Page 2 of
2 Iran's
'bomb' and dud intelligence By
Richard M Bennett
discovered that Iran had
indeed obtained the "know-how" to manufacture
nuclear-armed weapons.
Beijing is only
believed to have decided to assist the inspectors
after documents seized from Iranian officials were
found to include details of a program for the
procurement of dual-use technology; blueprints for
"shaping" uranium into warheads and the testing of
high explosives used to detonate radioactive
material.
Chinese designs for centrifuges
that refine uranium into a "weaponized" state had
been found previously in Iran, but these had been
thought to have come exclusively through a network
controlled by disgraced
Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan.
Much of this new material was then
presented to the governors of the Vienna-based
IAEA in February. That meeting is thought to have
finally triggered China's change of heart, though
this has since been vigorously denied in some
circles
US intelligence back tracks -
again Faced with this barrage of criticism
and contradictory intelligence, the US
intelligence community simply had little choice
left but to once again accept what any experienced
observer already knew, that Iran most likely did
still have an operational nuclear weapons program.
In fact, some suggest Tehran has actually
accelerated research with the overt help of North
Korea and China, and the covert assistance of
others.
Perhaps the blinkered analysts
stalking the dimly lit corridors of CIA
headquarters at Langley may have become confused
when it was reportedly discovered that Iran had
closed down a number of home-grown nuclear
research projects, but as it turned out, probably
only because they were no longer needed.
The fractured and underachieving US
intelligence community is still apparently reeling
from the pressures of rebuilding its old
clandestine muscle, shedding years of risk
avoidance management, facing up to the demands for
more positive action from the media and trying to
duck continuing political interference from the
administration.
So have North Korea and
others simply provided nuclear weapons knowledge
to Tehran for payment in oil? This would seem the
most likely explanation, in the absence of any
contradictory hard evidence.
The Israeli
newspaper Ha'aretz recently disclosed that Israel
is deeply concerned that North Korea has indeed
transferred technology and nuclear materials to
Iran to aid a secret nuclear weapons program.
According to information reportedly obtained by
both Mossad and apparently the CIA, this is
exactly what North Korea has been doing for some
years.
This leads many to believe that
Iran remains a "clear and present danger" and a
threat to much of the Middle East - something
experienced US intelligence analysts have
privately never seriously doubted.
Certainly, Israel has quietly expressed
concerns and made rather more public preparations
- its recent massive military exercises involved
"preparing for heavy casualties" from Iranian
retaliation should an attack be deemed necessary
on Tehran's nuclear infrastructure.
Indeed, while Israel was conducting these
home defense exercises, Binyamin Ben-Eliezer, the
minister for national infrastructure, was quoted
as saying. "An Iranian attack will prompt a severe
reaction from Israel, which will destroy the
Iranian nation." He added ominously that in a
future war, "Hundreds of missiles will rain on
Israel."
So just what does Tehran have
hidden away in dozens of secret underground
military bases scattered across its vast
mountainous hinterland?
President Mahmud
Ahmadinejad announced on April 8, Iran's National
Day of Nuclear Technology, that Iran had begun
installing 6,000 new centrifuges at its
uranium-enrichment plant in Natanz. These are a
crucial addition to the 3,000 centrifuges already
operational at this highly secure facility.
It was widely seen as a show of open
defiance to international demands to halt its
nuclear program, which Tehran has always claimed
is for peaceful purposes.
Expert observers
suspect Iran is replacing its original P-1
centrifuges with the IR-2, a modified P-2
second-generation system which operates three to
four times faster. Much of the technology for
these new centrifuges was obtained from Pakistan
or covertly via the Western nuclear "black
market".
It has emerged that Pakistan and
Iran agreed in about 1987 to a deal whereby a
Pakistani centrifuge design (P-1) was provided as
a stop-gap replacement for Iran's previous
unsuccessful attempts to master uranium-enrichment
technology. The transfer of Pakistani nuclear
technology largely sponsored by rogue scientist
Khan began in 1989 and probably continued until at
least 1996.
While a total of 9,000
centrifuges still falls far short of the 30,000
many experts claim to be a minimum for even a
low-level weapons program, it can be considered
further supporting evidence for the view taken by
a non-proliferation expert from the International
Institute for Strategic Studies in London, Mark
Fitzpatrick, who stated in 2007 that "Iran has no
intention of honoring the UN mandate that it
suspend all enrichment-related activity".
However, Tehran has always claimed its
right under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
to develop a nuclear program.
Significantly, Ahmadinejad paid a little
reported visit in April 2006 to the research
complex at Neyshabour in Khorassan. This
top-secret and heavily protected facility ringed
by the most advanced Russian air defense missiles
is designed to eventually operate as many as
155,000 centrifuges.
While this does not
mean than Iran will have a genuine nuclear weapons
capability any time soon - or that it wants to -
it still provides yet another startling counter
argument to the complacency of the NIE report.
Not surprisingly, the Iranian
Revolutionary Guards Corps appears to play a
leading role in the nuclear research program and
to be in direct control of the most sensitive
facilities through a section known as the
"Pasdaran Construction Jihad".
These
facilities reportedly include the main nuclear
power plant at Bushehr; the vast advanced Nuclear
Technology Center at Esfahan/Isfahan believed to
have a staff of some 3,000 scientists, and the
uranium-enrichment facilities at Natanz and
Neyshabour.
Many analysts believe that
what is probably the most positive evidence of a
hidden weapons program is provided by the heavy
water plant at Arak. Apparently Iran does not have
the type of commercial reactor that needs heavy
water to moderate the nuclear fission chain
reaction. It could be used in the production of
plutonium for a nuclear bomb.
Western
intelligence failures over the exact nature of
Iraq's WMD capability undoubtedly played a most
significant part in the leadup to the invasion of
2003 and which has resulted in a bloody insurgency
that shows no signs of ending five years later.
It can only be hoped that the continued
intelligence failures and confusion over
Ahmadinejad's nuclear program do not blindly lead
the US and its allies into a far more dangerous
war with Iran with untold possible consequences
for both the Middle East and the Western powers.
Richard M Bennett, intelligence
consultant, AFI Research.
AFI Research provides
expert information on the world's intelligence
services, armed forces and conflicts. Contact
rbmedia@supanet.com
(Copyright 2006 AFI
Research. Used with permission.)
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