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    Middle East
     Feb 16, 2008
Page 2 of 2
TERROR THROUGH A MORAL LENS, Part 2
The star-spangled delusion
By David Young

countries that - whether by lack of desire or capacity - enable militant groups to attack soft and hard targets of the US and its allies abroad. We negotiate and are explicitly allied with Pakistan's dictator President Pervez Musharraf, who consistently strikes deals with Pashtun militants (some Taliban, some not) promising them free reign to smuggle copious amounts of opium out of Afghanistan and attack North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces there.

In exchange, Musharraf solicits empty assurances that his own regime will not be the target of their aggression. These assurances have proven useless to a crippled Musharraf, but



regardless, these assurances were and are, in fact, negotiated. More importantly, in the weeks after 9/11, because we zeroed in on Osama bin Laden and his sponsoring Taliban regime in Afghanistan, we had no choice but to buy Musharraf's cooperation - as limited as it certainly has been.

Likewise, we negotiate oil prices with Near East tyrants because we are "addicted to oil", as Bush has said, even though the greatest beneficiaries to these deals often dedicate their wealth to terrorizing Americans and our allies in the region. Now, after nearly five years of stubborn self-delusion, we have decided to initiate the early stages of a very quiet and important negotiation with the Islamic regime in Iran over the stability of Iraq and Iran's nuclear weapons program.

In fact, even if our government did not negotiate with terrorists and their respective sponsors on a regular basis, the American government negotiates under countless other types of severe duress, which we strangely regard as benign "diplomacy". We negotiate with China about import-export tariffs that cost Americans hundreds of thousands of jobs because we believe that this benefits our nation in the long run. We negotiate with Mexico over illegal immigrants because we are worried about Latino contributions to America's melting pot.

When the Soviet Union inserted nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles into Cuba, we negotiated with them (though in secret) because, in order for us to pose an effective nuclear deterrence, we had to have more warning than the few seconds it would take for those missiles to reach Miami some 140 kilometers away. Under unfathomable duress, we eagerly negotiated during these 13 incomparable days.

Countless nations would add terrorism and kidnapping to the above list of obviously worrisome but normal forms of "leverage" - exceptionally persuasive leverage, but leverage nonetheless. In contrast, we see kidnapping and terrorism as extortion, and (ironically) our elected leaders actually feed into this delusion for the same reason that they negotiate with our enemies: they have to. Grounded in reality, they are compelled by a landscape that offers no other way to keep themselves and America at the head of the table.

Compromise is not a moral imperative, but rather a distinctly political one. So if we are repulsed by foreign insistence that we negotiate under duress, then this repulsion has nothing to do with morality, but is instead the standard and understandable reaction of any party facing a tactical disadvantage in negotiations. Employing moral rhetoric enables us to cope with feelings of utter impotence. Yet even if our resolve was, in fact, based on moral considerations, then we would be fooling ourselves to think we are able to measure up to these standards in a world that is already brimming with compromise at every turn.

Furthermore, the fact that the above negotiations with the Soviet Union, Pakistan, Mexico and Cuba were with "legitimate" governments is entirely irrelevant. It is not the statelessness of terrorists that repulses us, if only because there are countless transnational entities that have our endless admiration, like Amnesty International and the Red Cross. Instead, it is our vulnerability to their methods that terrifies us - a fear, no less, that is magnified by our inability to conquer our enemies or even overcome the fears they inspire.

Yet rather than come to terms with our fears, we continue lusting for assurances that our moral virtue compels us not to negotiate with terrorists, and simultaneously, that these very virtues also make our wholesale victory inevitable. Like every other person on the planet, Americans prefer not to negotiate under duress, and we are right to dread it; the world can be exceedingly erratic and unstable.

Yet even if it was the illegitimacy or statelessness of terrorists that bothered us, and even if we really managed to boycott every negotiation with every party that has ever expressed contempt for the US, then every other country in the world would continue to negotiate with their respective enemies, much as they do now, because they recognize that a country can have no power if it boycotts any negotiation where it is at more of a disadvantage than it would prefer to be.

Granted, if we are the only ones who suddenly refuse to negotiate with terrorists - assuming we can pull off such a feat - then the terrorists that America is determined to punish for their behavior will certainly learn that terrorizing Americans does not work. But because everyone else would still negotiate with them, America could only sustain such a boycott as long as it maintained a completely isolationist policy.

If we are the only ones not negotiating, terrorists will not be cut off. In fact, America will be cut off. Like any superpower, we Americans succeed at minding our own business only when we generously define everyone else's home as "our business". Regardless, cutting ourselves off would be far worse than capitulating to terrorism, but thankfully, those are not the only two choices, as the nations accustomed to negotiated disappointments can attest. Again, the point is not simply that we should negotiate with terrorists, but rather, that we already do, and rightly so.

Accusations of American inconsistency and double standards notwithstanding, an equally consequential dissonance among the American people brews unscrutinized. That is, more important than how the US government treats other nations is how that government relates to us, its constituency. Our government openly negotiates with our enemies but then tells us that we Americans refuse to "bow down to terrorism" because we are just and moral people. And naturally, we love hearing this. Both as Westerners and as members of the most powerful nation in history, how could we not enjoy hearing this?

Yet regardless of whether Americans are righteous or not, insisting that we are makes it impossible for our government to tell us what we must hear: sometimes, despite our unprecedented power, we still have to make uncomfortable sacrifices to get what we want; and even worse, sometimes we will not be able to get what we want, no matter the sacrifices we might be willing to make. If we are not prepared to admit this, then surely our elected leaders will never do so, because they know that Americans do not like being reminded that it takes a lot more work to remain the most powerful nation than it does to become the most powerful nation.

Consider, for instance, the American public's bitter reaction to Jimmy Carter's infamous "malaise" speech, when he told Americans, "In a nation that was proud of hard work, strong families, close-knit communities and our faith in God, too many of us now tend to worship self-indulgence and consumption. Human identity is no longer defined by what one does but by what one owns." And contrast this speech and its backfire with the glee we felt when Bush insisted after 9/11 that the best thing we could do for our country would be to go shopping.

If we were powerful enough not to have to negotiate with our enemies while under duress, then rest assured, we never would. In fact, if we were that powerful (by nearly any definition of power) then we would never negotiate at all. We would just take. But we are not that powerful, and we need the willing assistance of millions across the globe to ensure our safety and prosperity. We hate weakness, and we hate dependence. But we also hate expensive gasoline, and we hate watching a genocide unfold on CNN.

Unaccustomed to fear and vulnerability, we have been unable to recognize that all of us, all over the world, have always been and will forever be more vulnerable than we would like. Absent this self-awareness, we could only paint the "war on terror" as all-or-nothing, as unequivocally brave or cowardly. And as a result, we cannot end this war touting anything less than the unconditional surrender of our enemy - an obviously misguided goal in asymmetrical warfare, especially if our enemies are so diffuse that they could never agree on anything, and certainly not their terms for surrender. Hoping to avoid the eternal scorn of history books, Bush will stay at war indefinitely, and long after his successor withdraws our troops, when we feel another "flukish" sense of vulnerability in the future, our leaders will have exactly the same response, and the cycle will repeat itself.

But there is simply no need to view this so-called "war on terror" as an all-or-nothing battle. In fact, the only thing worse than not winning the war on terror would be not losing the war on terror, either. Like the wars on poverty and drugs, the best we can hope for is a vain fizzle for this war, far from the spotlight.

We have to make compromises, we have to negotiate with our enemies because they captured our soldier, and we want their oil; or because they killed our soldier, and they burned our oil. On 9/11, our culture framed the familiar debate around morality so that any US president in Bush's position would have been incapable of considering his choices outside the Manichean dynamic of cowardice (doing nothing, tolerating evil) and unleashing hell (doing everything, over and again). Without a middle ground, we will return to this battle, as though our sanity depended on it, again and again.

Whatever else America might need to win the "war on terror," what we need most is humility - and not because we are moral people who should care about how we treat others, although that is true, as well. No, we need humility for the simple reason that we cannot defeat terrorism by any definition of "defeat" and any definition of "terrorism".

We cannot defeat terrorism any more than we can defeat hatred or vulgarity. It is simply out of our league, out of anyone's league. And the longer we tell ourselves that we are that powerful - that we are essentially invulnerable because we morally deserve to be invulnerable - the longer we will find ourselves hopelessly watching replays of our crumbling foundations, staring at the face of an enemy we don't understand, and worse, locked in a battle with our own reflection, which we understand even less.

David Young is a fellow at Abraham's Vision and a graduate student at the Institute for Conflict Resolution at George Mason University in Arlington, Virginia. He has studied and participated in conflict resolution and peacebuilding projects in the Balkans, the Caucasus, Israel/Palestine, West Africa, Northern Ireland and Kashmir. He can be contacted at

(Copyright 2008 David Young.)

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