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Military holds the
key
By Yoel Sano
Whoever rules North Korea must rule its
army.
Despite all the talk of tremors and
instability in the North Korean regime, the
cardinal principle is that even if its leader Kim
Jong-il were killed or deposed, the Korean
People's Army (KPA) would remain firmly entrenched
in the ruling system, and any change would be
limited. Though some dissident generals reportedly
have fled to China, Kim and the military
apparently are secure in their power. Ultimately,
the military holds the key to resolving the
nuclear dispute, and to bringing about the
long-term transformation of North Korea.
Kim Jong-il depends on the military for
his rule, and giving up nukes could jeopardize his
grip on power.
This month North Korea held
a major conference in Pyongyang to reinforce the
country's songun (military first) policy.
This was the first in a series of public events
planned for 2005 designed to rally support for the
regime as it celebrates the 60th anniversary of
liberation from Japanese rule in August, and the
60th anniversary of the foundation of the ruling
Korean Workers Party (KWP) in October. More
important, however, the conference reflects the
increasing power and influence of the KPA, which
has risen significantly since Kim Jong-il took
over the country after the death of his father,
Korea's founder, the "Great Leader" Kim Il-sung,
in 1994. Indeed, North Korea has seen something of
a "coup by stealth" during the past decade, as the
military has accumulated more authority. As such,
regardless of what happens to Kim Jong-il - in the
context of heightened rumors about his regime
falling apart - the KPA will continue to wield
influence over North Korea for some time to come.
Military rule under Kim
Jong-il
Kim Jong-il rules North Korea in
his capacity as chairman of the National Defense
Commission, supreme commander of the KPA, and
general secretary of the ruling KWP. Of the three
posts, the first two are the most important, since
they put him in charge of the military. Of Kim's
87 public appearances in 2004, some two-thirds
were military-related, according to South Korea's
Yonhap news agency, and this figure is typical for
every year since Kim has ruled the country.
Although the KWP is still important, the "military
first" policy means that the army has superseded
the party.
The KPA is by far the strongest
force in North Korea, and is the only group that
can truly challenge Kim's rule. Also, North Korea
is the most militarized country in the world, with
1.1 million troops out of a total population of 23
million (almost 5%). The military officially
consumes 15.5% of gross domestic product (GDP),
and unofficially more than 30%, according to
estimates by the South Korean Defense Ministry.
Therefore, whoever rules North Korea must control
the KPA. Given that there have been at least two
coup attempts against Kim - and mindful of the
fact that the United States' invasion of Iraq was
made easier by betrayals within the Iraqi military
- Kim must keep a close eye on the KPA.
Multiple agencies watch the
military
Kim Jong-il cannot take military
support for granted. He has had to cultivate
personnel carefully. In fact, when Kim Il-sung
died, many observers believed that Kim Jong-il was
so disliked by the army - owing to his allegedly
pampered and decadent lifestyle, and his lack of
military service - that he would quickly be
deposed in a coup. Furthermore, the military was
still dominated by aging hardliners who were
former comrades of Kim Il-sung, and had fought
with him against the Imperial Japanese Army in
Manchuria during the 1930s and against the South
Koreans and the US during the Korean War
(1950-53). However, as the conservative old guard
gradually passed away, Kim consolidated his grip
on the military by promoting key loyalists to top
positions. He has promoted more than 1,100
generals since 1992, taking the total to about
1,400. Consequently, the North Korean military
must have one of the highest generals-to-troops
ratios in the world. Kim was thus able to remain
in power, but the military's influence over him
seems to have stepped up a few gears compared with
its influence over his father.
Kim Jong-il
today controls the KPA as head of the National
Defense Commission (NDC), which consists of his
key supporters, such as the chief of the KPA
general staff, Vice Marshal Kim Yong-chun, and the
defense minister, Vice Marshal Kim Il-chol. The
commission's first vice chairman is Vice Marshal
Jo Myong-rok, who also is head of the military's
General Political Bureau, which monitors the
behavior of all military personnel, especially
senior officers. Jo's two deputies at the bureau
are generals Hyon Chol-hae and Pak Jae-gyong, who
accompany Kim Jong-il on virtually all his public
appearances, underscoring the importance he places
in them. Another key supporter almost always seen
at Kim's side is General Ri Myong-su, the director
of the general staff's Operations Bureau, who is
one of the younger generation (the others are all
in their 70s).
Kim Jong-il is also
protected by the State Security Agency and the
General Security Bureau, which have eliminated
potential opponents to his rule. The multiple
agencies all watch the military and one another,
giving Kim extra protection from would-be coup
plotters and assassins. In addition, the region
surrounding Pyongyang is controlled by the 3rd
Army Corps, headed by Vice Marshal Jang Song-u,
the eldest brother of Kim's sister's husband, Jang
Song-taek. Pyongyang itself has its own defense
forces, headed by yet another Kim loyalist. As
such, it is virtually impossible for any military
force to march into Pyongyang and overthrow or
arrest Kim, unless they have the support of the
people in charge of the security agencies and the
top brass.
Previous 'coups' have
failed
Despite Kim's firm grip on the
military, there have been repeated rumors about
foiled coup attempts in North Korea. This is
hardly surprising, given the country's dire
economic situation - with reports of mass
starvation, and industry falling into disuse and
disrepair. Small wonder, then, that even amid
tight security there have been at least two
military coup attempts in the past 15 years.
The first attempt reportedly took place in
1991 or 1992, when Kim Il-sung was still alive.
According to reports at the time, around a dozen
generals trained in the Soviet Union and
influenced by the concept of perestroika
(restructuring) planned to assassinate the two
Kims and implement radical modernization of North
Korea. However, the plot was discovered, and the
generals were reportedly executed (some rumors say
they were burned alive at the stake in front of a
military audience to warn others of the
consequences of disloyalty).
The second
attempt occurred in 1995, in the first year of Kim
Jong-il's rule. According to North Korea military
expert Joseph S Bermudez Jr, officers in the 6th
Army Corps based in North Hamgyong province
bordering China (the area worst-hit by the famine)
developed coup plans - possibly in cooperation
with elements in the neighboring 7th Army Corps -
to march on Pyongyang, with hopes that the mutiny
would find support from top generals in the
capital. The plot was reportedly foiled by the 6th
Corps commander, Kim Yong-chun, who was rewarded
by being promoted to chief of the general staff
later that year.
Since those attempts,
there have been occasional rumors of military
dissent, but nothing to suggest a full-scale coup
in the making. In September 1997, according to
South Korea's intelligence service, General Ri
Bong-won, a deputy head of the Northern military's
General Political Bureau, was executed in
Pyongyang along with agriculture secretary So
Gwan-hui for espionage and treachery on behalf of
Seoul. Secretary So was blamed for sabotaging
North Korea's agriculture system and creating the
famine. A year later, Kim Yong-ryong, the deputy
head of the State Security Agency, was dismissed
after making highly critical comments about the
regime and calling for reform. However, since the
late 1990s, there have been fewer rumors of coup
attempts. Reports that about 130 generals have
fled to China in recent years suggest that
dissident commanders are voting with their feet
rather than attempting to seize power.
Iraq war showed need for domestic
security
Some observers believe that a
massive explosion at the railway station in
Ryongchon last April 22 - just hours after Kim
Jong-il's train passed through the town after his
visit to China - was an assassination plot. Kim
himself may have thought so, which would explain
the sudden dismissal of public security minister
Choe Ryong-su, who had been in office less than a
year at that time. Choe's appointment in July 2003
itself suggested that Kim was too concerned about
domestic security to leave it to the previous
incumbent, Paek Hak-rim, an 85-year-old veteran
associate of Kim Il-sung. Also that summer, Kim
Jong-il promoted three generals in charge of
military security units. Coming so soon after
reports that Iraqi president Saddam Hussein's
elite Republican Guard had struck a deal with US
commanders to allow American troops to enter
Baghdad unopposed, it appears that Kim was taking
no chances.
Nonetheless, the commanders of
North Korea's most heavily armed units - the
frontline 1st, 2nd and 5th Army Corps deployed
along the border with South Korea - have remained
in place for most of the past decade, suggesting
that Kim has sufficient faith in them. By
contrast, many authoritarian leaders frequently
rotate commanders, to prevent them from acting as
regional warlords.
Reformist coup or
conservative coup?
If a military coup
eventually were to occur, it would likely fall
into one of two categories. The first is a
reformist or progressive coup, designed to
liberalize North Korea's political system and
completely modernize its economy through
military-led development and greater contacts with
the outside world. A possible role model would be
the coup carried out in South Korea in May 1961 by
General Park Chung-hee, who ruled the country for
the next 18 years. Park is widely credited with
bringing about the country's development, although
he ruled as a dictator and failed to liberalize
South Korea.
A coup of this kind in North
Korea would most likely be instigated by the KPA's
mid-level officers or lower-ranked generals, who
would feel they had nothing more to gain from the
status quo and would prefer to see the backs of
the existing top brass and Kim Jong-il. It is
conceivable that such leaders could form a secret
society within the military. In South Korea's
armed forces, a secret society known as the
Hanahoe ("One Mind") group launched a coup in
1980, after president Park's assassination.
However, given the tightness of security in the
North, the plotters would probably need the tacit
support of the top generals to succeed.
The other kind of military coup that could
occur is a conservative or reactionary coup,
designed to preserve the status quo from rapid and
potentially destabilizing changes. If North
Korea's tentative free-market reforms, launched in
July 2002, falter, or if Kim Jong-il makes too
many concessions to the United States on North
Korea's nuclear-weapons program, he could come to
be seen as putting "the system" and indeed the
country in jeopardy. Under such a scenario, the
top leaders of the KPA could seek to overthrow
him, just as former Soviet president Mikhail
Gorbachev was briefly deposed by conservative KGB
and military-political hardliners in August 1991.
The military and the nuclear
dispute
The Korean People's Army holds the
key to resolving the ongoing nuclear dispute with
the United States. Kim Jong-il has pursued the
nuclear-weapons program as a way of deterring the
US from attacking or invading North Korea and
bringing about regime change, as happened in Iraq.
In this regard, he is backed by the military,
which quite logically does not want to face defeat
or destruction at the hands of the US - especially
after witnessing the "shock and awe" of the Iraq
war. Possession of nukes therefore keeps Kim and
the military in power.
If Kim were to
carry out "complete, verifiable, and irreversible
dismantling" (CVID) of North Korea's nukes - which
is Washington's stated goal - he would almost
certainly face opposition from the KPA.
North Korea's foreign policy is conducted,
at least in public, by officials of the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, who are seen generally as more
moderate than the KPA. However, it is highly
likely that the military can veto certain
initiatives, or can simply undercut diplomacy by
carrying out military maneuvers such as violations
of South Korea's territorial waters, or by
test-firing short-range missiles at sensitive
occasions. Most likely, Kim has to find a balance
between the military and the diplomats, although
he also benefits from this tension by appearing to
be willing to "talk nice" while at the same time
displaying hawkish signs. The result is an
occasionally erratic and unpredictable foreign
policy, which makes Pyongyang seem to foreign
countries too unreliable to deal with.
Generational shift within the
military
If the United States wants to
persuade the North Korean military to get rid of
Kim Jong-il and/or nuclear weapons, it has to
persuade generals that their privileged positions
will be preserved in exchange - or that they have
more to lose by sticking with the status quo than
by opting for change. A key question is whether a
gradual generational shift within the KPA will
lead to greater moderation. Top commanders such as
Jo Myong-rok, Kim Il-chol, Hyon Chol-hae and Pak
Jae-gyong are all in their 70s and have either
fought in the devastating Korean War or can
remember it from their youth. Distrust of the
United States is deeply ingrained. Although Kim
Jong-il has slowly been elevating generals in
their 50s and early 60s who have no combat
experience, years of anti-US propaganda have
similarly hardened their attitude toward the US.
Nonetheless, younger generals may indeed
be getting fed up with the status quo. Last year,
reports emerged that Major-General O Se-uk, 43,
had fled North Korea to Japan, and thence to the
United States. O Se-uk is the son of General O
Kuk-ryol - who in the 1980s was Kim Jong-il's
closest military confidant - and the grandson of O
Jung-hup, a revered anti-Japanese guerrilla
fighter. Although O Kuk-ryol, 75, rarely has
appeared in recent years, he is believed to serve
as head of the party's Covert Operations Bureau -
which makes his son's defection all the more
significant. Furthermore, the New York Times,
citing an unidentified South Korean journalist,
reported last November that O Se-uk was one of
some 130 North Korean generals who had fled their
country in recent years. Most of them had gone to
China. Given the lack of changes at the top levels
of the KPA, it is reasonable to assume that these
defectors were lower-ranked, younger commanders.
If so, it is discouraging for opponents of the
regime that those who could make a difference are
choosing to flee.
Other highly tentative
signs of the armed forces' willingness to embrace
change include the growing importance of
military-dominated "trading companies", some of
which are headed by top officers. These entities
are engaged in domestic industrial activities and
they export minerals and weapons to developing
countries, for the purpose of earning foreign
currency. According to North Korea expert Selig
Harrison, the largest such corporation, Chung Woon
San, is headed by Vice Marshal Jo Myong-rok. Some
observers speculate that as generals focus more on
their business activities - as has been the case
in China and other Asian countries - they will
have less reason to go to war. Beyond that, these
"trading companies" may form the nuclei of North
Korean chaebol (conglomerates) of the kind
that drove the rapid expansion of South Korea's
economy.
Military will remain a force,
post-Kim Jong-il
Most likely, given the
military's strength in North Korea's system, it
will remain a powerful force no matter who rules
the country next. If Kim Jong-il is assassinated,
a military junta consisting of his top officers
would likely take power. If one of Kim's sons
eventually succeeds him, he will need to rely on
the military. If North Korea collapses altogether,
the South's unification minister - who will
establish and run an emergency administration in
the North, according to Seoul's contingency plans
- will still need to rely on the KPA to maintain
order. The US experience in Iraq has shown that
dissolving the military and security services
leads to chaos, and may have forced some
commanders to join the vast Iraqi insurgency
campaign. Mindful of the need to avoid this, South
Korea will likely depend on the KPA, at least in
the early stages of any occupation.
This
might have negative consequences for the eventual
democratization of North Korea, especially if
military leaders became unofficial "warlords" once
the regime had gone.
Yoel Sano
has worked for publishing houses in London,
providing political and economic analysis, and has
been following Northeast Asia for many years.
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