Manhunt is on for Mekong Robin Hood By Brian McCartan
CHIANG MAI - A shootout on the Mekong River between Myanmar's army and a rebel
militia killed one and injured three Chinese sailors and motivated a manhunt
that involved the security forces of four nations. The mid-February incident
underlined the still-lawless nature of the notorious drug-producing Golden
Triangle, where Myanmar, Laos and Thailand meet and where China is making
strong trade and investment inroads.
The ethnic Shan rebel Naw Kham, 48, the target of the manhunt, is a former
member of drug lord Khun Sa's Mong Tai Army and current leader of the Hawngleuk
militia, known to be active around the Myanmar border town of Tachilek.
Naw Kham is wanted dead or alive by certain regional
governments and stands accused by Western counter-narcotics officials for drug
trafficking. Yet he remains immensely popular among many of the Golden
Triangle's poor rural residents, who see him as a sort of modern-day Robin Hood
for his daring attacks on rich Chinese commercial interests.
As a government-sanctioned militia leader, he was known to have close contacts
with certain factions of Myanmar's army, particularly the divisions responsible
for the remote Shan State. Those contacts included ties to Major General Ko Ko,
previously commander of the Tachilek area in the late 1990s and currently chief
of the army's Bureau of Special Operations Number 3, which is responsible for
the Pegu and Irrawaddy Divisions.
Those top-level connections haven't always been enough to protect his
interests. On January 10, 2006, in what the Myanmar government at the time
referred to as a "successful operation", Naw Kham's compound in Tachilek was
raided. A large stash of methamphetamine pills and production equipment, as
well as a cache of 150 weapons and ammunition, were seized.
Thai and Chinese anti-narcotics officials provided intelligence for the sting
operation, according to Myanmar officials who held a press conference after the
raid. That wasn't enough, however, to actually nab Naw Kham, who, presumably
with the help of his Myanmar military connections, was tipped off to the raid
and not in residence when officials converged on his compound.
He later regrouped with his militia members to a Golden Triangle area closer to
the Mekong River. In 2007, his militia began to levy a protection "tax" on
boats traveling along the waterway, as well as overland transport through the
remote areas he controlled. Naw Kham has consistently claimed he serves the
non-ceasefire Shan State Army-South (SSA-S), but this has been denied by the
group's leader, Yord Serk.
According to a report by the Shan Herald Agency for News (SHAN), an exile-run
news group internationally renowned for its coverage of the drug trade, Naw
Kham's group collected 5,000 baht (US$141) per kilogram of heroin and 2.5 to
three Thai baht per pill of methamphetamine, as well as taxes on legitimate
commercial goods.
By 2007, the Myanmar government had eased its pursuit and Naw Kham was,
according to Western counter-narcotics officials, maintaining houses near
Tachilek in Myanmar, in Laos' Bokeo province as well as near Chiang Saen in
Thailand's northern Chiang Rai province. "Sure the [Myanmar military] helped
him," claims SHAN editor Khunsai Jaiyen. "Naw Kham's group was too small to
operate in the tri-border area without protection."
Naw Kham's extortion activities have won him some powerful enemies. According
to a Western counter-narcotics analyst with extensive knowledge of drug
trafficking activities in the area, Naw Kham had started to confiscate drug
shipments that he was paid to protect and on-sold the narcotics for his own
profit. That is known to have peeved the United Wa State Army (UWSA), the
largest drug trafficking organization in Myanmar, situated along both the
Chinese and Thai borders. The UWSA is known in 2008 to have sent a contingent
to confront him, but were apparently blocked by the Myanmar Army.
Chinese enemy
Naw Kham is known to have made an even more powerful enemy in Beijing. A string
of shootings of mostly Chinese cargo vessels on a stretch of the Mekong near
the Golden Triangle in early 2008 culminated in an attack in February on a
Chinese maritime police patrol boat, the Jang Guojong 007. Three Chinese
police officers were seriously injured in the attack which the Myanmar exile
media, as well as Lao and Thai government sources, say was the work of Naw
Kham's militia.
Several reasons, none of them confirmed, were put forward for the attack. They
include: the protection of illegal drug shipments; retaliation against another
drug trafficking organization for using the patrol boat to transport narcotics
down river and undercut Naw Kham's enterprise; as a warning to Chinese
businessmen building a casino in nearby Tonpheung on the Laotian side of the
river to pay his militia protection money; or to steal outright money being
transported by the boat to the multi-million dollar casino project.
Whatever the reason, Western counter-narcotics officials say Beijing was
infuriated about the incident and put strong diplomatic pressure on the Lao,
Thai and Myanmar governments to capture Naw Kham. A source close to the Lao
government said that Lao leaders were displeased by the attack, which caused
Vientiane to lose face since the attack occurred on Laos' stretch of the
Mekong.
The Myanmar government, some say bowing to Chinese pressure, staged on February
18 another attack on Naw Kham's militia. The events surrounding the Mekong
firefight are still murky, but what is known is that four Chinese cargo boats
were stopped by Naw Kham's men at an island in the river and ordered to pay
protection money. Soon thereafter, soldiers from the Myanmar army's Light
Infantry Battalions 359 and 526 situated in Tachilek attacked Naw Kham's
militia members.
During the firefight one of the Chinese boats was hit by either a
rocket-propelled grenade or a grenade fired by a M79 grenade launcher. Four
Chinese on the boat were wounded, one of whom later died of his injuries. The
Myanmar military, associates of Naw Kham and individuals who claim to be
witnesses to the fight, give conflicting accounts about who fired the grenade.
What seemed more clear from the incident was that certain Myanmar army
officials were given marching orders to stop protecting Naw Kham.
Some analysts say that Chinese pressure on the Myanmar, Lao and Thai
governments had been building steadily since the 2008 patrol boat attack. They
suggest that plans for this year's counterattack were hatched at a February 7
meeting between Myanmar and Thai security officials, which may also have been
attended by Chinese representatives. The Bangkok Post, a Thai English-language
daily, reported that Chinese police had joined both Myanmar and Lao security
forces in the chase.
Naw Kham escaped the initial attack, which killed five of his men, but the
ensuing manhunt is believed to have decimated his organization. According to
SHAN, as of February 24, at least 34 of his men had been arrested by Myanmar
soldiers and police. Others are believed to have fled to Laos, where according
to sources in the area they were either killed or arrested by Lao security
forces.
Myanmar's army chief of staff General Thura Shwe Mann, the number three ranking
official in the ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), made a
two-day visit on February 24 to Laos, where security was reportedly at the top
of the agenda in talks with Lao President Choummaly Sayasone and Minister for
National Defense Lieutenant General Duangchay Phichit.
Jungle gang
Naw Kham's militia, with at most 50 men and their family members, was run more
like a gang than a fighting force. Yet he is known to have received generous
support from villagers and influential businessmen in Myanmar, Laos and
Thailand who are believed to have benefited from his drug trafficking
activities. With his ability to move and operate in an area patrolled by three
sovereign countries, he almost certainly also received protection from certain
Myanmar, Lao and/or Thai security officials.
Some of that support arose from Naw Kham's charisma and business savvy; his
extortion rackets and drug trafficking activities are believed to have
generated rich profits. More significantly, he was able to tap a growing
undercurrent of resentment about China's growing commercial influence in the
Mekong region. Many villagers in the area were happy to see him "tax" Chinese
cargo vessels, which often carried products that undercut the price of their
local foods and wares.
He is known to have a particular following in the Tonpheung district in Laos'
northwestern Bokeo province, where a huge Chinese casino and hotel project has
forced many from their homes with little or no compensation. As an added
insult, the Chinese company responsible for the project imported Chinese
workers for the project instead of hiring displaced and underemployed local
villagers.
Some say the displaced villagers saw Naw Kham as the only way to challenge the
Chinese investors, who are working hand-in-hand with the Lao government through
a concession arrangement. Sources along the border say that villagers have
supported some of Naw Kham's operations, including allegedly the 2008 attack on
the Chinese patrol boat. According to SHAN's Khunsai, the gunmen were Naw
Kham's in that particular incident, but they were given back-up support from
Lao villagers.
They are battling against big money interests. The four-star, 689-room hotel
and casino is being constructed by the Kings Romans Group Co Ltd (also known as
the Dokngiewkham Company) and is expected to open in the coming months and be
fully operational by 2010. Provincial vice governor Amphone Chanhthasomboun
told the Vientiane Times in August that the project would cost about US$300
million, although other in-the-know sources predict the project is worth closer
to $200 million.
The casino and hotel are only the start of a Chinese-financed new town on the
Mekong, situated around 46 kilometers northwest of the provincial capital of
Huay Xai. A 827-hectare concession, granted by the Lao government in 2007,
gives the Chinese company rights for 50 years with an option to extend for an
additional 25 years.
The Lao government retains a 20% share in the so-called "economic zone", which
will entail 47 projects, including hotels, golf courses, shopping centers,
schools, universities, hospitals and water systems. The entire project is
slated for completion in 2018 and will include investment of $2.2 billion. Huay
Xai's rundown airfield is also scheduled to be upgraded to an international
airport as part of the broad scheme.
The enterprise, some in Laos fear, will be similar to Boten in Laos' Luang Nam
Tha province, where Lao villagers were forcibly displaced and now live in a
shantytown to make way for a Chinese-invested casino, hotel and shopping area
populated almost exclusively by Chinese visitors. What happened at Boten is
well known in Bokeo province and has fueled resentment against Chinese in
northern Laos, where growing numbers of migrants are settling and seen to be
dominating business opportunities.
Local resentment over Chinese investment and settlement has been compounded by
China's controversial control over the upper reaches of the Mekong, where
Beijing has erected a series of dams that environmentalists say has adversely
altered the river's flow. Locals claim that water levels are adequate when
Chinese vessels are scheduled to travel down the river, but are lower when Thai
vessels attempt to make the trip upstream. Chinese officials counter that only
18% of the Mekong's flow originates in China and so its dams do not
significantly affect downstream water levels.
The Mekong has in recent years become a profitable transportation route between
northern Thailand and China's otherwise remote and landlocked southwestern
Yunnan province. The river route became economically viable after the dredging
and blasting of river rapids in Laos and Myanmar in 2004. China sees the route
as an outlet for manufactured goods from Yunnan and to import agricultural
products and fuel from Thailand. Although a faster land route linking China and
Thailand through northwestern Laos was completed last year, the lack of a
bridge across the Mekong means that the river route is still profitable.
It will likely be more so with Naw Kham's extortion racket driven out of the
area. Naw Kham is still at large and was always a small player in a region
increasingly being driven by big powers. Yet he captured the imagination of
many locals fuming over the perceived exploitative nature of growing Chinese
investments in the Golden Triangle area.
And in such an environment, even hit-and-run characters like Naw Kham can take
on the stature of local folk hero.
Brian McCartan is a Chiang Mai-based freelance journalist. He may be
reached at brianpm@comcast.net.
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