Page 1 of 2 IAEA's not-so-secret satellite game
By Peter J Brown
In one of his final interviews as director general of the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA), Mohamed ElBaradei told the Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists - in its September/October issue - that the IAEA needs to receive
better satellite imagery.
"[W]e need to receive better satellite imagery, which sometimes I get and
sometimes I don't get depending upon the policy objectives. To do it well, you
really need to have a United Nations satellite agency, something the French
proposed 30 years ago. That would allow us to receive satellite imagery in a
predictable and objective way. In short, in all of our work, we need more legal
authority, more state-of-the-art technology and more resources," said
ElBaradei.
ElBaradei added that while he is not in favor of the IAEA developing its own
intelligence capability, that "the IAEA does need the information and the
capability to analyze it and distinguish information from misinformation".
With these words, and his specific mentioning of satellite imagery and
information and misinformation, ElBaradei has presented one final mixed message
of considerable importance. Among other things, this invites closer scrutiny of
the IAEA's satellite-based activities to date, which include a very
controversial event in 2007 - the IAEA's monitoring of Syria's secret reactor
site. ElBaradei's actions and statements in late 2007 propelled the IAEA into a
heated debate that did not serve the agency's purposes.
ElBaradei had tried for weeks to makes his case and convince the world that the
IAEA's hands were tied. In effect, ElBaradei's depiction of the IAEA's
inability to obtain commercial satellite imagery - he described it as
"baffling" - damaged the IAEA's credibility. One IAEA staff member said at the
time, "Perhaps he is just frustrated."
The Israeli bombing raid that year, which obliterated the Syrian site, serves
as a chilling reminder of what might start to rapidly unfold with Iran in the
days ahead.
"In the case of the Syrian reactor, the IAEA director general complained
bitterly that he needed more satellite imagery which was not provided to him. I
beg to differ," Dr Ephraim Asculai, senior research associate at Tel Aviv
University's Institute for National Security Studies, told Asia Times Online.
"He had in his hands all the imagery he needed, both from the United States
government which was made public, and from commercial sources, to reach the
necessary conclusions. [But] he chose not to depend on these [and this] gave
him the necessary alibi to not indict Syria for its transgressions," he said.
During an interview on CNN's "Late Edition with Wolf Blitzer" on October 28,
2007, ElBaradei stumbled badly. Here is a significant excerpt from the
program's transcript.
BLITZER: I know you have seen some commercial satellite photos
though of the before and after. Are there any conclusions you can draw based on
what you have seen in those satellite photos?
ELBARADEI: These are commercial satellite photos that we procured
ourselves, has not been providing to us. And we are still investigating them.
We are still comparing the pre and after. But in addition to us buying
commercial photos, I would very much hope that countries will come forward if
they have information so we'll do - go through a due process.
BLITZER: We are almost out of time, but based on the commercial photos
that you have seen from these satellite reconnaissance, are there any
conclusions that you and your team have been able to come up with?
ELBARADEI: Not at this stage, Wolf. Not at all.
When he
told CNN that, "in addition to us buying commercial photos", the message was
pretty clear - IAEA had obtained commercial satellite imagery of the site in
Syria. Because he never complained about the quality of the imagery, this CNN
interview strongly suggests that IAEA had its hands on plenty of
high-resolution imagery, despite his accusations that many countries including
Israel had "withheld critical information".
You cannot discuss ElBaradei and satellites without mentioning this disturbing
episode. He has been in charge of the IAEA during a period of time when the
entire commercial satellite imagery market has undergone a profound
transformation. What is present and available in the commercial earth
observation satellite sector today is an astounding array of satellites
equipped with high-tech and often multi-spectral cameras which, in terms of
resolution and coverage, would have been considered prized military assets only
15 years ago.
The commercial satellite imaging companies include GeoEye and DigitalGlobe in
the US, Spot Image in France and RapidEye in Germany, to name a few.
RapidEye's fleet of five identical earth observation satellites revolve around
the earth 15 times daily and cover over 4 million square kilometers with a
spatial resolution of 6.5 meters, using multi-spectral cameras which can scan a
strip of land that is 77 kilometers wide and 1,500 kilometers long. The
satellites were launched simultaneously aboard a single Russian rocket in the
summer of 2008. They form a long chain in space with all 5 satellites passing
overhead in 19-minute intervals.
On Thursday, DigitalGlobe's new Worldview-2 satellite, which is designed to
scan more than 770,000 square miles per day, was launched. It will yield
multi-spectral images using a 1.8-meter resolution.
While the capabilities of commercial satellites like the two mentioned are
increasing steadily, what cannot go unmentioned during any discussion of the
IAEA and its dependence on satellites is the growing alliance in space
involving India and Israel. Both countries have uneasy relationships with the
IAEA which, it is safe to say, Israel distrusts.
Both nations are discovering that the advantages of their joint spy satellite
ventures far outweigh the disadvantages. Whereas Israel seeks constantly
updated satellite imagery of everything that moves in its neighborhood
including Iran, India requires the same with respect to both eastern Pakistan
and its sprawling border with China stretching from Kashmir to Myanmar.
This is about much more than Israel simply building the satellites and India
launching them. Their advanced, radar-imaging spy satellites which orbit
closely together offer at least the option of coordinated formation flying.
That said, there is no evidence that Israel and India engage in this type of
formation-flying activity, which can enhance the resulting satellite imagery of
the site under surveillance.
With Tehran's decision earlier this week to reject the Additional Protocol
which would have enabled the IAEA to conduct spot inspections of Iran's nuclear
sites quickly on the ground, sustaining and enforcing the international nuclear
safeguards agreement becomes more risky and more satellite-driven. And in the
process, Israel's desire to engage India's space-based surveillance assets
accordingly may only intensify.
This is another reason why the discussion of satellite imagery can be so
sensitive, and why the details surrounding the flow of satellite imagery can
become so murky. When the IAEA press office in Geneva was contacted and
presented with a list of questions for this commentary, the IAEA refused to
participate.
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