Indonesian military - the powers that
be By Richel Langit
JAKARTA -
At a glance, it seems Indonesia's powerful military
finally has completed its reform campaign by withdrawing
from politics completely. On Thursday, the 38 members of
the military/police faction, which has dominated the
country's political life for over the past 40 years,
officially quit the People's Consultative Assembly and
the House of Representatives.
A closer look at
the departure, however, makes the military's so-called
political withdrawal appear as a tactical retreat rather
than a complete abandoning of political life. The
election of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono as the country's
next president also is evidence that the military's
departure from politics is far from complete.
The military's long-awaited departure from the
country's two highest legislative bodies and regional
legislatures nationwide caps a series of reforms the
Indonesian Military (TNI) has undertaken since the
downfall of former strongman Suharto in May 1998.
Demands for the TNI to return to their barracks
and become professional soldiers forced the military in
1998 to scrap their territorial and socio-political
roles by abolishing the military chiefs' territorial and
socio-political commands.
The so-called
territorial function allowed the military to deploy
troops down to the district level, where for more than
three decades they were mobilized to coerce the people
into supporting Suharto's iron-fisted leadership.
Their socio-political role, on the other hand,
paved the way for active military officers to engage in
practical politics. Often, civilian politicians
contesting general elections were forced to undergo
screening by military personnel to determine whether
they were involved in the outlawed Indonesian Communist
Party. In practice, the screening often was used to get
rid of Suharto's critics and potential challengers. The
military was then used by Suharto as a tool to suppress
his political opponents.
Realizing its mistake,
the military embarked on reforming its role within the
legislature in 1998 by first scrapping its territorial
and political roles. The military's exit from the
legislative bodies will complete the reform process.
Already the 38 members of the military/police
faction in both the Assembly and the House have made
farewell speeches. During the recently concluded annual
Assembly session, they thanked their fellow lawmakers
for the cooperation and help extended to them during
their political stints.
But before dissolving
into oblivion, the House, including the military/police
faction members, endorsed the new military bill, which
allows active military officers to take up civilian
posts in the Coordinating Ministry of Political and
Security Affairs, the Defense Ministry, the president's
Military Secretariat Office, the national resilience
agency, state intelligence, state code, the National
Defense Council, state search and rescue, the national
narcotics agency and even the Attorney General's Office.
Initially the bill, which was jointly
deliberated by the House and the government, proposed
that active military officers be allowed to occupy
civilian posts in the bureaucracy, but the House
rejected the idea. In the final draft, both the House
and the government agreed that active military officers
may fill civilian posts that require military
capability.
The bill also places the military
directly under the president, putting it on par with
cabinet ministries. The proposal by military observers
and some factions in the House to place the military
under the Defense Ministry was rejected by the
government, which was represented by the Coordinating
Ministry of Political and Security Affairs, the Defense
Ministry and the TNI itself. Such a high position will
allow the military to intervene and influence government
policies, including political decisions.
While
the bill places the TNI under the president, the head of
state has little say in the deployment of troops across
the country. One of the articles, for example,
stipulates that in deploying military personnel and
using military force, the TNI is accountable to the
president only after the fact; the TNI does not ask
permission from the president to deploy troops, it only
reports its actions after the decision has been made.
This vague article will give leeway to the
military to act on its own without necessarily informing
or asking permission from the head of state. This will
also give room to the military to reinstate its
territorial role, allowing it to engage in practical
politics at the regional level.
The bill also
fails to state explicitly that the TNI has to seek
permission or approval from the president, who by
constitution is the chief commander of Indonesia's armed
forces, in deploying and using military force.
Prior to the first round of the presidential
election on July 5, TNI chief General Endriartono
Sutarto issued a ruling withdrawing all active military
officers from civilian posts, including some from the
Coordinating Ministry of Political and Security Affairs.
Existing regulations also stipulate that military
personnel wishing to occupy civilian posts have to
resign from the military service.
To highlight
further the military's distance from politics, Sutarto
banned military personnel from casting their votes in
the three elections held in the country since April.
Interestingly, the House and the government
rushed to finish deliberating the bill after Yudhoyono,
a retired four-star army general, emerged as the clear
winner of the country's first-ever direct presidential
election. Yudhoyono, whose political advisers are mostly
retired military generals, is heading for a landslide
victory over incumbent Megawati Sukarnoputri.
The bill's deliberations started in the fourth
week of August and had appeared to head for a deadlock
until results of the September 20 runoff trickled in,
showing Yudhoyono far ahead of Megawati. With more than
110 million ballots counted so far, Yudhoyono, who
campaigned for change and security stability, already
has 60.9% of the vote, compared with Megawati's 39%.
More than 153 million people registered for the runoff,
of whom some 125 million were believed to have cast
their votes.
But though he is headed for a
landslide victory, Yudhoyono does not have the necessary
political machinery to support his policies. His
Democratic Party and its allies have slightly over 60
seats out of 550 in the House while the opposition
controls more than 300 seats in the House. Chances are
that the opposition will use its strength to shoot down
virtually all proposals and initiatives introduced by
Yudhoyono's administration.
In the meantime,
expectations are running high for Yudhoyono to resolve
Indonesia's multidimensional crises that have plagued
the country since 1997. The pressure is now high for
Yudhoyono to fulfill his campaign pledges to restore
peace and order and bring the country out of its
economic doldrums.
Such a hostile condition is
likely to force Yudhoyono to turn to the military for
political support. There is no doubt that the military,
which has controlled the country's political life for
the past 40 years, continues to be the most influential
entity in Indonesia. Aligning himself with the military
appears to be necessary for Yudhoyono's political
survival. However, such a backing would not come without
political concessions on the part of Yudhoyono.
As the House endorses the new military bill,
which will automatically take effect one month from
Thursday's approval, with or without the president's
signature, active military officers are ready to take up
civilian posts in strategic government offices and
high-ranking state institutions. Judging from their past
actions, it is hard to imagine that military officers
active in the government would refrain from influencing
state policies issued by the Yudhoyono administration.
So despite the military's departure from the
Assembly and the House, as mandated by the amended 1945
constitution, the TNI as an institution is ready to
influence the government, and thus the country's
political life, from within the government itself.
Moreover, the TNI's departure from the country's two
highest legislative bodies should not be understood as a
complete withdrawal from politics but a tactical retreat
to tighten its grip on Indonesia's political life. It is
not surprising, therefore, that the national media paid
little attention to the military/police faction's
farewell speeches.
Richel Langit is a
freelance journalist based in Jakarta. She covers
various topics including education, health, the
environment and political issues. She worked as a
reporter for the Manila Times in the Philippines for
five years before moving to the Indonesian capital in
1999.
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