Indonesia's appetite for arms grows
By Frida Berrigan
Jakarta wants weapons. Lots of them.
Right after Valentine's Day, Indonesian Air Force officials met with their US
counterparts to discuss "bilateral defense cooperation". On their wish list
were Lockheed Martin's F-16 fighters and C-130 Hercules tactical transport
planes. There will be more defense talks in April between the two countries as
they step up military cooperation.
The US and Indonesia "normalized" military relations in 2005, ending a 10-year
period during which Jakarta was essentially barred from receiving most forms of
US weapons sales and
military aid and training because of its military’s human rights abuses and
corruption.
Jakarta is happy to be back in Washington’s good graces. The US Defense
Secretary dropped by for a visit on February 25 and praised Indonesia as a
"huge Islamic country, democratic, secular", before continuing to say: "I think
strengthening our relationship with Indonesia is very important, not just in a
regional context, but I think in terms of the role that Indonesia may be able
to play more broadly." But its military is carefully courting other weapons
suppliers so it is not again dependent on a single source.
Looking to Moscow
When Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Jakarta in September 2007,
weapons were at the top of the agenda. Moscow extended US$1 billion in loans
for weapons and in December, Indonesia picked up medium and short-range
missiles, aerial bombs, and other systems. In 2003, Indonesia bought Russian
fighter planes and other hardware as part of a $192 million package of weapons,
and Moscow let its new friend pay most of the tab with palm oil. Jakarta’s
military is now hoping for more - including 20 fighter planes, six submarines,
air defense systems, helicopters, boats, and other systems that could add up to
about $3 billion.
Washington is watching this new friendship with a wary eye. Throughout the Cold
War, the US counted on Indonesia as a staunch anti-communist and friend.
General Suharto ruled the archipelago with an iron fist and an avaricious eye
for more than 30 years.
Jakarta's rearmament push comes as Indonesia wrestles with Suharto's bloody
legacy following his death in January at the age of 86. The former leader was
given the burial of a statesman, and his legacy was burnished to a high gloss.
"Though there may be some controversy over his legacy," eulogized US Ambassador
Cameron Hume. "President Suharto was a historic figure who left a lasting
impression on Indonesia and the region of Southeast Asia."
The "controversy" includes Transparency International’s 2004 assertion that
Suharto was the "world’s greatest kleptocrat ever" with a fortune of $35
billion or more stolen from the Indonesian people. Other controversial issues
include mass killings. His extermination of between 400,000 and one million
suspected communists as he moved to seize power in 1965 and 1966 stands out in
its brutality. There was also the 1975 invasion of East Timor, the Santa Cruz
Massacre in 1991, and much more. Suharto was labeled "one of the worst mass
murderers of the 20th century", by the East Timor and Indonesia Action Network
(ETAN).
Throughout the Suharto regime and since, Jakarta enjoyed the full support of
the US. Most of Indonesia’s weapons came from the US, their officers graduated
from US academies, and the two militaries conducted joint exercises. Jakarta
was almost completely dependent on Washington for its military strength.
Additionally, Jakarta’s generals developed a strong preference for US weapons.
Thus, the congressionally mandated checks on weapons sales and military aid
effectively hamstrung the Indonesian military and sent it a strong message that
it must reform. But pressure from military officials from both countries and
the political exigencies of the war on terrorism successfully weakened and
eventually undermined Washington’s willingness to use its influence to demand
that the Indonesian military respect human rights and eliminate corruption.
Strengthened ties
Normalization of military ties between the United States and Indonesia in late
2005 was accompanied by State Department assurances that "the United States
remains committed to pressing for accountability for past human rights abuses
and US assistance will continue to be guided by Indonesia’s progress on
democratic reform and accountability”.
The guides seem to have lost their map. This year, over the objections of the
State Department, Congress withheld $2.7 million - a fraction of US foreign
military financing - until the State Department could demonstrate that
Indonesia was taking steps to hold members of the military accountable for
human rights violations and implement "reforms to increase the transparency and
accountability of their operations and financial management". John M Miller,
national coordinator of ETAN, reacted to this attempt to influence Jakarta by
saying "withholding this small portion of military aid is an inadequate stick,
but it serves to keep up appearances. The Indonesian government looks like it
is trying, but the Indonesian military correctly interprets it as a token
gesture. The military gets what it wants without concretely changing how it
does business or losing its impunity."
Meanwhile, Washington nearly tripled Foreign Military Financing (FMF) for
Indonesia. In 2006, FMF totaled $990,000, jumping to $6.5 million in 2007. The
request for 2008 is $15.7 million. ETAN reacted in a statement at the time: "We
see no dramatic change in the Indonesian military’s conduct over the past year
to warrant such a generous increase."
But this is just the beginning of what the US is providing to Indonesia. Under
a little-noticed Pentagon program known as "train and equip authority" or
"Section 1206", Washington gave Indonesia another $18.4 million in 2006 to
procure coastal radar stations, and improved air and sea surveillance
capabilities. In 2007, "1206" funding totaled $28.7 million and was used to
beef up radar and communications equipment for the Indonesian navy and coast
guard. For 2008, details have not been released, but funding is expected to be
comparable.
The Global Train and Equip program is designed to help armed forces address
regional terrorism problems, while bypassing the normal State Department
channels for aid. In 2006, the Pentagon doled out a total of $200 million to
foreign militaries through this program. Now the Defense Department is seeking
to increase "1206" authority to $750 million and make the program permanent.
Military aid is not the only thing pouring in. In 2005, the State Department
authorized Jakarta for $51 million in licenses for weaponry, defense articles,
and services. The next year, the State Department issued licenses for more than
$100 million in military hardware including spare parts for fighters, cargo
planes and helicopters, explosives and torpedo launchers were issued. Not all
licenses are exercised, but the list gives a sense of Indonesia’s voracious
appetite for weapons.
Why so many weapons?
Washington hopes that by bulking up Indonesia’s military capacities it can help
the nation counter terrorism and emerge as a regional leader able to thwart
North Korea’s nuclear ambitions and deter China’s aggressive military build-up.
That’s what Secretary Gates means when he talks about the “role that Indonesia
may be able to play more broadly” and that’s why Washington is so threatened by
the way Russian President Putin has reached out to Jakarta.
So, Washington dangles F-16s to make its sweeping vision of Indonesia's
strategic importance a reality. But, in the past, US-originated weapons,
military know-how and aid were not used to achieve lofty political aims. They
were turned on Indonesian citizens active in the multiple movements for
self-determination and autonomy in far-flung regions like Aceh, Papua, and
Timor. They were used to put down political demonstrations and quell unrest
after economic collapse destroyed the livelihoods of hundreds of thousands.
The checks on US military aid are gone, and now the floodgates have opened.
Political and military officials need to watch what Jakarta does next very
carefully. Human rights, broad political participation, secular democracy, and
regional leadership do not spring fully formed from the belly of an F-16 or the
barrel of a gun.
FPIF columnist Frida Berrigan is a senior program associate at the Arms
and Security Project of the New America Foundation.
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