BOOK REVIEW A new political
mask Thaksin - The Business of
Politics in Thailand by Pasuk Phongpaichit
and Chris Baker
Reviewed by Marwaan
Macan-Markar
BANGKOK - It is becoming an act of
courage in Thailand to fire a volley of criticism at
Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, or the wealthy empire
over which his family presides.
Some who have dared to do
so since Thaksin's party swept into power in 2001 have
ended up facing the brunt of a government that enjoys
unprecedented political power and, to a large extent,
popularity.
The victims who have fallen by the
roadside because of the belief they were doing their bit
as citizens of a democracy are an eclectic mix. They
included academics, bureaucrats, journalists and
grass-roots activists. Some were fired from their jobs;
some were bullied into silence; some were quietened by
other means, such as money.
So is Thai democracy
a pantomime? Is the country's democracy just as fake as
the counterfeit products found in abundance near
Patpong, the famed red-light district here?
These troubling questions are what Thais, at
least in Bangkok, appear to be grappling with seven
years after a new constitution was unveiled with much
promise that it was written to deepen and spread the
spirit of democracy.
And it is against this
backdrop that a new book was launched in Bangkok this
month, Thaksin - The Business of Politics in
Thailand. The book seeks to unravel some of the
reasons why this sense of angst is spreading among
sections of Thailand's intelligentsia and the political
cognoscente by exploring the ways in which Thaksin is
changing the country's political landscape.
In
his three years as prime minister, Thaksin has come to
symbolize the new face of politics that has emerged in
Thailand since the adoption of the 1997 constitution,
the 16th such document since the country abolished the
absolute monarchy in 1932.
What is more, the
authors, Pasuk Phongpaichit, an economist at Bangkok's
Chulalongkorn University, and Chris Baker, a
Cambridge-educated scholar, are a perfect team to offer
such insight about a man who is unique among Southeast
Asian leaders - a business tycoon named among the
world's billionaires by Forbes magazine.
They
have teamed up before for three previous books, all of
which provide a critical assessment of Thailand's
political and economic landscape.
Their research
brings to the fore aspects of Thaksin's past that
explain the reasons behind some of his strong views -
development is more important than democracy, for
instance - and why the language he speak resonates with
a large portion of Thais.
In the process, of
course, some of the myths Thaksin created for greater
appeal - including that he comes from humble origins -
were exposed. Indeed, Thaksin was born into a wealthy
family with powerful military and political connections.
His Chinese migrant ancestors, the basis of his humble
roots, actually did him a favor by laying the groundwork
through a range of businesses (including silk) for him
to build on.
But while his early years may not
have marked him out, Thailand's future prime minister
demonstrated that he wanted to pursue a different path
from his family as a young adult.
Though he
chose to join the police and then the army, as his other
relatives had done, the authors point out in one of the
numerous gems studded throughout the book, Thaksin had
"little expectation of a future in government service".
He was more interested in a career as a businessman.
One of the most captivating sections of the book
looks at the streak that has prevailed in Thaksin from
the time of his youth until today: to persevere, to take
risks, to never take no for an answer.
That he
went about building himself up as a businessman while
still working as a police officer was of little worry to
him. During this time, he opened a silk shop,
distributed films and built an apartment block, all
ventures that ended in failure and left him in debt.
By the time he turned his attention to
telecommunications, Thaksin had acquired skills that
helped him on the road to wealth. He had learned how
government officials and the business community struck
deals for mutual benefit and discovered the key to
success in Thailand: knowing "a lot of people".
"Between 1988 and 1991, Thaksin had been
transformed from [the] owner of a struggling computer
leasing business into a major entrepreneur in government
concession [namely telecommunications]," the book
states.
The billion-dollar empire he built,
including a huge chunk of the mobile phone market, also
helped shape another trait Thaksin has become known for
- his obsession with economic growth as a priority, even
at the expense of democracy.
That aspect of the
narrative helps explain why when he launched his own
political party Thai Rak Thai (Thais Love Thai) in July
1998, he was a hit among the class of business people
who wanted to take control of Thailand's politics.
Bankers, property developers, industrialists and
entertainment moguls all signed on to support him.
Moreover, the language Thaksin was speaking
appeared a perfect antidote to a business community that
had taken a heavy beating during the 1997 financial
crisis.
The "new politics" he was advocating
also made inroads into a sector that had largely been
ignored or marginalized by the Thai political
establishment up to that point - the rural poor.
Pasuk and Baker do credit Thaksin for breaking
new ground here by not only offering policies to
alleviate the suffering of the poor, but by delivering
on his promises soon after his party won the largest
parliamentary majority in Thailand's history.
What followed, however, reveals why
disenchantment with Thaksin began to surface, though not
immediately. The authors elaborate at times with
forensic precision how the Thaksin administration went
about mixing business and politics as if the term
"conflict of interest" was non-existent.
The
measures Thaksin began to pursue limited the space
available for dissent, disregarded human rights and
molded society with an appeal to nationalism; disturbing
for Thais who had hoped they were on the road to a new
democracy.
Some of Thaksin's arguments, the
authors point out, hark back to the views echoed by the
military dictators who ruled Thailand for decades.
"Thaksin constructed a mix of Western social
contract theory and modernist Buddhism to argue that
'good' disinterested leadership justified itself, and
that all opposition was by definition illegitimate," the
book states.
Sadly, what the book lacks is a
chapter explaining why the majority of Thais appear to
be happy with their leader, despite what his critics
say. (Although there is increasing evidence that
cronyism and human-rights abuses have worsened under his
watch, it seems likely that Thaksin will comfortably win
upcoming elections in January.)
By not stepping
back and trying to locate Thaksin within the bigger
picture, the authors have avoided examining how Thai
traits, such as its patron-client system, people's
unhealthy reverence for rich over poor and the
acceptance of corruption, have to shoulder blame for
aiding the Thaksin phenomenon.
Nevertheless,
that is a minor flaw in a book that is helping to
pioneer a new political literature dealing with the man
who deserves to be closely watched in Southeast Asia,
since he has announced his intention of staying in power
for years to come.
Thaksin: The Business of
Politics in Thailand by Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris
Baker. Silkworm Books, Thailand. ISBN: 974-9575-55-5,
301 pages, price 595 baht (US$14).
Some who have dared to do
so since Thaksin's party swept into power in 2001 have
ended up facing the brunt of a government that enjoys
unprecedented political power and, to a large extent,
popularity. 
