Widespread fallout from India-US pact
By Brad Glosserman and Bates Gill
The United States-India civilian nuclear agreement was signed into law this
month after two years of negotiations and bitter debate, yet the deal's final
terms have sharply divided arms control and non-proliferation specialists. The
focus of this often-emotional debate revolves around a simple question: is the
deal a meaningful compromise that protects India's national security interests
and the integrity of the nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), or does it
give Delhi too much power and undermine the NPT? The debate continues with no
consensus in sight.
Unfortunately the deal's potentially far greater consequences are garnering far
less attention. In particular, little has been said about how this deal is seen
in other countries, the precedent it appears to set, and the impact it has on
US leadership generally, especially on nonproliferation issues. These are
equally critical
concerns and, while we are still in early days, they may come back to haunt
this agreement.
Make no mistake: Washington's decision to agree to terms with Delhi offers hope
to other governments considering nuclear weapons that they too may receive
special status. India's insistence that it is a unique case - as it never
signed the NPT and it developed its own nuclear technology - is unlikely to
make an impression on would-be proliferators which have seen India gain
official recognition despite its rejection of the NPT. Even if this is only
hope masquerading as reason, it is still likely to encourage proliferation.
While proliferation concerns top the list of the deal's critics, other
political and security problems loom. Japan, for example, has made support for
the NPT a cornerstone of its diplomacy and a core element of its postwar
identity. Strategists in Japan are dismayed that a country which has
consistently thwarted the will of the international community on proliferation
issues would be rewarded for its obstinacy, and its status enhanced in the
process. Delhi, like Tokyo, has sought a permanent seat on the United Nations
Security Council, and Japan is confounded by the notion that India has not paid
a price for insisting on having a nuclear arsenal - that being "a good nuclear
citizen" does not count for much.
Japanese officials and strategists also worry that the US-India agreement could
pave the way for a nuclear-armed Korean Peninsula. Even though all six
governments participating in the multilateral talks to deal with North Korea's
nuclear weapons programs have declared their goal is a denuclearized Korean
Peninsula, there is a fear in Tokyo (and elsewhere) that those talks will yield
a "gray" Korean nuclear capability, neither confirmed nor denied. Japanese
strategists argue this could be the tipping point that encourages their country
to reconsider its nuclear options - even if the finger on the button is
"Korean", not North Korean.
Japan's concerns illustrate how Washington's readiness to accept the deal with
Delhi has undermined its own credibility. A key ally is now wondering if it can
rely on a US-extended deterrent. In private discussions, Japan is now asking if
the US commitment to its protection is more solid than the pledge to
denuclearize the Korean Peninsula. What will Washington do after Korean
unification if another US ally - one with a history of enmity toward Japan -
has its own nuclear weapon?
The deal also further undercuts American credibility in Europe. Europeans ask,
"How can we take the United States seriously when it asks us not to transfer
conventional weapons and technologies to China, yet Washington flouts it own
commitments by offering [weapons of mass destruction] WMD-related technologies
and assistance to a country outside the global nonproliferation regime?"
European countries such as Austria, Norway, Ireland, the Netherlands, and
Switzerland initially opposed the US-India deal within the 45-member Nuclear
Suppliers Group (NSG), and could have scuttled the entire idea. But they came
under enormous pressure from the United States and India (as well as France,
Russia, and the United Kingdom) to let it go forward. In the end, these and
other countries acceded to the deal in a unanimous NSG decision, but that did
nothing to diminish the resentment and perplexity within certain quarters of
European capitals about US motivations and leadership on nonproliferation
matters.
More profoundly, many European officials and defense specialists see the
US-India deal as part of a broader effort to reshape the Asian balance of
power. Many of them believe the agreement is an attempt to forge a new
relationship with a regional power that ultimately aims at balancing China. The
perception that Washington is willing to use the NPT as a pawn in a
geostrategic game undermines US leadership and diminishes the status of the
NPT. Rather than serving as the cornerstone of the global nonproliferation
order, the NPT now looks like just another item in a great power's diplomatic
toolkit.
Debate on the US-India agreement has focused on its impact on India's nuclear
program and whether it strengthens the normative basis of the NPT by bringing a
longstanding objector under its purview. But attention must also be given to
the deal's impact on perceptions of US global leadership and reliability and
the credibility of the NPT itself, especially as the treaty nears its next
major review conference in 2010. The next US administration must pay close
attention to the way that this agreement is implemented. It cannot be seen as
lowering the bar on nuclear transactions either bilaterally or within
multilateral forums.
More generally, the next US administration must reassert its leadership in
nonproliferation matters. It must challenge the perception that proliferation
concerns have been subordinated to other priorities. Failure to do so will
undermine efforts to build consensus on nonproliferation - one of the top US
security concerns - while simultaneously encouraging other countries to follow
India's example.
Brad Glosserman (bradg@hawaii.rr.com) is executive director of
Pacific Forum CSIS, a Honolulu-based think-tank. Bates Gill (director@sipri.org)
is director of SIPRI, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.
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