In
the past few weeks, Washington has altered its tone on
the issue of Iran's nuclear development program. The
present policy, instituted with the inauguration of the
George W Bush administration, began with tough treatment
of Iran, labeling the country a "rogue state" and a
potential subject for "regime change". Yet, due to the
drain on US resources brought by the unexpected
instability in Iraq, the Bush administration has been
forced to moderate its tone on the Islamic republic.
The change in the administration's tone was
evident by recent statements from Bush administration
officials that the US would consider offering incentives
to Iran to convince it to abandon its desire to control
the entire nuclear fuel cycle and to comply with United
Nations demands. State Department spokesman Richard
Boucher explained the change in policy, commenting, "We
are going to hear from the Europeans on the work they
have been doing on how to get the Iranians to comply."
That being said, however, Boucher did not retreat from
the official Bush administration line of exercising
Article 41 of the UN Charter, which would refer the
Iranian nuclear question to the UN Security Council for
the possibility of placing international economic
sanctions on Iran. Boucher repeated that Washington's
goal is to "move this matter to the Security Council".
The Bush administration fears that Iran's desire
to control the nuclear fuel cycle is grounded in a
covert quest for nuclear weapons. The danger to the US
of a nuclear-armed Iran is that Tehran would be in a
better position to take actions contrary to US interests
in the region by altering the regional balance of power.
The Bush administration's consideration of
offering incentives to Iran derives from the lack of
viable military options in destroying Iran's nuclear
facilities; the decision also reflects Washington's
recognition that it may not be able to successfully push
the UN to institute international economic sanctions on
the Persian country.
Lack of viable military
options Washington's lack of military options arises
out of the US military interventions in Afghanistan and
Iraq. The perpetuating instability in these countries,
and primarily in Iraq, has overburdened the US military.
The overextension of the military constrains America's
ability to effectively threaten Iran with martial force
since it is clear to all observers that it would be
undesirable to the US military to open up another front
of conflict, considering it is sustaining daily attacks
in Iraq with no end to the clashes in sight, in addition
to the tenuous situation prevailing in Afghanistan.
Further, Iran is a very different country than
post-Gulf War Iraq in terms of its military defense
tactics. The country's armed forces, which is obviously
greatly outmatched by the US military, has enough
tactical options to endanger US interests in the region.
Plus, any change in the state of affairs within the
Iranian political establishment could threaten
instability in a state that is situated in a region
already unbalanced; indeed, the effects of the region's
instability can be seen in the high oil prices currently
irritating the economies of oil-dependent countries.
Even if the military card was available, the
conditions of Iran's nuclear program make it relatively
immune to destruction by any limited air strike; nuclear
experts such as Dr David Albright, who is the president
of the Institute for Science and International Security,
argue that "while military strikes can hurt Iran's
nuclear capabilities, they cannot stop them ... There
are likely other facilities that are unknown and would
escape damage".
Finally, the US is still
suffering from a diplomatic defeat emanating from the
loss of credibility sustained by its failure to discover
alleged massive quantities of weapons of mass
destruction in Iraq, in addition to the inability of the
US military to end the persistent instability in Iraq
caused by a local and foreign-based insurgency.
International economic sanctions The
lack of military strategies for dealing with Iran's
nuclear development program explain why Washington has
attempted to garner support from Great Britain, France
and Germany to have the issue of Iran's nuclear
development program referred to the UN Security Council
for vote on possible international economic sanctions.
The US already has its own sanctions on Iran, which have
remained in place since their initiation under president
Ronald Reagan in 1987, but the impact of these sanctions
has been marginal since other states such as Russia and
the Western European powers have a heavy trade volume
with Iran.
The problem with the strategy of
using the UN Security Council to punish Iran has become
evident in recent days; the flaw inherent in this
strategy is that it is unlikely Washington will be able
to achieve the political support necessary to institute
a UN sanctions resolution. The Europeans have remained
hesitant to the idea and China and Russia - two states
that would hold a veto over any resolution - are
brutally opposed to that outcome. Indeed, Russia has
been the very country assisting Iran to build the
nuclear reactors that could give it the ability to
develop nuclear weapons.
Washington has
recognized these drawbacks and is pursuing a new line of
attack by garnering the support of as many influential
states as possible - mainly the three aforementioned
European states and Japan - to unite them in the demand
that Iran will not be allowed to develop nuclear
weapons. This multiparty approach is a smart strategy in
that such a union of states would pose a serious threat
to Iran's economic and diplomatic well-being, enough for
Iran to rethink the costs that its nuclear development
program could bring.
This threat hinges on the
strategy that if Washington is unable to pass a
resolution on Iran in the UN Security Council, it could
institute a more limited form of international economic
sanctions - for example, by persuading Great Britain,
France, Germany and Japan - the five largest economic
powers in the world - to institute coordinated economic
sanctions on Iran.
(Editor's note: On
Thursday, Iran said that it had not accepted a proposal
of the EU to trade nuclear technology with its uranium
enrichment program. "It is just at the initial stage.
The matter has to be considered on both sides," Sirius
Naseri, an Iranian official, said. At a three-hour
closed-door meeting with Germany, France and Britain at
the French mission to the United Nations, Iran and the
EU trio agreed to have further talks before the November
25 meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency,
Naseri said. If the November meeting is inconclusive,
the matter will be referred to the Security Council for
possible sanctions against Iran. The EU offer, which
included the provision of a light-water nuclear reactor,
nuclear fuels and nuclear technology, received reluctant
blessings from the US, which suspected that Iran was
using the talks to buy time and that EU technology would
be employed in developing nuclear weapons. The EU offer
came a day after Iranian President Mohammad Khatami said
his country would not yield to pressure and stop
enriching uranium, which he insisted was only for power
generation and was totally transparent.)
Nevertheless, the US is far from achieving
this level of support, which explains its present course
of offering concessions, an approach more similar to the
methods of the European states. Through this technique,
Washington will attempt to work with the Europeans by
offering limited concessions to Iran, to which
Washington assumes Tehran will reject, and, once that is
done, Washington will be better able to convince the
Europeans to help refer the issue to the UN Security
Council for international economic sanctions, or, if
that fails, to place multiparty sanctions on the
country.
As stated by US Deputy Secretary of
State Richard Armitage, "We hold the view that Iran
needs to be brought to account and we would like to move
to the UN Security Council after the November
[International Atomic Energy Agency] board of governors'
meeting." Armitage continued, arguing that "one thing
has become clear and that is that we all share - the G8
- the same end, the desire, and that is that Iran should
be free of nuclear weapons and be transparent and let
the international community have sufficient confidence
that that is the case."
This backdoor diplomacy
could bring surprising results if the US truly offers
incentives to the Iranian regime. If Washington offers
genuine concessions, it's possible that Iran could
decide that a relationship with the US would be more
beneficial to its interests than the risks inherent in
developing nuclear arms. Tehran also could go far in the
way of assistance to US aims in Iraq, since the large
Shi'ite Muslim population in Iraq is at least somewhat
influenced by Iranian Shi'ites. If the US would begin to
trade again with Iran, like it did under Shah Mohammad
Reza Pahlavi, Tehran would have less of a need to
independently protect itself from outside threats. Yet
the probability of this outcome is minute since both
Tehran and Washington hold deep misgivings about each
other's intentions.
Furthermore, officials in
Tehran have made repeated statements on their
unwillingness to abandon their nuclear development
program. On October 12, for example, Iranian Foreign
Minister Kamal Kharrazi told a news conference, "It is
wrong for [the Europeans] to think they can, through
negotiation, force Iran to stop enrichment. Iran will
never give up its right to enrichment." Of course, at
other times, Iranian leaders have offered more
conciliatory statements which seem to contradict past
statements by other officials. This confusion spawns
from what political analyst Michael A Weinstein has
labeled Iran's "polycentric politics, in which decisions
on security and foreign policy are the result of
shifting alliances and independent initiatives" leading
to seemingly opposed policies.
The present
conflict between the US and Iran continues to evolve,
with each side crafting strategies that will protect its
interests. Iran, which seeks to control the nuclear fuel
cycle, uses intimidation in attempts to display the
inevitability of the completion of its nuclear
development program. Nevertheless, when faced with
pressure from other G8 countries - mainly those of
Europe - Tehran has shifted strategies and has taken a
more conciliatory approach, desperately avoiding the
threat of European economic sanctions. Therefore, Iran's
strategy can be clearly explained as one that aims to
control the nuclear fuel cycle as long as that quest
does not jeopardize its relations with other economic
powers that are critical to the country's continued
growth.
The US, on the other hand, has
threatened Iran with serious repercussions if it fails
to give up its nuclear enrichment aims. Yet, suffering
from the loss of power resulting from instability in
Iraq, Washington does not have any viable military
options with which to threaten Tehran. At last
recognizing this conundrum, the Bush administration has
chosen to negotiate with the Europeans to develop a
strategy that will effectively threaten Tehran with
international economic sanctions, preferably through the
United Nations but, if that proves impossible, through
multiparty sanctions by the major economic powers of the
G8. Finally, this approach also has the benefit of
delaying any sort of confrontation between Washington
and Tehran at a time when any new political development
could dramatically affect the upcoming US presidential
elections.
The Israel factor US support
of Israel is both historical and consistent. It is
primarily founded on US geopolitical interests. The
state of Israel is an isolated country heavily dependent
on the US for its survival. This dependence allows
Washington to use the country to further its interests
in the Middle East - interests such as preventing any
independent Middle Eastern power from becoming a
regional hegemon.
A primary interest of the US
in the Middle East is a stable oil supply. For oil
dependent countries such as the US, a cheap, stable oil
supply is essential for their economies. In order to
create favorable conditions, the US has been involved in
the internal affairs of significant states in order to
foster a form of government that will work to fulfill
these needs; an example of joint US-British maneuvering
to produce these conditions was the forced regime change
of Iranian leader Mohammed Mossadegh in 1953, shortly
after he nationalized Iran's oil industry.
The
goal of oil dependent countries has been to keep Middle
Eastern states dependent on the West for both their
economic success and their military protection. To keep
these states dependent, it is imperative that no Middle
Eastern country accrue enough power to be able to shake
off their dependency on the West and to practice a
foreign policy that exploits the desperate need for oil
by the dependent consumers.
There have been
occasions when a Middle Eastern state has dominated and
attempted to become a regional power. Gamal Addel
Nasser's Egypt and Saddam's Iraq both fit this model. In
such cases, Western countries, led by the US, have
utilized the Middle Eastern pseudo-proxy state of Israel
to return the region to the status quo.
Washington has unloaded high-tech weapons onto
this state and has given it a grossly disproportionate
military advantage over its neighbors. This advantage
can be seen in the various wars that have returned the
Middle Eastern balance of power into the favor of
Israel. Israel has also taken small-scale actions to
deal strategic blows to potential regional powers, seen
in its 1981 strike on the Osirak nuclear reactor in
Iraq.
Israel's small size and cultural isolation
has prevented it from forming any sort of military
alliance with neighboring states; its regional position
also has spared it from the vast oil reserves that
litter the territory of other states in the region.
These factors explain why Israel has remained a state
reliant on Washington, emitting only a facade of total
independence - a facade that would vanish were the US to
withdraw its support.
Israel's geostrategic
dilemma is perfect for Washington policymakers;
Jerusalem is basically a US battleship in the Middle
East, largely beholden to US interests. This reality is
what allows the US to overlook its harsh measures when
it confronts the terror tactics used by its rebellious
Palestinian population, in addition to overlooking its
settlements in the disputed territories of the West
Bank, Gaza Strip and Golan Heights.
The
challenge from Iran The world now sees a replay
of 1981, the year when Iraq was growing in regional
power and was treading closer to a nuclear weapons
capability; a situation that resulted in an Israeli air
strike on Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor to stifle
Baghdad's quest for nuclear arms. Now, very similar
developments are occurring, this time with the Islamic
Republic of Iran. Iran has the potential of becoming a
regional power due to its large semi-industrialized and
educated population, and its strategic position of
sitting on vast oil reserves, while also bordering the
Caspian Sea and acting as a hub between Central Asia,
the Caucasus and the Middle East.
Iran's
influence in the Caucasus - an area that is to be a
major oil transit route from the Caspian Sea city of
Baku to the West, via the Turkish port city of Ceyhan -
is critical, since a powerful Iran would have the
ability to affect events in the strategically
significant state of Azerbaijan. Iran also enjoys
cordial relations with Russia, with Moscow assisting in
its nuclear research program; a relationship that partly
stems from Moscow's desire to keep the US, and the West,
out of the affairs of the Caucasus and Central Asia.
Therefore, Iran's regional position is very
significant. If Tehran were to realize a nuclear weapons
capability, it would mean that Iran could become a
regional power in a position to dictate oil resources,
endangering the interests of the oil dependent countries
led by the US.
This explains why the US has been
struggling to prevent Iranian acquisition of nuclear
arms. In September, John Bolton, under secretary of
state for arms control and international security, told
journalists in Jerusalem that Washington is "determined
that they [Iran] are not going to achieve a nuclear
weapons capability". Both the US and Israel have
threatened Iran, and there is speculation that Israel
has been formulating potential military strategies to
strike Iran's nuclear facilities in a repeat, albeit on
a much larger and more dangerous scale, of its 1981
strike on Iraq's Osirak reactor.
A powerful Iran
could cause regional instability. Unlike Israel, Iran's
size and oil resources give it the opportunity to become
an independent and powerful state. A powerful Iran would
dwarf Israel's power and suppress that country's foreign
policy leverage in the Middle East. This result would be
hotly resisted by Israel, possibly spawning a military
struggle in the region - which is still reeling from the
invasion of Iraq. Such a struggle could easily disrupt
oil supplies in a market already heavily plagued with
uncertainty. Furthermore, lacking the troops to invade
Iran, any struggle would likely fester and create
regional implications for years to come.
A
weakened Israel would provide impetus to regional
states, such as Syria, that contest Israeli domination.
Non-state actors, too, like Hezbollah - an organization
already supported by Iran - would be emboldened and
could escalate their attacks on the Israeli state.
Iran's acquisition of nuclear arms would also
certainly affect other Middle Eastern states, possibly
igniting a new arms race. If nuclear weapons were to
proliferate to the Middle East, states such as Turkey
and Saudi Arabia might feel the need to begin their own
nuclear weapons programs in order to protect their
territory.
Published with permission of
thePower and Interest News Report,
an analysis-based publication that seeks to provide
insight into various conflicts, regions and points of
interest around the globe. All comments should be
directed tocontent@pinr.com
