Page 2 of 2 Jihad goes intercontinental
By Walid Phares
Post-Mumbai
Inside the jihadi war room for the subcontinent, preparations are underway to
meet two forthcoming challenges. One is the decision by the Obama
Administration to send two additional divisions to Afghanistan. General David
Petraeus, chief of Central Command, and his fellow military strategists have
recommended a surge-type campaign to eradicate al-Qaeda and its allies from
inside most of the country and, with the help of other NATO forces, push the
Taliban hordes all the way back to the borders. The second jihadi worry is
possible military pressure on Waziristan from the Asif Ali Zardari government.
Logically, the Taliban/al-Qaeda Plan "C" will be to try to crumble both
offensives before they happen. Therefore, in war game scenarios, if you are the
jihadi, you would put all efforts possible to delay and weaken the forthcoming
NATO-led surge. How they
will go about accomplishing this is a good question. The terror network has
more than one tool at its disposal: rapid deterioration inside Afghanistan,
striking at NATO allies, disrupting NATO supply lines originating in Pakistan,
assassinations and even possible strikes on the American homeland, if they can.
But one other tool may also be considered: luring Washington into negotiations
with the Taliban. Already the propaganda machine of the jihadis from different
corners of the planet, including via its tentacles inside the Western media, is
pushing the idea that discussions with the "good Taliban" is a viable and
pragmatic option. Recently, a particular push for considering radical Islamism
as a "fact of life" to be recognized has materialized in a publicized Newsweek
article.
Painting the jihadis as credible partners in a peacemaking equation is, in
fact, part of a smart maneuver to gain time and delay US-led efforts to defeat
the network in Afghanistan. Ironically, similar moves were undertaken in
Pakistan. In order to delay Islamabad's new secular government in its
preparedness to confront the Taliban once and for all, good cop-bad cop tactics
are employed: suicide bombings target officials and civilians alike, while
offers for ceasefire from local Islamists shower the authorities.
The recent agreement of Malakand signed between Sufi Islam and Pakistani
authorities allowed the implantation of sharia in the province. The agreement
could have been used to the advantage of the Taliban to indoctrinate the youth,
recruit fighters and suicide bombers, repress civil society movements and
eradicate government presence. Just look at the Waziristan accord (2006) as an
example.
Another trap we should not allow ourselves to fall into is calling those who
are reconcilable the "good" Taliban or the "little" Taliban. We should avoid
assigning the label to armed opposition groups or other groups that may
associate with the Taliban on a small level. Just as it would have been a
strategic mistake to label the members of the Sahwa (Awakening Councils) in
Iraq little "q" al-Qaeda or "good" al-Qaeda - it would be quite the blunder to
consider as Taliban those who cooperate with the Taliban out of fear or those
that seek cooperation as a way to feed their family.
And as the stalling tactics are employed in Afghanistan and in Pakistan,
reverse moves will be executed in India. Unfortunately, the regional war room
more than likely will order terror activities on Indian soil to diminish the
will of the Pakistani government to go to Waziristan. If violence erupts on its
eastern border with India, Pakistan cannot be sending troops to battle the
Taliban on its western frontiers. Inflaming tensions between New Delhi and
Islamabad causes the latter to redeploy forces from the Federally Administered
Tribal Areas and North-West Frontier Province to the border with India, thereby
relieving military pressure the Taliban faces in northwest Pakistan. Thus Plan
"C" seems to announce waves of happenings in the sub-continent. What can and
should be done about it, remains the most important question.
Counter strategies
Any counter strategy design must being with the following affirmations:
That the threat is strategic and regional, not just local and legitimate.
That the counter strategies must put the confrontation of the regional threat
above all local considerations and issues.
That the United States and its allies operating out of Afghanistan are
determined to engage that threat with all the tools at their disposal and with
the largest alliance it can muster.
That Pakistan and India should realize that they are both targeted by the
jihadis regardless of their quarrels over ethno-territorial issues.
With these principles accepted, a global set of counter strategies can be set
to deal with al-Qaeda/Taliban and their jihadi nebulous in the sub-continent.
Afghanistan
The US-led NATO coalition should proceed with the reinforcement of the
expeditionary force to levels capable of insuring a full control of the
country's national soil; and at the same time a gigantic effort must be
mustered in three directions: training and equipping the Afghan Army and
Police, supporting a vast network of civil society non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) countrywide and reaching out to countries that haven't yet
participated in the post-9/11 counterterrorism campaign in Afghanistan, such as
Russia, India, China, Indonesia, Brazil and Nigeria, and invite them to join
the consortium in sectors of their choice. The further the campaign is
internationalized, the more jihadis will be isolated.
Engagement strategies
The US and NATO should not be dragged to the path of the so-called partnership
with jihadis to defeat other jihadis. In this game, the more ideological and
sophisticated factions always win. Instead, the international coalition must
engage the democratic forces and sustain them to win the intellectual and
political battle.
Pakistan
The present government must undertake a full reassessment of its past
strategies and reform its own forces so that it can ready itself to wage a
national mobilization, part of which will be on the military level, but the
most significant part must be on the popular and political levels. The campaign
to counter the terror forces can only be successful if large segments of the
population are engaged in the struggle against fundamentalism.
India
New Delhi, too, will have to reshape its plan to counter the jihadi strategies
in the region and on its soil. While the military and security engagement
against local terror groups will continue, Indian resources in the war of ideas
will have to be tapped. As a major economic and technological power in the
region, and now worldwide, India has the ability to open a new front against
radical ideologies with the help of linguistic, cultural and intellectual
skills, crucial to the battle. The establishment of a vast network of
television and radio broadcasts, NGOs and intelligence capability based on
Indian soil can weaken Islamist radicalism.
Last but not least, the vital cement of all the above strategies is their
integration and eventually fusion under one platform. If the United States,
NATO and other international partners can bring together the three
democratically-elected governments of the subcontinent - Afghanistan, Pakistan
and India (and perhaps Bangladesh) - under a unified and coordinated global
strategy, the jihadi forces will be isolated and gradually rolled back.
Dr Walid Phares is the director of the Future Terrorism Project at the
Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, a visiting scholar at the European
Foundation for Democracy and the author of The Confrontation: Winning
the War against Future Jihad. Dr Phares teaches global strategies at National
Defense University.
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