Britain's Afghan role in question By Kaveh L Afrasiabi
If only the United States would stop "wavering" and match Britain's resolve in
Afghanistan, progress would follow. This is the message being pushed by London
- reflected in a recent interview of British Foreign Secretary David Miliband
with the New York Times. [1] However, evidence suggests that British forces
could become a liability for US objectives in Afghanistan.
With 85 soldiers killed so far this year, the growing British casualty list
alone is an indication of the insurgency's sharp focus on British forces. It
seems the imperial legacy of Great Britain in Afghanistan - aptly narrated in
the Patrick Macrory classic Retreat from Kabul: The Catastrophic British Defeat
in Afghanistan, 1842 - makes British troops more of a target than their
US counterparts.
Fearful that history may be repeating itself, various British military
officials, pundits, and politicians are now warning of the country's imminent
"strategic defeat" in Afghanistan. Some blame the lack of a clear-cut British
strategy separate from that of the US, while others point a finger at US
President Barack Obama and his "wobbling," "wavering" and "lack of will". [2]
Intent on winning the current debate in Washington on "counter-insurgency"
versus "counter-terrorism" in favor of the former, the British government and
British media outlets have spared no effort in their attempts to influence US
decision-makers. The UK government even seems willing to resort to the type of
disinformation that was used to support the 2003 invasion of Iraq, which
included discredited intelligence reports of Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass
destruction.
Suspicions have been aroused by a report on the BBC's Newsnight program last
week claiming Washington had confirmed to Downing Street that the "substantial
increase" in US troops requested by top US commander in Afghanistan, General
Stanley McChrystal, would be approved. White House spokesman Robert Gibbs
quickly dismissed the report, saying "it's not true either generally or
specifically ... the president has not made a decision, and when he does, I
think that you can assume that the BBC will not be the first outlet for such a
decision."
Nonetheless, an apparent British focus on influencing policy at the Oval Office
remains undeterred, even though its new occupant is not as amenable to such
influence as his predecessor.
Obama and British Prime Minister Gordon Brown are unlikely ever to replicate
former premier Tony Blair's cozy ties with former president George W Bush. The
relationship is undermined by the Labour government's prominent support for the
Iraq invasion, as well as Britain's questionable performance in maintaining
stability in Basra, southern Iraq. A retired US army colonel, Peter Mansoor,
accused the British in September of "abdicating responsibility" in Basra before
their withdrawal in late 2007. [3]
The confidential British report partially leaked to the press in September
claiming the British faced a similar debacle in Afghanistan is in marked
contrast to comments made in the summer by the top British commander in
Afghanistan, Brigadier Mark Carleton-Smith. He triumphantly told the world's
media that the insurgents in Afghanistan "are on the brink of defeat".
Leading the British charge for more US troops in Afghanistan, Brown has even
crossed the lines in terms of diplomatic protocol by publicly backing
McChrystal during a recent tour of Kabul. McChrystal has requested some 40,000
additional troops for the mission in Afghanistan and has warned of dire
consequences if this does not materialize.
Given that officials including Vice President Joseph Biden have stated
reservations over McChrystal's request and that Obama has distanced himself
from the general, perhaps Brown should take steps to avoid the impression that
he is a Washington lobbyist.
Prime Minister Brown earlier this month gave the go-ahead "in principle" for
the deployment of an additional 500 British troops to Afghanistan, taking the
total UK force in the country to 9,500. However, he said the reinforcements
were dependent on a series of conditions being met - including that they be
fully equipped. Nor did he indicate when the deployment would take place.
It is not entirely clear that the US strategy in Afghanistan would necessarily
benefit from more British troops - on the contrary, there are reasons to
believe the opposite. Firstly, while the US can capitalize on the collective
Afghan memory of US support against the Soviet Union during the 1980s, negative
perceptions of Britain's colonial legacy in Afghanistan only serve the
insurgents' interests.
Many people in the region also blame the British forces for the failure of the
anti-narcotics campaign after the 2001 invasion and occupation of Afghanistan,
as they ran the program. Since 2001, Afghanistan's narco-economy has grown into
a monstrous tumor that feeds the insurgency as well as an international network
of criminals. As of yet there has been no objective assessment of the
British-run anti-narcotics campaign in 2001-2007, during which poppy seed
production rose exponentially.
Another factor undermining the British presence in Afghanistan is the UK's
tense relations with Iran. Tehran has accused London of meddling in Iran's
post-election unrest [4] and of aiding an insurgent group, Jundallah, which
recently launched attacks on Iran's Revolutionary Guards Corps. Tehran's
animosity toward British forces in Afghanistan could easily translate into
operational support for Afghan insurgents willing to concentrate on attacking
British forces.
"The British government blames Iran for its debacle in southern Iraq, and knows
well that Iran is quite capable of considerable 'mischief' in Afghanistan,
partly because of its strong connection with warlords who stayed in Iran during
the era of Soviet occupation of Afghanistan," a Tehran University political
scientist told the author.
"If Iran concludes that its interests dictate taking a sharp turn against the
British in Afghanistan, that could change the regional calculations," he said.
Britain feels slighted by its perceived exclusion from talks on Iran's nuclear
program, while France and Russia have come to the fore. London is also unhappy
that no nation has matched its unilateral increase in sanctions on Iran - a ban
on trade with Iran's Bank Melli and the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping
Lines.
Principally because of Britain's stance on Iran, Tehran is unwilling to budge
on the idea of a North Atlantic Treaty Organization supply corridor to
Afghanistan via Iran. Nor is it willing to resume cooperation with the US on
Afghanistan that was in place during 2001-2003. There is a link between Iran's
nuclear crisis and the regional crises, and should current talks fail - and the
British, Americans and others opt for more heat on Tehran - then Iran will
likely hit back in Afghanistan.
There are glimmers of hope regarding the Iran nuclear issue and US-Iran
cooperation in Afghanistan, but stumbling blocks remain and a British
imperialism apparently intent on resurrecting its lost glories would be a major
one.
Kaveh L Afrasiabi, PhD, is the author of After Khomeini: New
Directions in Iran's Foreign Policy (Westview Press) . For his Wikipedia entry,
click here. His
latest book,
Reading In Iran Foreign Policy After September 11 (BookSurge Publishing
, October 23, 2008) is now available.
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