Why the
general begs to differ
By Syed Saleem Shahzad
KARACHI - Islamabad and Washington have agreed to a plan under which Pakistan
will hand over all necessary source material regarding its dealings with Iran's
nuclear program, in exchange for which the US will not take action against the
most sensitive people suspected of involvement in the underground network which
facilitated the proliferation with Iran.
In mid-2003, a worldwide nuclear-proliferation network based in Pakistan was
unearthed, headed by Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan, the father of Pakistan's nuclear
program. According to a report issued by the US Central Intelligence Agency on
November 23 this year, Khan not only sold advanced uranium-enrichment
centrifuges to Iran, he likely also sold it an actual nuclear-weapon design,
along with nuclear fuel material. The network also apparently had dealings with
North Korea and Libya.
The specific period in which this network spread its wings is said to be from
1987 to 2003. After the exposure, Pakistan's military government put the blame
squarely on Khan, saying that he operated the network entirely independently
and without the knowledge of the army, which oversaw Pakistan's nuclear
development program. Khan even gave a confession on national television.
However, there has been widespread skepticism, especially in the West, that the
network could have operated without the knowledge of the generals.
Former chief of army staff General Aslam Beg [1], who held the position from
1988 to 1991, is frequently mentioned as being pivotal in the network, and in
aiming to build an Iran-Afghanistan-Pakistan nexus to challenge US influence in
the region.
However, people close to the security establishment who spoke to Asia Times
Online point out that it is somewhat naive to point to Beg alone - if the army
were involved in the network, it would most likely be on a much more
institutionalized basis. Certainly, the army is known to have helped organize
trips for Khan and a number of his scientists to Iran.
But whereas before the US might have been interested in tracking the nature of
the Pakistan army's involvement in proliferation - with potentially explosive
consequences for Washington's key ally in the "war on terror" - the focus has
now been narrowed to find evidence that Iran is indeed pursuing a nuclear arms
program. Islamabad is lending its weight to this initiative, and is prepared to
ask Khan, who is under house arrest, some hard questions.
Against this backdrop, Asia Times Online spoke by telephone to Aslam Beg
in Rawalpindi, the twin capital of Islamabad where army headquarters are
housed.
Asia Times Online: Some top US think-tanks believe you had a role
in nuclear proliferation. What are your comments?
Beg: When I was chief of army staff, Pakistan made great progress
towards developing its atomic program and delivery system, my role was
restricted to that only.
ATol: Some people say you were involved in selling nuclear
programs to countries such as Iran.
Beg: This is absolutely wrong and a baseless allegation. I tell
you, had these allegations been true the US would not have spared me. because
it has a grudge against me as I always took a stance against US designs in the
region.
ATol: But Pakistan's nuclear program was developed under the
Pakistani army. How could an individual like Khan manage to work independently
and continue to do so for at least 16 years?
Beg: Dr A Q Khan was given special status and power. We all
trusted in him and gave him a free hand to develop Pakistan's nuclear program.
We had no idea that he would misuse his powers.
ATol: Are you satisfied with Pakistan's handling of the nuclear
proliferation issue?
Beg: Absolutely. Pakistan has identified the people involved in
the network. Dr A Q Khan confessed his involvement. Now we have solicited the
US to stay away from Dr Khan and let us handle interrogation matters.
ATol: The way Pakistan exposed its own people to the
international community, would it not threaten Pakistan's nuclear program?
Beg: They had been exposed anyway and we did not have any other
way out. I agreed in principle with [President General Pervez] Musharraf's
handling of the issue. Now we will help catch the whole network and there will
be no threat to Pakistan's nuclear program. They were only rumors that after
Pakistan's scientists had been exposed in nuclear proliferation, Pakistan's
program would be capped or rolled back. It is not possible in the regional
context, where India is a nuclear power and we possess nuclear weapons as a
deterrent, that Pakistan would alone be forced to roll back or cap its nuclear
program.
ATol: Was a better strategy possible? Was it necessary to
disgrace Dr Khan before the nation?
Beg: Yes, it could have been done more politely, but I tell you
the whole episode was inevitable because the person [Khan] was involved [in
proliferation].
Note
[1] General Mirza Aslam Beg was vice chief of army staff in General Zia
ul-Haq's military administration, and after Zia's death in a plane crash he was
immediately made chief in August 1988. He was born in Azam Garh, British India.
Zia's son and the incumbent federal minister of religious affairs have blamed
Beg in the press for being behind the crash, the cause of which was never
officially established.
After Zia's death, Beg helped Pakistan to a peaceful transition of power
through general elections after which the Pakistan People's Party's (PPP's)
Benazir Bhutto became premier. In the meantime, Beg's then director general of
the Inter-Services Intelligence, Lieutenant-General Hamid Gul, and Beg were
accused of gathering all right-wing parties under the umbrella of the Islamic
Democratic Alliance against the PPP.
Beg remained a powerful chief of army staff until 1991, a period in which
Pakistan developed nuclear weapons.
After his retirement Beg remained a controversial figure, both for his alleged
role in a bank scandal and the nuclear proliferation issue. He founded the
think-tank Friends and the non-political Awami Qaiyadat Party (National
Leadership Party) and continued to be a powerful part of Pakistan's ruling
oligarchs.
President General Pervez Musharraf served under bith Beg and Gul, and
apparently had high respect for them, but after September 11, 2001, they
gradually drifted apart. Their differences surfaced for the first time when in
a press conference Musharraf spoke about the negative role of a few generals
and called them "pseudo-intellectuals".
Beg raised a storm in 1991 when he publicly refused to send troops to the
Persian Gulf (troops were sent later, but only to be deployed for the safeguard
of holy places in Saudi Arabia) to take part in the action against Iraq. This,
for the first time, strained relations between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.
