Page 2 of 2 Keeping Pakistan's nukes extremist-free By Russ Wellen
army was not driven by religious fanaticism. Yes, it exhorted its soldiers to
embrace shaheed, or martyrdom, in the name of Allah. [But men] did not
go into battle dreaming of death."
She then cites Cloughley's recent book, War, Coups and Terror (Pen &
Sword Military, UK), in which he acknowledges that the Pakistan army includes
extremists. But he maintains that the promotions system which Musharraf
instituted ensures that officers are promoted on the basis of competence alone.
Still, Cloughley notes, some soldiers in the Federally Administered Tribal
Areas (FATA), concerned that dying in action
against Muslims cancels out their martyrdom, have refused to fight. Also,
predictably, they're on board with al-Qaeda and the Taliban's mission to oust
the infidels from Afghanistan.
Neither should we forget that not only the army, but much of the Pakistani
public, interprets the recent nuclear deal the United States signed with India
as further proof that the two countries are cozying up to each other to the
exclusion of Pakistan.
The Pakistani army's lack of trust for the United States was also addressed by
Arnaud de Borchgrave in a recent report for the Center for Strategic and
International Studies. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael
Mullen, he writes, said "he was stunned in early 2008 when he was invited to
speak to a group of 30 Pakistani war college students at the US Embassy in
Islamabad. The majority of the questions were about the Pressler amendment,
which was passed before most of the students were born."
In 1985, Republican Senator Larry Pressler sponsored an amendment which banned
economic and military aid to Pakistan unless the United States could certify
that Pakistan did not possess nuclear weapons. Once the United States was no
longer able to, president George H W Bush ended military exchanges with
Pakistan. De Borchgrave writes that "Anti-Americanism in Pakistan's officer
corps soon took root."
We asked Anand Gopal of the Christian Science Monitor the extent to which he
thinks that the Pakistani army and the ISI sympathize with and support
Islamists. "I think the sentiment is strongest with former military and ISI
officers," Gopal said. "Groups like these have a lot of support throughout
military and intelligence ranks, but I think that's more of a marriage of
convenience - Lashkar-e-Taiba is very useful strategically.
"More than a few times I've met whisky-swilling secular Pakistani military
folks who nonetheless have kind things to say about groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba
and Jaish-e-Mohammed. As far as [the late Taliban commander] Baitullah Mehsud's
group is concerned, it seems like the support, if any, comes from fringe
elements, foot soldiers, and former military officials, not from anyone in the
mainstream military command. On a related note, the US is pushing the UN to
declare some prominent ex-military officers and ex-ISI officials as
international terrorists."
Gopal continues: "At one time supporting Islamic insurgents was very much in
vogue and the mainstream of the Pakistani military was full of Islamist
sympathizers. After 9/11, the United States started pressuring the military and
intelligence to clean up their act and many of the biggest sympathizers went
into retirement."
However, he cautions: "Remember that in Pakistan the military pretty much
constitutes a sort of ruling class - they are the dominant political and
economic force in the country. So retired officers still held a lot of power
and were able to use their money, position and connections to help radical
elements."
What a jihadi strike on a nuke site might look like
Though it seemed like a distinct possibility when Benazir Bhutto was
assassinated in December 2007, the specter of Pakistan as a failed state looms
less large, at least for now. But jihadis need not seize the helm of the ship
of state - it's enough to seize control of a nuclear weapons site. (Or two -
Pakistan's nukes are broken down into components and stored at different
sites.)
Never fear, though - America's neo-conservatives are riding to the rescue.
Frederic Kagan and Michael O'Hanlon of the American Enterprise Institute and
the Brookings Institution respectively, unfurled their plan in the New York
Times.
"Somehow, American forces would have to team with Pakistanis to secure
critical sites and possibly to move the material to a safer place ... For the
United States, the safest bet would be shipping the material to someplace
like New Mexico ... More likely, we would have to settle for establishing a remote
redoubt within Pakistan, with the nuclear technology guarded by elite
Pakistani forces backed up (and watched over) by crack international troops."
(Emphasis added.)
First, the vagueness of "somehow" and "someplace" scarcely becomes individuals
who seek to be taken seriously as strategists. Second, using phrases like
"remote redoubt" and "crack international troops" is exactly what gets the
neo-cons accused of treating national security as a boys' adventure novel.
Worse, a remote redoubt in Pakistan, as shown earlier, is exactly where the
nuclear weapons would be most ripe for the picking.
Still, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice once stated that the United
States has formulated "contingency plans" to deal with the threat. In fact,
wrote Bruce at the Herald, "US special forces snatch squads are on standby to
seize or disable Pakistan's nuclear arsenal in the event of a collapse of
government authority."
Apparently privy to information others aren't, he added that they're "augmented
by volunteer scientists from America's Nuclear Emergency Search Team". His
"military sources" may be anonymous, but it's not illogical to assume that the
"snatch squads" (a term more typically heard in the United Kingdom) would trail
bomb sniffers in their wake.
Luongo reminds us, though, that "suggestions of this course of action are met
with vehement opposition from Pakistani officials". Indeed, according to
Gregory, Rice's words "were really only a rhetorical exercise aimed at
reassuring the American public". We also asked Cloughley about Rice's remarks.
"The remarks by Rice and others to the effect that the United States would send
in troops to secure the warheads and bombs were irresponsible to the point of
imbecility," he said. In fact, "they served to stiffen the resolve of Pakistan
to resist any effort that might be made.
"The Pakistan army would resist [US assistance] as it is already deeply
suspicious of the US and especially the US military - no matter what might be
claimed to the contrary by US officers. There have been discussions with
British and US experts concerning PAL [the permissive action link locking
devices] procedures, but there is no question of any foreign forces being
permitted to take control under any circumstances."
In the same Independent article cited earlier, Johann Hari wrote: "Every time
the US military has war-gamed sending in troops ... it has ended in a horrific
bloodbath - and the weapons still eluding their control."
Cloughley agrees: "It would, indeed, be a bloodbath if any attempt were made to
insert special forces. How anyone in their right mind could even suggest such a
scenario is beyond me."
Still, he continued, "In spite of its being lunacy, the attempt ... to
clandestinely insert special forces teams ... might well go ahead. This could
be done by having them join the embassy in the guise of marine guards, or be
accepted as part of a liaison or training mission, then, in civilian vehicles,
moving to the various sites to attempt to take them over.
"This could be concurrent with heliborne [air assault by helicopters] insertion
from Afghanistan or carrier(s). There would have to be a large number of teams,
but I'm not prepared to provide an assessment of how many.
"The helicopter operation would have to involve complete dominance of
Pakistan's airspace, mounted from Afghanistan and carriers from the Arabian
Sea/Indian Ocean. This would excite the attention of the Pakistan Air Force
which would attempt to deny control. The air war would be intense and end in
favor of the USAF/USN, although their casualties would be high.
"This would escalate into all-out war, and Pakistan would attempt to involve
the UN, which would be vetoed by the US and the UK. China and Russia, for once,
would join hands in condemnation. The entire Muslim world would go berserk.
"It is possible - just - that some weapons could be taken over, but the sites
are extremely well-guarded (although their ground-based air defenses are
minimal). Fighting would be intense, with already earmarked army units coming
to the aid of the guard units. By this time, the US Embassy would be under
siege and all foreigners' lives would be at grave risk. There would be chaos on
a very large scale indeed."
We asked Cloughley if there was any chance the United States would consider
intervening in the event Pakistan were on the verge of making first use of its
nuclear weapons against India.
"Not a hope," he replied. "Imagine world reaction."
Finally, we asked Professor Gregory of the PSRU what the best route to both
nuclear safety and sanity was for Pakistan?
"Pakistan's biggest problems," he replied, "continue to be (a) the
over-powerful role of the army/ISI and (b) that the army/ISI continue to
support terrorism/extremism as instruments of state policy. There can be no
meaningful progress for Pakistan until [this changes.]
"Outside agencies - like the United States, the United Kingdom and the European
Union - can keep up the pressure for this kind of change but ultimately it is
the people of Pakistan who must decide what they want Pakistan to be and what
role they want the army/ISI to play."
Russ Wellen writes about national security and nuclear deproliferation
for Scholars & Rogues and Huffington Post.
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