rattled nerves in the international community, especially South
Korea, Japan, China and the US, last Friday when it said it had begun restoring
its main nuclear facility in Yongbyon because Washington had delayed its
removal from the US terrorism blacklist. The media also reported last week the
communist nation secretly tested the engine of a long-range
missile at a new site on its west coast this year - in violation of United
Nations sanctions imposed after its nuclear test in October 2006.
This new missile site, reportedly still under construction and expected to be
completed next year, means that Pyongyang is still straining to develop
upgraded ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear warheads into the
inland area of the US, extending beyond Alaska, and that it cheated the US,
while having shown apparent good intentions at the six-party talks aimed at the
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
"Should North Korea allow any inspection, this could lead to one disablement
after another, resulting in no nuclear weapons in the nation," Michael Green,
former senior director for Asian affairs of the White House National Security
Council, said of Pyongyang's ulterior motives. He was speaking on TV Asahi's
news discussion show Sunday Project.
"Thus, by creating obstructions as much as possible, it [North Korea] does not
want to cooperate. This is a continuing pattern of North Korea over the past 15
years. The important thing to remember is that North Korea does not want to
give up its nuclear weapons," said Green.
The US estimates that the North has about 50 kilograms of plutonium, enough to
produce five to 10 nuclear weapons, depending on how big the North Korean bomb
is. Pyongyang unilaterally declared itself a de facto nuclear power in February
2005. But it may still feel that, without the ballistic missiles capable of
carrying nuclear warheads, the US won't be frightened enough to see it as a
true nuclear-weapon state, even though North Korea might have a few nukes.
In this situation, it may feel disadvantaged and in no position to bargain.
With new missiles targeting the US, though, it can talk from a position of
strength.
In comments to the official Korean Central News Agency, a North Korean Foreign
Ministry spokesman said last Friday the country no longer desired to be taken
off the terror blacklist and reiterated the country's rejection of a US demand
to set up a regime meeting international standards so its nuclear program can
be monitored.
It is not known whether Kim Jong-il, 66, who US and South Korean intelligence
said suffered a stroke around mid-August, took this decision. But it is highly
likely top North Korean officials acted on a pre-arranged plan established by
Kim before he was incapacitated.
This diplomatic standoff virtually replicates what happened in 2002 and 2003.
North Korea restarted its main reactor complex at Yongbyon in February 2003
after it expelled International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors from its
then-frozen nuclear facilities in December 2002 and pulled out of the nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty a month later. It is widely believed this deadlock was
triggered by the reclusive nation's acknowledgement of its secret
uranium-enrichment program in October 2002 - in violation of the so-called 1994
Agreed Framework accord between the US and North Korea.
At that time Pyongyang could have had a good deal, by receiving two nuclear
power plants and 500,000 tons of fuel oil annually in return for disarmament.
For a country whose electricity shortages were already reaching crisis point,
such energy aid would have been invaluable.
But instead Pyongyang admitted its clandestine uranium-enrichment work. Why?
North Korea conceivably was afraid of inspections of its nuclear facility at
the final stage of formalizing the deal - the same pattern seen now.
For Kim Jong-il, the nuclear deterrent is his strongest weapon, it bolsters his
iron-fisted dictatorship and perpetuates the slogan of military-first politics
and the Juche (self-reliance) ideology.
Bush rushed to make a deal with North Korea in the final stage of his
presidency by significantly moderating his hardline stance. In the accord
reached at the six-party talks in 2007 - involving the US, Japan, South and
North Korea, China and Russia - Pyongyang agreed by the end of the year to:
disable the five-megawatt reactor and two other plants at Yongbyon; provide "a
complete and correct declaration of all its nuclear programs"; "reaffirm its
commitment not to transfer nuclear materials, technology or know-how."
The accord, however, crucially omitted declaration of existing nuclear
"weapons"; the controversial and problematic highly enriched uranium program;
past proliferation activities involving nuclear material and missile technology
to Syria and Iran, among other nations.
The Bush administration's hasty, dramatic dash to Pyongyang has turned out to
be overly optimistic and Pyongyang may resort to its favorite tactic of further
brinkmanship to escalate tensions and wring concessions. It could do this by
expelling US inspectors still on the spot as a first step. It may also cause a
naval skirmish on the volatile sea border with South Korea. It may also launch
enhanced Taepodong-2 missiles.
This brinkmanship was fomented by the appeasement at the six-party talks. North
Korea has learned over the past five years there are zero penalties for
escalating tensions.
Excluding Japan, where the issue of North Korea's past abductions of Japanese
nationals has become highly prioritized and politicized, the other four nations
have paid Pyongyang a kind of a pre-bonus for just showing up at the table.
North Korea has engaged in its salami-slicing tactics, extracting maximum aid
for every concession.
The renewed nuclear standoff has already had repercussions for the region. The
US and South Korea plan to cut energy aid to North Korea if it speeds up its
efforts to restore its partially disabled nuclear reactor, South Korea's Yonhap
news agency has reported. It also could adversely affect non-proliferation
discussions with Iran.
It may also serve as a spur to Japan's arch-hawk, Taro Aso, who won the ruling
Liberal Democratic Party's presidential election on Monday to succeed Prime
Minister Yasuo Fukuda. Aso, who once tried to generate national debate on
acquiring nuclear weapons after North Korea's atomic test in October 2006 - to
Beijing's and Seoul's great concern - could get a boost from Pyongyang's
tougher stance in the House of Representatives election, which is widely
expected to be called soon. Japan's Air Self-Defense Force successfully shot
down a dummy ballistic missile in a joint test with the US on September 17,
just one day after reports that North Korea had tested new missile engines.
Kosuke Takahashi, a former staff writer at the Asahi Shimbun, is a
freelance correspondent based in Tokyo. He can be contacted at letters@kosuke.net.
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