Page 2 of 2 A convenient North Korean distraction
By Peter Lee
It is safe to say that, with attitudes like this at the most senior level of
the Japanese military, no Asian nation is going to be very comfortable with the
idea of unleashing the SDF for security operations outside Japan. A more
assertive SDF is not favored by the United States either.
Beyond the obvious regional difficulties of an unpopular revival of Japanese
militarism, America's franchise as the security arbiter of Asian affairs would
be undermined if Japan - the only Asian democracy capable of projecting
significant power in the region - emerged with its own offensive forces and a
competing doctrine.
The US presence derives its regional credibility and popularity from its
perceived role as an external honest broker, an alternative
to the rapacious Japanese and Chinese militaries, its effectiveness assured by
America's near-monopoly on nuclear deterrence and its insistence on coordinated
command of allied forces.
These assurances are undercut by Japan's well-advertised interest in a more
assertive military role.
Beyond incensing Asian countries, there is absolutely no strategic fit between
the US vision for the region and an independent Japanese military presence.
CNAS's 2009 Asian policy review [3], which Campbell co-chaired, offered Japan a
good deal of hortatory if markedly condescending rhetoric but absolutely no
encouragement for its emergence in a regional military role or any freedom of
action in the name of "collective self defense".
Instead, there was a lot of talk involving boring second-tier humanitarian
activities that will not make Tomogami's heart beat faster.
As has been
repeated throughout this report, the US-Japan relationship remains the starting
point for any assessment of US engagement with Asia. Despite repeated
assurances that the US remains committed to the alliance and that Japanese
fears of "passing" are unfounded, anxieties in Tokyo continue to rise.
Enough! Our first recommendation for Japan is that it ends the hand wringing
and introspection and instead focus on the assets it can and should contribute
to the alliance. One way to do that is to develop a national security strategy.
As Japan charts novel political terrain, it is more important than ever that
Tokyo articulate a vision for the country that commands a national consensus.
Japan can be more creative in identifying ways it can contribute to the
alliance and ensure that those contributions are commensurate with its
capabilities and responsibilities.
There are many ways in which Japan can contribute to regional security outside
a strictly military context, such as in promoting maritime safety and security,
disaster relief and humanitarian assistance, development aid, or through
national capacity-building in a broad array of fields ranging from export
controls to product safety. Japan has particularly advanced capabilities in the
fields of energy conservation and efficiency as well as "green" technologies
and environmental protection. Japan should exploit its advantages in these
areas to contribute to regional security as well as develop a higher regional
profile.
The CNAS paper is a strong indication that the US
prefers a non-nuclear SDF whose operations are closely coordinated under
American command and under the US nuclear umbrella.
In other words, a militarily strong Japan is not only destabilizing for the
region and a flashpoint for disagreements between China and the United States;
it undercuts American power and prestige in the region.
But the fundamental problem for the US is not keeping a lid on unhealthy
Japanese proclivities toward regional militarism and preserving the American
pre-eminence in Asian security.
If, as expected, the LDP is crushed in the next Japanese general election and
the left-leaning Democratic Party of Japan takes power, conservative dreams of
a regionally resurgent Japanese military will fade even further.
The problem is finding a useful and effective role for Japan in meeting the
most significant challenge to US influence and Japanese ascendancy.
That challenge is not military adventurism from North Korea; it's the growing
economic integration between China and South Korea, which Japan apparently
lacks the structural and geopolitical tools to reverse.
In his June 10 testimony, Campbell acknowledged that China's rise had
implications "difficult for our Japanese friends". Nevertheless, he averred
that the trilateral relationship between Washington, Beijing and Tokyo should
not be a "zero-sum game" and said hopefully that there are "signs that [China
and Japan] need each other".
Unfortunately, in reality, the signs all seem to be pointing in the other
direction.
Japan doesn't only see difficulties from a rising China. It's got problems with
a rising South Korea as well. The unanswerable challenges it faces in the
region are economic, not military.
Taking advantage of the furor over North Korea to jump on the US military
bandwagon - and hoping that Chinese overreach in its military posture will
derail its economic juggernaut - is not the solution to Japan's long-term
problems.
Japan's failure to achieve a free-trade agreement with South Korea - and its
inability to come to terms with South Korea's enthusiasm for a
China-Japan-Korea free-trade grouping with regional heft equivalent to the
Eurozone - is indicative of the zero-sum relationship between the Tokyo and
both its industrializing competitors in North Asia.
The mainland financial news website China Stakes provided the perspective from
China:
South Korea President Lee Myung-bak said during a visit to Japan
that he was in favor of the establishment of a China-Japan-Korea free-trade
zone, as it would help all three countries maintain competitiveness in the
global market. Kim says that Lee, a former Hyundai president, is very sensitive
to the market economy. Lee has always emphasized that economic development is
most important to the country.
Some Japanese regard China, with its rapid economic growth, as Japan's most
dangerous potential rival. There is worry that the establishment of free-trade
zone may lead to industry transfer or even hollowing-out, and they have become
increasingly reluctant on this issue.
"Many common Japanese see China as a threat, and this will certainly affect
Japan's foreign policies and its attitude towards a free trade zone," said Feng
Zhaokui.
Add to that a graying population, a debilitating
recession and a prime minister with popularity in the single digits, Japan's
pessimism about its ability to retain its place at the center of Asian affairs
is understandable.
Throwing its military weight around in coordination with the United States may
provide psychological reassurance but do little to reverse long-term trends.
And those economic trends include an unexpected but inevitable factor: North
Korea's economic opening.
Japan's - and America's - dilemma is neatly illustrated by its response to the
North Korean situation.
While the People's Republic of China unceasingly calls for non-military and
diplomatic measures to defuse the crisis, Japan continually invokes the North
Korean bogeyman to lift its military profile and solidify its security alliance
with the US.
This year, Prime Minister Aso exploited North Korea's antics to argue [4] for
enshrining "pre-emptive capabilities", ie attacks on North Korean facilities
threatening Japan in Japan's National Defense Program Guidelines, eliciting the
objection of China's ambassador.
In the wake of the new UN Security Council sanctions targeting North Korea's
WMD-related exports, Japan went the extra step and banned all exports [5] to
North Korea. This largely symbolic gesture (Japan's exports to North Korea in
2008 totaled little more than US$8 million) ended all direct economic relations
between the two countries.
Japan's willingness to completely sever economic relations with North Korea and
offer itself as America's sheriff in North Asia is at the heart of Tokyo's -
and Washington's - problems in the region.
The United States may be perversely grateful that North Korean bellicosity
provides a justification for America's continued relevance in the region.
However, this convenient crisis isn't going to last forever.
North Korea is going to open up someday. Probably not through reform, regime
change or collapse, or through the application of American or Japanese military
force.
But it will open up.
There is too much money and strategic advantage at stake for the interested
nations of North Asia to stand idly by and simply watch North Korea
disintegrate.
Maybe change will come by means of a controlled implosion, jointly managed by
China and South Korea, the two neighboring regimes that covet North Korea's
cheap labor, resources and markets, and abhor the consequences of Pyongyang's
chaotic disintegration in equal and extreme degree.
If and when that happens, Chinese and South Korean businesses will flood into
North Korea and the entire Korean Peninsula will become part of the zero-sum
equation bedeviling Tokyo. Japan may find itself on the outside looking in at
North Asia's burgeoning new economic frontier ... together with the United
States.
Unfortunately, Japan in 2009 doesn't look much like a resolute and powerful
ally of the United States. It looks more like a client state at the end of its
rope that sees no recourse other than to seek the protection of its patron - a
burden and not an asset.
Using the threat of North Korea to strengthen the alliance with Japan may do
little more than tie the United States to a sunset nation unable to project
meaningful economic and military influence in Asia on America's behalf.
Note
1. To view the report, click here.
2. Yosano Says Japan's Trust in Treasuries 'Unshakable'. Bloomberg, June 12,
2009.
3. To view the review, click
here.
4. See Pushback
on preemption, June 8, 2009.
5. Japan to ban exports to North Korea after nuclear test, Reuters, June15,
2009.
Peter Lee writes on East and South Asian affairs and their intersection
with US foreign policy.
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