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Keeping the peace initiative on
track
By Syed Saleem Shahzad
KARACHI - In many ways, the talks that begin in
Islamabad on Monday between Pakistan and India are
simply the showcase of behind-the-scenes initiatives
that have been under way for some years, with the United
States as the key driver.
Since becoming
actively engaged on the Indian sub-continent over the
past few years, the US has exerted considerable pressure
on the governments in New Delhi and Islamabad. Most
noticeably, this took placed during the Kargil incident
in 1999, and after the terror attack on the Indian
parliament in December 2001. In both instances,
extensive US intervention helped prevent the countries
from going to war after they had massed close to a
million troops on their borders.
Behind-the-scenes or "track II" US diplomacy
helped defuse the crises. Underlying the US position is
the immediate goal of shutting down the war theater, in
which Islamic militants are active. The US considers
them the main immediate threat to any Kashmir
settlement, and there is always the danger that, if left
alone, an anti-US movement could take root in the Valley
along the lines of Osama bin Laden's days in Afghanistan
as a guest of the Taliban.
Another strategic US
interest is to create a situation in Kashmir, the most
sensitive spot on the political map of the region, under
which the US will be able to influence the region's
political trends, in which the key players are India,
Pakistan and China.
To a large extent, the US
strategy is on course. It has managed to help bring
India and Pakistan to the peace table, with talks
starting on Monday. Now the hard bargaining will begin.
Tracking track II
The present round of
track II diplomacy - or confidence-building measures -
began in the mid-1990s during the second tenure of
Pakistani premier Nawaz Sharif. The main players on the
Pakistan side were former vice chief of army staff,
General K M Arif; former foreign secretary and foreign
minister, Abdus Sattar; career diplomat Niaz A Naik; and
former diplomat Sardar Ahmed.
On the Indian
side, those active included Muchkan Dubay, former
foreign secretary; Admiral Ram Das, who is affiliated
with a non-governmental organization; I K Gujral, a
former premier; and Kuldeep Nayyar, a prominent
journalist.
Think tanks: Friends,
an organization run by General Mirza Aslam Beg of
Pakistan, held several seminars sponsored by
international donor agencies in which, for the first
time, ideas of a common currency and no visa
restrictions were suggested for South Asian countries.
M Farooq Kathwari helped set up a US-sponsored
group in Washington called the Kashmir Study Group. This
initiative and its work have given real importance and
significance to track II diplomacy, and the group
remains an influential player. Its members include Dr
Ainslie T Embree of Columbia University, former US
ambassador Howard B Schaffer and Dr Joseph E
Schwartzberg of the University of Minnesota.
These and other experts have visited the region
and interacted with a cross-section of society in India
and Pakistan. They chose 125 individuals in India and 75
from Pakistan to submit suggestions that were then used
to pen a document entitled "Charting Paths to Peace".
This was widely circulated, and after amendments was
redrafted as "A Way Forward" and presented to then
Pakistani premier Nawaz Sharif and his Indian
counterpart Atal Bihari Vajpayee, still the current
India premier. From this time, both countries recognized
the importance of track II diplomacy and decided to
adopt it at an official level. Anwer Zahid, principal
secretary to the premier from the Pakistan side and
Berjaish Mishara from the Indian side were appointed.
These officials then began the process of developing
different proposals and hypothesis for a Kashmir
solution. After Zahid's death, Naiz A Naik took his
place.
Naik often spelled out that in Europe
rivers and mountains are used as demarcations for
boundaries to resolve conflicts. He argued that the same
option should apply to Kashmir. But as a counter to
this, the "Chanab formula" was devised under which
Kashmir would be divided along religious lines.
Apparently, Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf
favors this solution, but not Vajpayee.
Under
the Chanab solution, the parts of Kashmir that are
presently administered by Pakistan and India would be
partitioned instead in such a way that the
Muslim-majority areas would be allowed to join Pakistan,
and the areas where Hindus and Buddhists are in the
majority would remain with India. If put into effect,
most of the areas that are already in Pakistan's control
would remain with it. However, Pakistan would also get
most parts of Jammu and Kashmir state in Indian-run
Kashmir, including the summer capital Srinagar. India
would retain most of the Jammu region, as well as Ladakh
and some of the areas adjoining it. At present, India
holds about 45 percent of the disputed region, Pakistan
over 33 percent and China the remainder.
A
recent position paper from the non-government sector in
the US is called "New Priorities in South Asia: US
Policy Towards India, Pakistan and Afghanistan." It came
out late last year, the product of two years' work
sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations and the
Asia Society in New York. "Given the dangers inherent in
the festering India-Pakistan rivalry, the United States
should be more active in trying to help the two
nuclear-armed enemies manage their differences,
including the Kashmir dispute," the report suggested.
"In addition, and in the light of the nuclear
proliferation risks in South Asia, the executive branch
should be searching for ways to integrate nuclear India
and Pakistan within the global non-proliferation
framework. Meanwhile, it should be working to ensure
tighter controls against leakage of sensitive nuclear
technology and material." the paper argued.
Naik
and Mishara still head track II initiatives. Naik's
proposal to use mountains and rivers as demarcation
lines is still under consideration, but now the thinking
is centered on a division purely on a geographical
basis. Recent discussions have centered on a formula for
the transfer of people in the event that a geographical
division does take place.
These deliberations
will continue well after the two days of talks in
Islamabad end, and it is from them that any real
progress will be made, well beyond glaring cameras and
the attention of the international media.
(Copyright 2004 Asia Times Online Ltd. All
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