Page 2 of
2 Turkey's
offensive comes at a price By M
K Bhadrakumar
General Staff, General Ergin
Saygun, received his American counterpart, General
James Cartwright, and the US's top commander in
Iraq, General David Petraeus, in Ankara for
follow-up discussions. They established a
mechanism for intelligence-sharing. And the US
began supplying Turkey with real-time intelligence
regarding PKK activities in northern Iraq.
By the time US Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice arrived in Ankara a week later in
early December, she could already acknowledge that
Turkey had a "comprehensive plan" to fight the
PKK. The tacit understanding with the US enabled
Turkey to launch the air strikes inside northern
Iraq from December 16 onward. Washington - and
European countries - openly accepted
the
legitimacy of Turkey's attacks on the PKK bases.
It was a major diplomatic and military victory for
Ankara.
Turkish columnist Cuneyt Ulsever
wrote in Hurriyet, "My greatest pleasure in this
operation is that Turkey was able to show the
entire world that it is the greatest power in the
Middle East. This should be a warning not only to
the PKK, but to all nations about Turkey's
superiority in terms of both technology and the
human capital employing it."
The
US-Turkish bonding rapidly thickened as it happens
when old friends get together. At a speech at the
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
during his visit to the US in January, Turkish
President Abdullah Gul said, "Turkey and United
States are partners in Iraq. Needless to say, we
both have [a] great stake in Iraq's security and
stability and welfare."
Even the left-wing
Kemalist Cumhuriyet newspaper acknowledged, "A new
era is upon us [in US-Turkey relations]." With a
sense of deja vu, Iraqi Kurd leaders began
realizing that Bush has done a Kissingerian trick
on them and the ground has shifted beneath their
feet. Since November, they have been resigned to
the inevitability of Turkish military operations
inside northern Iraq. More important, they have
assessed that with the u-turn in US policy, the
odds are heavily stacked against them. The Kurds
know from long experience it is futile to be
defiant of a superpower, especially when it bonds
with a strong regional power - at least for the
time being.
Both Barzani and Kurdish
leader and President Jalal Talabani have accepted
that as long as the Turkish operations are in the
nature of "limited military incursions to remote,
isolated, uninhabited regions" of northern Iraq -
to quote Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebary,
who is also Barzani's nephew - they won't make a
fuss about the Turkish violation of Iraqi
sovereignty. When the Turkish jets and helicopter
gunships first appeared over the northern Iraqi
skies in mid-December, it was apparent that
Barzani had abandoned the PKK and henceforth the
latter would be on its own. Barzani expects Ankara
to appreciate his attitude as a serious concession
and an act of goodwill.
The three-way
equation throws light on an obscure aspect of
Ankara's ties with Barzani. Turkey and Barzani are
equally interested to see that the transportation
of oil from northern Iraq proceeds without
disruption. In the future, as increased volumes of
oil (and gas) begin to flow, this convergence of
interests will only get reinforced.
Muted international reaction
Ankara can derive satisfaction that there
has been no outright condemnation of its military
incursion by the international community. Turkish
diplomats claim that the Iraqi authorities had
"close knowledge" of the incursion in advance.
Zebary told the BBC that "all this has
been done unilaterally", but he would only point
out that the Turkish action had the "potential to
escalate" and, therefore, should end "as soon as
possible", and he couldn't "contemplate" any
protracted stay by the Turkish army on Iraqi soil.
Indeed, Europe, which is grappling with
the Kosovo issue, is hardly in a position to
prescribe the cannons of international law to
Turkey. Predictably, United Nations secretary
general Ban Ki-moon sounded defensive. The Arab
League essentially called for restraint by Turkey.
Ankara has little to worry about. US
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates sees no reason
to postpone his scheduled visit to Turkey on
Tuesday. Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak
visited Ankara on February 13. His main agenda was
to canvass for Israel's highly lucrative arms
sales to Turkey, but in his meeting with the
Turkish chief of general staff, General Yasar
Buyukanit, Barak said Israel supported Turkey's
fight against the PKK. (This was despite Gul's
criticism of Israeli attacks on Gaza when Barak
called on him.)
General James Cartwright,
deputy head of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, also
arrived in Ankara on February 13 for discussions
with his Turkish counterpart, General Ergin
Saygun, on the operations against the PKK. The two
generals are the point persons designated by
Washington and Ankara as responsible for
coordinating US-Turkey military cooperation in
countering the PKK.
Evidently, Turkey is
acting in concert with the US and Israel. The US
and Israel endorse Turkey's pre-eminent role in
northern Iraq. With the Balkans in focus and with
defeat staring in the face of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO)in Afghanistan, Turkey's
importance as a key US ally is rising. Turkey
commands the KFOR (Kosovo Force) in southern
Kosovo. Turkey has historical influence in the
Balkans.
The fact is, the Kosovo model is
both good and bad for Turkey. As Russian President
Vladimir Putin caustically suggested last week,
the West should also now recognize Northern Cyprus
as Turkish. On the other hand, Kosovo sets a bad
example for separatist elements in Turkey,
Georgia, Azerbaijan and Iraq. Ankara's prompt
decision to recognize the "independent" Kosovo was
indeed a diplomatic signal to Washington that it
is willing to harmonize its foreign policy
decisions with US geostrategy.
Turkish
role in Afghanistan However, for
Washington, it is not Ottoman Turkey's legacy in
the Balkans, which is all very well as misty
history, but what Ankara can tangibly do for it in
Afghanistan that becomes the number one priority.
Frank Hyland, a former US intelligence official
(who served in the Central Intelligence Agency's
Counter-Terrorist Center, the National Security
Agency and the National Counter-Terrorism Center)
wrote recently that Washington has requested
Turkey to step up its troop deployment in
Afghanistan and, more importantly, to deploy the
troops in active combat missions against al-Qaeda
and the Taliban. (The 1,000-strong Turkish
contingent is presently deployed in non-combat
duties in and around Kabul.)
Turkish media
criticized that the US was seeking a quid pro
quo from Turkey for its cooperation in the
fight against the PKK. This is a correct reading
of Bush's intentions. During his two-day mission
to Turkey on Tuesday, Gates will reiterate the US
expectations. Hyland says, "Washington is well
aware of the strong hand it brings to negotiations
with Turkey, considering the latter's need to
locate and track PKK guerrillas in support of
Turkish military operations."
Certainly,
when someone takes its help, Washington usually
expects the friend to return the favor. Ankara
can't be an exception. But, will the AKP
reciprocate? It will be a tough call. The Islamist
AKP government will seriously ponder over the
irony of ordering troops to get cracking on
militant Islamists as part of a NATO force, which
a growing number of alienated Pashtuns in
Afghanistan and Pakistan view as an occupation
army. Turkey would consult its close friend,
Pakistan.
But Bush is running out of time.
He will expect Erdogan and Gul to stand up and be
counted as true friends by the time NATO gathers
for its summit in Romania in early April. Hyland
sums up, "Given the stakes for the United States,
the tough negotiations over the NATO/ISAF mission
in Afghanistan have just begun with other NATO
allies as well as with Turkey. After making a
general appeal for additional troops across the
entire NATO community, the United States appears
to have chosen Turkey as the 'best-chance' ally to
focus on for immediate results.
"Turkey's
success against the PKK since real-time
intelligence made it possible to hit targets in
Iraq with pinpoint precision, is a considerable
inducement in the ongoing discussions, especially
as spring approaches - the traditional season for
the commencement of another PKK campaign."
The buck of course stops with the Turkish
Pashas. They are wise men, who are not given to
hyperbole. They will coolly evaluate the challenge
of fulfilling Bush's great expectations of Turkey
as a regional power - not only in the snow-clad,
windy Qandil mountains, but also in the
inhospitable Hindu Kush notorious for its
unwelcome ways.
M K Bhadrakumar
served as a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign
Service for over 29 years, with postings including
India's ambassador to Uzbekistan (1995-1998) and
to Turkey (1998-2001).
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