Page 2 of 2 Through the (North Korean) looking glass
By Bruce Klingner
Pyongyang a catalyst for US policy change
What brought about the reverse in Obama's nascent North Korea policy?
Pyongyang's audaciously belligerent provocations and violations of United
Nations resolutions. In a few short months, Pyongyang launched a Taepodong 2
long-range missile, conducted a nuclear test, abrogated all inter-Korean
agreements, walked away from the armistice ending the Korean War, abandoned the
six-party talks, kicked out international inspectors, vowed to build more
nuclear weapons and threatened war against the US, Japan and South Korea.
North Korean violations also triggered a change in the Bush administration's
policy in 2002-03. At that time, Pyongyang was
pursuing a covert uranium-based nuclear weapons program in violation of four
international agreements. The widespread misperception was that North Korea's
highly enriched uranium program was merely a Bush administration fabrication to
undermine the Agreed Framework. But the facts belie the mischaracterization.
Robert Gallucci, president Bill Clinton's negotiator for the 1994 Agreed
Framework between the United States and North Korea, rebutted assertions that
the Bush administration had "politicized the question of North Korea's
uranium-enrichment program". Gallucci explained that the US had "for a number
of years, well-founded suspicions that North Korea has been working on the
enrichment of uranium. Indeed, in both 1999 and 2000, the Clinton
administration was unable to certify to Congress that North Korea was not
pursuing a uranium-enrichment capability. This fact alone should dispel claims
of partisanship on this point."
Gary Samore, Obama's special assistant and White House coordinator for arms
control and weapons of mass destruction, proliferation and terrorism, stated in
July 2009, "I'm absolutely convinced that they have been pursuing a secret
enrichment program."
What if North Korea hadn't shot itself in the foot?
What alternative scenario would have occurred had North Korea not been so
belligerent in 2009 and, instead, reached out to Washington? Obama would have
seen this as a vindication of his philosophy and been encouraged to pursue a
vigorous outreach to Pyongyang. He could have blamed all of the shortfalls and
failures of the six-party talks on Bush rather than North Korean intransigence
and refusal to abide by its commitments. The talks would have resumed and it is
uncertain what economic and diplomatic inducements the Obama administration
might have offered to gain perceived progress.
Doing so, however, would have exacerbated South Korean and Japanese
nervousness. These nations were leery of the naive and excessively eager
approach taken by the US in the last two years of the Bush administration.
Tokyo had publicly questioned the Bush strategy. Seoul had privately harbored
concerns but remained mum so as not to undermine President Lee Myung-bak's
determination to repair US-South Korean relations.
The difference in approach toward North Korea between Washington and its Asian
allies would have caused strains in those bilateral relationships. This would
have been particularly noticeable with South Korea since it would have come
atop diametrically opposing views toward the stalled US-South Korean free-trade
agreement (FTA). The protectionist Obama administration refuses to accept the
FTA without first rewriting auto sector provisions to accommodate unreasonable
demands by US automakers.
However, North Korean provocations since January led Obama to reverse his
policy, bringing it into alignment with America's allies, allowing them to
confront North Korea with a consensus unattainable during the past several
years. Given rising concern over how far Kim Jong-il is willing to press a
crisis, North Korea has crowded out all other items from the agendas of
Washington and its Asian allies, overshadowing the trade dispute.
Talking and image aren't everything
Obama campaigned on the promise that initiating dialogue with rogue regimes and
improving America's image overseas would solve the world's problems. But
changing perceptions don't ensure changed policies. A mantra of "we're not the
other guy" and a willingness to listen aren't enough of a basis for policy.
Foreign public opinion polls showed soaring approval for the US following
Obama's inauguration. But despots around the globe have bitten the extended
open hand of dialogue and refused to change their behavior. Nor have US allies
stepped up to provide resources to redress common security threats.
Former national security advisors Brent Scowcroft and Zbigniew Brzezinski have
praised Obama for defusing anti-Americanism overseas. Yet Brzezinski questioned
whether the Obama administration has "sufficient steadiness and determination
to implement it". Scowcroft commented, "I'm worried because I don't see much
happening [on substance]. It's all still mood-setting."
The path ahead
When confronted with North Korean recalcitrance, the Obama administration
correctly assessed the situation and altered course to adopt a pragmatic
two-track approach of pressure and negotiation toward Pyongyang. Perhaps Obama
has learned the famous adage of Frederick the Great that "diplomacy without
arms is like music without instruments".
North Korea has proven to be its own worst enemy since Obama's initial
willingness to engage. Pyongyang's blatant rejection of repeated US offers of
bilateral dialogue has gained Washington traction for international pressure
tactics that Bush was never able to achieve.
Putting an Obama face on Bush policies may offer the best opportunity to
achieve a diplomatic solution to the North Korean nuclear problem. Success
depends, however, on sustaining extensive international sanctions against North
Korea until the aberrant behavior that triggered them is rectified rather than
abandoning them in return only for Pyongyang's willingness to return to the
negotiating table. Principles shouldn't be abandoned for parsimonious progress.
The Obama administration must maintain its resolve to implement a "full range
of particular steps [to] put pressure on North Korea [including] a robust set
of sanctions and unilateral actions” [to show] there are consequences for these
provocative actions" until North Korea undertakes "irreversible steps" to
abandon its nuclear weapons programs.
In months to come, a growing chorus of voices will again call for throwing more
inducements and lowering the bar of North Korean compliance to UN resolutions.
The Obama administration must reject this tired siren song.
Bruce Klingner is Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia in the Asian
Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation (www.heritage.org).
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