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COMMENTARY
Vanished
fear of an al-Qaeda attack
By
Ehsan Ahrari
Americans, I am sure,
are happy that they are no longer bombarded with
the fear-mongering public warnings of "imminent"
and impending al-Qaeda attacks, and the
announcements of heightened "threat levels" that were
abound during the presidential election campaign.
Now reality is at the other extreme. It appears as
if al-Qaeda has virtually disappeared from
America's domestic radar screen, even though it is very
much present in carrying out most of the attacks
on US forces in Iraq. How should one explain
this reality?
Has the threat of a
potential al-Qaeda attack on the US really
dissipated, or was it not that worrisome a factor
to begin with? A good way of finding an answer is
to understand the cumbersome strategy of al-Qaeda
in Iraq and its linkage with that entity's global
strategy, especially in relation to attacking the
United States at home.
The long-term
presence of the US in Iraq offers al-Qaeda a
tremendous opportunity to engage it as brutally
and as frequently as possible. The terrorist
entity is convinced that it can defeat the lone
superpower there for two reasons.
First, America's "Vietnam syndrome" is
legendary. Simply put, that syndrome states that if a high
number of American troops were to die in Iraq
over a prolonged period of time, it
would seriously consider pulling out. Richard Nixon
devised the strategy of "Vietnamization" of the
Vietnam War, not only to lower the casualty rates
of American soldiers, but also to let the South
Vietnamese take over the brunt of fighting and
dying for their country. That strategy was to
deliver Nixon a way out, an "honorable" withdrawal
from Vietnam.
That very same
strategy is being implemented in Iraq through
the massive training of the indigenous forces. The US
tried in vain to get substantial force
commitments from such European countries as France
and Germany; Asian states such as India; and even
from Muslim countries, who knew better than to become
a part of the US occupation of a Muslim state.
The Bush administration even attempted to extract
a commitment of North Atlantic Treaty
Organization forces without much success. Thus
Washington's last best hope became the massive training of
the Iraqi security forces, with the hope that,
like the South Vietnamese soldiers, Iraqi boys
would fight and die for their country, thereby
paving the way for an eventual US withdrawal.
Second, al-Qaeda seems to be convinced
that the frequent and massive killing of Iraqi
forces will result in the defeat of America's
strategy of "Iraqization" of the Iraq war. In this
regard, that organization and other insurgent
groups appear to have been quite effective.
Let's also not forget the
relationship between the large-scale killing of Iraqi
security forces and the upcoming elections in that
country. Here again, al-Qaeda's purpose is to make
January 30 elections as questionable as possible. It
knows that, given the rising enthusiasm of the
Shi'ites and the Kurds to participate in the elections,
it is facing an uphill battle. Even if, as the
worst-case scenario from the US vantage point, most
Sunnis were not to participate, still about 80%
of popular participation - or something close to
it - would make the Iraqi elections quite meaningful.
(Even the US is notorious for having a low
voter turnout - percentages around the low to mid-50s - during
its presidential elections. For congressional
elections, that turnout rate goes down even
further.) However, the absence of Sunni
participation, or even a very low turnout, would
constantly raise doubts, both domestically and in
the global arena, about the legitimacy of the
elected Iraqi government.
The overall
outcome of the preceding, as al-Qaeda envisages,
would result in a long stay of US forces in Iraq.
The longer the US stays in Iraq, the better the
chances for it to be bled into withdrawal - ie,
its defeat. Indeed, that very same reality resulted
in the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in
1989. One can argue ad nauseam whether al-Qaeda's
calculation is valid. The validity of it
will only be proved or disproved over time. But the
underlying logic or rationality of it may not be
questioned.
So how does the preceding
relate to the question raised earlier of whether
the al-Qaeda-related threat has dissipated?
The struggle between the US and al-Qaeda
is not about Iraq alone. It is, first and
foremost, about reclaiming the Arab Middle East
from US dominance. The rest of the Islamic world
is the secondary part of its global campaign.
For that purpose, engaging the United States in
Iraq and bleeding it is a crucial aspect of
al-Qaeda's war, but it isn't an end in itself.
Al-Qaeda knows that striking the US at home is the
most important aspect of its success: taking
terrorism to America. Osama bin Laden was quite
unequivocal when he said, around the time of the
US military campaign against the Taliban regime,
"We want you to feel the same terror that we have
been experiencing for a long time." In this sense,
it is sheer folly to think that al-Qaeda will not
strike the US again. Unfortunately, that old adage
- it is not a matter of "if" but "when" - is most
apt.
The encounters between
President George W Bush and challenger John Kerry involving
al-Qaeda were about winning the election. Bush won
that contest. But the most troubling question of
the day is whether the US is deceiving itself in
thinking that the threat of al-Qaeda has
dissipated.
Ehsan Ahrari, PhD,
is an Alexandria, Virginia, US-based independent
strategic analyst.
(Copyright 2005
Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please
contact us for information on sales, syndication and republishing.) |
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