The wave of hysteria that greeted the victory of the Democratic Party of Japan
(DPJ) in parliamentary elections last month has receded. The win doesn't signal
the end of the United States-Japan alliance, nor does it even necessarily imply
a rough patch for the bilateral relationship. In fact, domestic policies,
rather than the foreign policy agenda, are likely to most profoundly impact
relations with the US.
But keeping the alliance on an even keel is a second-best solution. Next year
marks the 50th anniversary of the US-Japan Security Treaty: the two countries
could use the opportunity to truly modernize their alliance. Sadly, that isn't
likely.
The sky isn't falling
As expected, DPJ chief Yukio Hatoyama, who formally becomes prime minister on
Wednesday, has made reassuring gestures
toward the United States since the election: he made all the right noises in a
post-election sit-down with US ambassador John Roos and confirmed in a phone
conversation with President Barack Obama that the US-Japan alliance continues
to be the foundation of Japanese diplomacy - the two men will also meet in a
few weeks.
There are plenty of reasons to believe that fears of a DPJ reassessment of
Japanese foreign and security policy - and relations with the US - were
exaggerated. First, Northeast Asia, from a Japanese perspective, is a scary
place. Japanese anxieties have been rising for over a decade and with good
reason: the country is surrounded by hostile or potentially hostile neighbors.
In this environment, no government is going to undermine the cornerstone of its
security system and its foreign policy for the past half-century, especially
when the alliance has served it so well.
Second, there will be an Upper House election next year. If the DPJ intends to
stay in power for more than a year and stand any chance of consolidating its
grip on power, it will make sure that voters have no easy reasons to vote
against it. That means taking the security issue off the table. Hence, the
signs of "new realism" in DPJ thinking even before the election, with revisions
of the party platform that soften objections to the Status of Forces Agreement
(SOFA) and the base realignment plan.
Third, what is the alternative? Improved relations with Asia is the mantra;
striking a better balance between East and West the goal. That is laudable, but
how can Tokyo improve relations with Beijing? That key relationship has been on
the upswing since former prime minister Junichiro Koizumi left office and his
successors stayed away from the Yasukuni Shrine - which serves as a memorial
for Japan's war dead - to avoid offending Chinese (and Korean) sensitivities.
But the real obstacles to improved Japan-China relations defy any change in
government and many require changes not in Tokyo, but in China. The issues
include territorial disputes, China's military modernization, a lack of respect
for Japan, history, product safety, and crime. They speak to a profound unease
in Japan about China's rise, a sense that Japan doesn't get the credit it
deserves, and difficulties in Japan and China in dealing with other Asian
nations as equals. (And don't forget that it was DPJ kingmaker Ichiro Ozawa who
reminded his Chinese hosts seven years ago that Japan could always go nuclear
if "China got too inflated". Balance, yes; naive or uninformed about security,
no.)
Also, the DPJ's desire to forge a more equal partnership with the US is nothing
new; it's been shared by almost every previous Japanese government. Realizing
that ambition has been blocked by the imbalance in the two countries' defense
capabilities and the asymmetry in the very structure of their relationship, a
lack of creativity on Tokyo's part when it comes to ideas that could
"rebalance" the partnership, and a lack of will to spend political capital on
alliance issues.
That last point is particularly important. The DPJ is being pilloried for
questioning the project planned to relocate Okinawa's Futenma US Marine Corps
Air Station to a new location. But why should the party spend its political
capital to deliver on promises the LDP never pushed when it was in power? (The
objection that agreements between governments survive a change of one
government is correct, but that principle isn't the issue here. And it can be
finessed, as noted below.)
Plainly, the sky isn't falling in Tokyo, at least when it comes to the
alliance.
A return to old Japan The real issue in this election, the one with the most implications for
Japan's future and its relations with the US, is economic policy. In important
ways, this election signals Japan's return to its historical social consensus.
The DPJ manifesto and Hatoyama's now infamous New York Times opinion piece that
appeared before the ballot reflect traditional Japanese approaches to foreign
and domestic policy.
Japan is re-embracing its traditional social compact. Hatoyama's NYT comment
has repeated references to "non-economic values" and an emphasis on fairness,
social welfare, and the failure of "US-led globalization". This is a rejection
of the reform agenda that was (reputedly) pushed by the Koizumi administration.
That choice is certainly Japan's to make - and one that a majority of Japanese
would endorse; at least the election suggests as much - but it has profound
implications for Japan and its alliance partner.
The preference for equality over efficiency signals a turn away from market
forces in Japan's economy and will result in even slower growth. Add a mountain
of debt - at 170% of GDP, already the biggest among developed nations, and sure
to expand with the DPJ's election promises - a bleak demographic profile, and
an inward-looking trade agenda, and Japan looks set to marginalize itself
within Asia - regional ambitions notwithstanding.
Trade issues deserve more attention, especially if the new government wants to
raise its Asian profile. If current DPJ policies or promises are realized, the
prospect of subsidies to farmers in a (misguided) attempt to increase food
self-sufficiency will aggravate trading partners. Promises to exclude
agriculture threaten to derail negotiations with Australia; the decision to
exclude rice from a free trade agreement with the US dooms prospects for that
deal.
Japan's readiness to increase protection for its farmers may win votes, but it
makes bilateral and regional deals tougher, and makes a mockery of the World
Trade Organizations's Doha Round's call this month to focus on the needs of
developing countries. Japan is not creating "gold standard" trade agreements,
nor will it be broadening relations with Asian partners. It certainly won't be
able to match China's aggressive trade diplomacy.
Making the most of the 50th anniversary
The US has to respect Japanese choices and adjust policies accordingly.
Patience is needed as a new government sorts out the business of governing. A
DPJ government will come around and embrace many of the policies of its
predecessors. But settling for the status quo is a wasted opportunity. It
certainly isn't the best this alliance can manage.
Japan faces unprecedented challenges as it, the region, and the world
experience a profound transformation. This is unsettling, but it is also an
opportunity. Japan should seize the moment, but it must work within the
constraints of the Japanese social compact rather than try to expand or break
it. It should and will maintain the alliance as the cornerstone of its security
and diplomatic policy, while refocusing that partnership.
But the longstanding alliance bargain needs to be reassessed. Quid pro quos
are out. For its part, Washington needs to forget about pushing Tokyo to put
"boots on the ground" or "to show the flag". That inserts the US into a bitter
domestic debate that ultimately politicizes the alliance.
Rather, both countries should think in terms of public goods that serve
regional and larger interests. But the real burden rests on Tokyo. As Japan's
geographic and demographic horizons shrink, it should broaden its security
outlook. Let Japan take the lead on a range of initiatives that better suit its
needs, its assets, and its mindset. That could mean the provision of human
capital throughout the region to institutionalize good governance or
sustainable development, or reinvigorated diplomacy on economic or trade
issues.
The alliance must diversify and focus less on military issues and more on
security broadly defined, whether this is fighting disease, protecting critical
infrastructure, stemming the spread of weapons of mass destruction, creating
energy security, or trade security. An aggressive and creative agenda, one that
Japan helps define and shape, can better balance the two countries'
contributions to a real partnership. And if Japan can put something of equal or
greater value on the table, then the capability that Futenma represents should
be up for consideration as well.
Asia policy is a vital component of this effort. Rebalancing relations between
East and West makes sense, especially if the bilateral security alliance
provides the fulcrum. Japan needs to be more deeply embedded in Asia as its
demographic woes weaken its economy and the region becomes more integrated.
That process should begin now, to maximize Tokyo's dwindling strength,
leverage, and influence. Washington has to trust Tokyo to look out for US
interests as Asia "emerges"; that is another contribution Japan can make to the
partnership.
Next year marks the 50th anniversary of the alliance. As both countries prepare
to commemorate a half-century of partnership, they should be aggressive and
creative about developing an alliance that best suits their needs, their
capabilities, and their responsibilities. That would be a real reason to get
excited about a new government in Japan; we aren't there yet.
Brad Glosserman (brad@pacforum.org) is executive director of the
Pacific Forum CSIS.
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