Page 2 of 2 North Korea enjoys the attention
By Georgy Toloraya
This strategy probably took shape in late 2008, after the initial shock brought
about by Kim Jong-il's health problem wore off. The malevolent speculations in
the West and South Korea about Kim Jong-il's possible demise and the regime
collapse that might follow really irritated the North Korean leadership.
Emotions are not unimportant in politics. Seeing the degree of personal
animosity of so much of the outside world, North Korea's leaders felt morally
right to resist compromise or concession. They concluded that only sheer force,
not mere words, could assure their survival.
The early signs included very harsh statements and rhetoric on the part of
North Korea's Foreign Ministry and its military spokespersons. North Korea
almost totally suspended relations
with the South. The criticism of Lee Myung-bak reached unprecedented heights;
however, the world didn't take that seriously, seemingly following instead a
path of "benign neglect".
Perhaps that was unsurprising given the Obama administration's preoccupation
with the financial crisis, Iraq, Afghanistan and other pressing problems. North
Korea was obviously not a priority and Pyongyang could not realistically expect
any major concessions allowing them to display the vitality of songun (military
first) policies or to bring closer their goal of becoming a "strong and
prosperous nation by 2012".
Missile launch
The missile launch, widely publicized for nearly two months, became a perfect
opportunity. North Koreans may have taken secret satisfaction from the fact
that Western governments (especially Japan's) swallowed the bait and gave the
missile launch much more attention and publicity than it deserved. Dozens of
missiles and rockets are launched regularly round the globe. Only Japanese
paranoia about this being an "enemy" rocket helped the impoverished country's
once-a-decade launch of an outdated missile become the focus of global concern.
Iran's successful satellite launch in February, despite its potentially much
graver consequences, went almost unnoticed.
North Korea got the attention it longed for and the pretext it needed to
"tighten the screws", while also demonstrating that it didn't actually need
allies. It doesn't hide its displeasure at Chinese and Russian "betrayal" by
their support for the United Nations Security Council president's statement.
Following the launch, Pyongyang can leave out of its decision-making process
not only Japan and South Korea, but all the other parties. The United States
will sooner or later have to resume bilateral dialogue with Pyongyang.
Otherwise new provocations would follow.
The international community will have to wait until earnest dialogue between
the United States and North Korea starts. Pyongyang has resorted to criticism
of the Obama administration, probably in order to "tame" the relative novices
in Washington and to raise the stakes for future concessions. Procrastination
also helps North Korea raise the stakes (by reprocessing fuel rods, conducting
a nuclear test or missile test, or possibly instigating border clashes with
South Korea).
Much as all others dislike it, the status of North Korea as a nuclear power has
become a reality. That reality has to be taken into account while the
international community explores possible arrangements under international
non-proliferation regimes, even as negotiators still work to keep Korean
peninsula denuclearization on the agenda.
New approach
It may sound somewhat cynical, but the US administration now has a unique
chance to work out a totally new approach to Korean problem. First, a paradigm
of US-North Korean coexistence has to be worked out based on the assumption
that the Pyongyang regime is here to stay and should be recognized.
A tacit understanding on the future of North Korea and an easing of pressure on
the country should be effected (paradoxically, such easing of tensions could
open the way to peaceful evolution of the regime, first by economic
marketization and later by a resulting softening of the regime).
This new approach should be seriously presented to North Korea by a
communication at the highest level, without the demand for immediate "tit for
tat". Only after doing that could new arrangements for security on the Korean
peninsula be discussed, with demilitarization and denuclearization remaining a
vital but distant goal.
Although the role of the United States is central to bringing about change,
that of other players is also important. China and Russia would support such an
approach with few reservations and they will help promote dialogue since
normalization in Korea corresponds with their strategic goals both in the
region and in their relations vis-a-vis the United States.
Japan has to change its unconstructive approach and at least take a
wait-and-see attitude, without attempting to disrupt the dialogue or to promote
its own egoistic interests. South Korea could play a vital role by supporting
US efforts, rather than pushing its own agenda without concern for wider goals,
and it should refrain from hostile actions against North Korea whatever
irritations it might face.
The multilateral coordination mechanism (even without North Korean
participation, as in five-plus-one talks) should be kept intact, and Pyongyang
should not be allowed to play on the contradictions between its partners in the
talks. In the end the deal on the newly established "rules of the game" should
get the approval and guarantees of implementation from all the players. A
high-level political declaration and a set of legally binding bilateral
treaties between each of the participants could be the form of a final basic
arrangement that launches a new security architecture in Northeast Asia.
This might not seem an opportune time to think about such things. But North
Korea needs to grasp the strategic concept of its partners in order to see
clearly where the road could take it. The same can be said for Washington.
Georgy Toloraya is a professional diplomat, current director of Korean
Research Programs, Institute of Economics, Russian Academy of Science, and a
contributor to Foreign Policy In Focus.
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